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RACE, POLITICS AND INDIAN LAW
ABSTRACT
[F]rom the very moment the general government came into
existence to this time, it has exercised its power over this
unfortunate race in the spirit of humanity and justice, and has
endeavoured by every means in its power to enlighten their
minds and increase their comforts, and to save them if possible
from the consequences of their own vices.1
In 1846, in United States v. Rogers, the Supreme Court blithely
announced the above vision of the history of Indian-United States
relations. The first part of the quote describes Indian people as a
race and an inferior one; the second part describes a positive and
paternal federal relationship to this race. As even the most casual
student of American Indian history knows, this vision was more
fantasy than reality, more desire than description. Although such
fantasies are commonplace in Indian history, in this case the
statement signaled a shift in federal Indian law and policy,
heralding a move from viewing Indian tribes as sovereign govern-
ments to viewing them as collections of individuals bound together
by ethnicity. As governments, tribes posed a legal barrier to federal
interference with their members. Although the federal government
could wage war against them, could demand unfair agreements
from them, and could usurp their property, they were still govern-
ments, and thus their members and territory were subject to tribal,
not federal, authority. By redefining Indians as individuals joined
not by politics but by race, the federal government could assert a
new kind of power: the power to breach tribal boundaries and
regulate their members in order to "enlighten their minds and
increase their comforts" and "save them ... from the consequences of
their own vices."2 What "humanity" demanded then was not that
tribes be treated, as far as possible, according to the law of nations
but that Indians be treated as subjects in need of guidance to fully
incorporate into the American mainstream.
The decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. Rogers did
not initiate this change. It was instead the product of a growing
1. United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572 (1846).
2. Id.
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movement to increase federal power to regulate Indian lives. This
movement was tied to such diverse factors as the bureaucratic
centralization of the Indian Department, the emergence of the
science of ethnology, and the debates over American identity in the
face of increasing immigration to the United States and interna-
tional conflicts over the North American continent. The success of
this vision in the Supreme Court was fueled by distortions of law
and fact ranging from mischaracterization of the role of white men
in Indian country to the fact that the case was moot at the time it
was decided. By memorializing the vision of this movement in law,
however, the Rogers decision provided it with powerful legal and
moral ammunition in ways that continue to resound in the courts
and on Indian reservations today. In this Article, I use Rogers as a
lens through which to examine the nature and origins of this shift.
INTRODUCTION
United States v. Rogers arose from homely facts. In 1844, in the
Cherokee territory west of Arkansas, William S. Rogers allegedly
stabbed his brother-in-law Jacob Nicholson to death with a five-
dollar knife.3 Although both men were racially white, both had also
married Cherokee women, thereby becoming citizens of the tribe
under Cherokee law.4 When federal authorities sought to prosecute
Rogers for the murder, he argued that the court had no power over
him because the law that provided for federal jurisdiction in Indian
country exempted crimes between Indians, and he, as a citizen of
the Cherokee Nation, was an Indian for purposes of the exemption.5
In 1846, the Supreme Court summarily dismissed Rogers'
challenge.6 A white man was a white man, and no political affilia-
tion could change this.' Although the term "race" had often been
used to refer to Indians before this time, it contained an ambiguity
indicating both a group with a common biological heritage and a
3. See Indictment at 1-2, Rogers (No. 114), microforned on U.S. Supreme Court Records
and Briefs (Scholarly Resources, Inc.); CHEROKEE ADVOc., May 22, 1845, at 3.
4. Rogers, 45 U.S. at 568.
5. Id. at 568, 571.
6. Id. at 573-74.
7. Id. at 572-73.
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group with a common national or political identity. s The assumption
of policymakers in the time before Rogers was that the two senses
of the word were identical, that the political and biological bound-
aries around Indian tribes were the same. But what if they were
not? What if whites or blacks became citizens of Indian tribes? The
Rogers opinion, for the first time, established a biological limitation
on the federal definition of "Indian."
Authors have seized on this limitation as evidence that Indian
law is a "blood law"9 based on racial distinctions between Indians
and non-Indians."l Some scholars and courts have recently extrapo-
lated from this assertion to suggest that descent-based tribal
membership requirements and even Indian law itself must be
discarded as irredeemably tainted by racial discrimination." This
Article shows that neither the historical record nor the Rogers
opinion support this understanding. Although the 1840s saw the
growth of scientific racism and its use to justify oppression of
African Americans, policymakers and ethnologists continually
emphasized that race did not define Indian people, stressing instead
the equal potential of Indians and whites. 2 In Rogers itself, the
inferior people are not the Cherokees themselves but the "mischie-
8. THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1402 (2001). For a modem use of the latter
definition, see Justice Scalia's concurrence in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("In the eyes of government, we are just one race here.
It is American.").
9. John Rockwell Snowden et al., American Indian Sovereignty and Naturalization." It's
a Race Thing, 80 NEB. L. REV. 171, 200 (2001) (calling Rogers the "foundational case" for
federal 'blood law").
10. See, e.g., Christopher A. Ford, Administering Identity: The Determination of "Race" in
Race-Conscious Law, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1263 (1994) (citingRogers for the proposition that
"[tiraditionally, the term 'Indian' was conceived in classically racial terms"); Snowden et al.,
supra note 9, at 205 (calling racism the "fourth pillar" of Indian law); Patricia Owen, Note,
Who is an Indian?: Duro v. Reina's Examination of Tribal Sovereignty and Criminal
Jurisdiction over Nonmember Indians, 1988 BYU L. REV. 161, 177-78 ("Rogers demonstrates
that historically race was the determinative factor in dealing with Indians.").
11. See, e.g., Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 665-66 (9th Cir. 1997) (reinterpreting the
Reindeer Act of 1937 so as to eliminate race-based protections for Alaskan natives); L. Scott
Gould, Mixing Bodies and Beliefs: The Predicament of Tribes, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 702, 771-72
(2001); Snowden et al., supra note 9, at 173-76, 231-38; see also Carole Goldberg, Critical Race
Studies: Descent Into Race, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1373, 1375-76 (2002) (discussing and criticizing
this trend).
12. See discussion infra Part IV.B.3.
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vous and dangerous" whites that associated with the Cherokees."3
The primary legal significance of Rogers, moreover, is that it was
the first time that the Court asserted federal authority and control
over any person in Indian territory, regardless of race. 4
This is not to say that race was irrelevant to the decision or the
federal policy behind it. To understand its role, however, requires
broadening one's understanding of the many ways race works
in American law. 5 By defining tribes as collections of individuals
united by race rather than as governments bound together by the
political choices of their members, the United States could justify
regulating Indians without regard to the barriers that governmental
status might pose. At the same time, the belief that individual
Indians were not defined by this racialized group status justified
destruction of the tribal group in the name of assimilation. It was,
therefore, the fact that Indian tribes-not Indian individuals-were
indelibly raced that supported this expansion of federal power.
The history behind Rogers is replete with fabrications of law and
fact to achieve this result.16 The Court's opinion presents Congress
as having unlimited authority over tribes and their property. Close
13. See Rogers, 45 U.S. at 573.
14. Id.
15. Others have pointed to the need for a new understanding of the way that race works
with regard to Indians. Vine Deloria, for example, has discussed the oversimplification of
equating treatment of American Indians with African Americans, suggesting instead that
federal assumptions must be understood according to federal needs regarding the two groups:
Because those in power needed the involuntary labor of African Americans, it had to imagine
them as "draft animals," justly separated from Anglo-American society and rights; because
the powerful needed not labor but land from the American Indian, it had to imagine them as
wild animals, tojustify taking their land and governmental rights in the name of assimilation.
VINE DELORIA, JR., CUSTER DIED FORYOUR SINS: AN INDIAN MANIFESTO 169-74 (Univ. of Okla.
Press 1988). Similarly, Joseph Singer juxtaposed the 1924 Immigration Act that denied
American citizenship to Chinese immigrants with the 1924 Citizenship Act that involuntarily
thrust it upon American Indians to show that the "means of oppression are various." Joseph
William Singer, The Stranger Who Resides with You: Ironies of Asian-American and American
Indian Legal History, 40 B.C. L. REV. 171, 172-73 (1998).
16. For earlier critiques of the legal basis of the Rogers decision, see Rachel San
Kronowitz et al., Toward Consent and Cooperation: Reconsidering the Political Status of
Indian Nations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 507, 524 (1987); Nell Jessup Newton, Federal
Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195,210-11 (1984);
Daniel L. Rotenberg, American Indian Tribal Death-A Centennial Remembrance, 41 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 409,420 (1986); David E. Wilkins, A Constitutional Conundrum: The Resilience
of Tribal Sovereignty DuringAmerican Nationalism and Expansion: 1810-1871,25 OKLA. CITY
U. L. REV. 87, 106-07 (2000).
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examination of earlier case law and Congress' own statements
regarding its power paint a sharply contrasting picture, one in
which the federal government has no power over tribes or their
members on reservations' and in which tribal property rights were
as sacred and protected from federal intrusion as those of non-
Indians. 8 Subsequent Indian law cases, moreover, show that the
Court, and even Justice Taney himself, did not adopt the vision of
Indian law that the Rogers opinion espoused. 19
The facts behind the decision were equally distorted. Most start-
ling, at the time the case was argued before the Supreme Court, the
defendant William Rogers was ten months dead-a circumstance
that if recognized would have deprived the Court of jurisdiction to
hear the case.20 This fact was omitted from both the certified record
compiled in Arkansas two months after Rogers' death" and the
Attorney General's argument before the Court eight months later.22
More subtly, the assertion of jurisdiction rested on the argument
that Indian tribes were neither able nor willing to control the white
men in their midst.2" The historical record, in contrast, reveals that
the Cherokee government neither wanted nor needed federal
assistance in controlling white men in Indian country and that
federal attempts to exercise jurisdiction only increased lawlessness
in the Cherokee territory.24
This Article shows that rather than representing an accurate
reflection of the law or the policy needs of the time, the Rogers
decision was the product of a broader campaign by the executive
branch of the federal government to expand its power over Indians.
This campaign was catalyzed by the increased bureaucratization of
the Indian Department as well as the development of the science of
ethnology, both of which created institutional interests in regulating
Indians not as members of political entities but as individuals.
Concerns about two impending wars over federal power on the
17. See discussion infra Part II.A.
18. See, e.g., Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 746-48 (1835).
19. See discussion infra Part III.A.
20. See discussion infra Part II.B.3.
21. See infra note 212 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
23. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
24. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
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North American continent led the Supreme Court to concur with the
executive branch's expansive definition of federal power over Indian
territory.
Although the decision had little basis in law or fact, it represents
a turning point in Indian law. The decision represents a moment in
which what might have been a trend to increase the political power
of tribes became instead a vast increase in federal power over tribes.
The decision immediately provided legal grounding for the coalesc-
ing executive branch policy that treated Indians as individuals
being groomed for inclusion into American society rather than as
members of political entities negotiating their rights as govern-
ments.25 When Congress decided to test the limits of its power over
Indian tribes forty years later, Rogers became the core precedent
justifying this extension of federal power.2" Although contemporary
Indian law scholars often point to these late nineteenth century
decisions as the origin of the "plenary power" doctrine," Rogers
provided the legal grounding for these opinions. Rogers has
resurfaced in the modern era in the "implicit divestiture" doctrine,
which further racializes tribal power by limiting tribal jurisdiction
to members of the subject tribe.28
The remainder of this Article proceeds in several parts. Part I of
this Article describes the legal challenge that Rogers posed and the
Supreme Court's response to this challenge. Part II attempts to
unmask the reality the opinion obscures in its portrayals of both
the law and the facts of the case.29 Part III examines the historical
25. See discussion infra Part III.B.4.
26. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 380-81 (1886); discussion infra Part V.A.
27. This is the doctrine that: "Congress has plenary authority to limit, modify or eliminate
the powers of local self-government which the tribes otherwise possess." Santa Clara Pueblo
v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978).
28. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191,209-10 (1978); infra Part V.B.
29. John T. Noonan, Jr. developed the concept of "masks" of the law. See JOHN T. NOONAN,
JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOzO, HOLMES, JEFFERSON, AND WYTHE AS MAKERS
OF THE MASKS (1976). Judge Noonan argued that by concealing the reality of the parties whom
the court was acting on, and by obscuring the institutional power of the court in acting on
those persons, courts were able to cloak lawmaking in the guise of inevitability and
compulsion, rather than human agency and suffering. Id. at 14-28. In a recent book, David
Wilkins applied this concept to fifteen Indian law cases, including Rogers. DAVID E. WauLNS,
AMERIcAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: THE MASKING OF JUSTICE
(1997). Wilkins' work provides the most thorough legal historical analysis of Rogers to date.
See id. at 38-49. This Article, however, focuses more sharply on the history behind the case,
1964 [Vol. 45:1957
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factors that may have led to these misrepresentations. Part IV
considers the reasons that race and power came together so
powerfully in the opinion, and Part V discusses the long shadow the
case has cast on Indian law jurisprudence. Finally, in conclusion, I
consider the impact of this history both on Indian law and on our
understanding of race and politics today, and suggest that in light
of this history, those that cry racism to undermine protection for
tribal sovereignty have it exactly backwards.
I. THE ROGERS DECISION
When William Rogers was indicted for Jacob Nicholson's murder,
the federal Trade and Intercourse Act of 183430 was the sole source
of federal jurisdiction in Indian country. Section 25 of the Act
provided that:
[Slo much of the laws of the United States as provides for the
punishment of crimes committed within any place within the
sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, shall be in
force in the Indian country: Provided, The same shall not extend
to crimes committed by one Indian against the person or property
of another Indian."'
Rogers argued that as both he and Nicholson had married Cherokee
women, left their homes in the East, and been fully incorporated as
citizens of the Cherokee Nation, they were "Indians" for purposes of
this exemption. 2
It appears that the Court had little trouble rejecting this asser-
tion. The decision amounts to only four pages in the official
reporter.3 The only briefs in the case were the pleadings submitted
to the trial court in Arkansas almost a year earlier.34 At a time when
the Court might take over a year to decide a single case, there was
precisely one week between the date the case was argued and the
and reaches significantly different conclusions about its legal and cultural significance.
30. Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729 (1834).
31. Id. § 25, 4 Stat. at 733 (emphasis added).
32. United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 571 (1846).
33. See id. at 571-74.
34. See Index of Records, Rogers (No. 114), microformed on U.S. Supreme Court Records
and Briefs (Scholarly Resources, Inc.).
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date the decision was announced. 5 The opinion inspired no dissents
or concurrences and failed to cite a single source of law besides the
statute and treaty provision actually construed." Despite-or
perhaps because of-this lack of scholarly reflection, the decision
contains sweeping assertions regarding the powers of Congress and
Indian tribes.
Congress' understanding of the term "Indian" would be irrelevant
if the Cherokee Nation could, through its political decisions,
immunize those in its territory from federal control. Before deciding
whether Congress intended to assert jurisdiction over men like
Rogers, therefore, the Court first had to decide whether Congress
had the power to do so." The Court held that tribal political
decisions had no impact on the scope of federal power.3"
To reach this conclusion, the Court merged the status of Indian
land as federal territory with the subjection of the people there to
federal control. According to the Court, although it was true that the
land where the crime occurred was "occupied by the tribe of
Cherokee Indians," it had "been assigned to them by the United
States, as a place of domicile for the tribe, and they [held] and
occup[ied] it with the assent of the United States, and under their
authority." 9 From the first interactions between European govern-
ments and Indian tribes, moreover,
native tribes ... [had] never been acknowledged or treated as
independent nations by the European governments, nor re-
garded as the owners of the territories they respectively occu-
pied. On the contrary, the whole continent was divided and
parcelled out, and granted by the governments of Europe as if it
had been vacant and unoccupied land, and the Indians continu-
ally held to be, and treated as, subject to their dominion and
control.'
35. See id.
36. See Rogers, 45 U.S. at 571-74.
37. Id. at 571-72.
38. Id. at 572.
39. Id.
40. Id.
1966 [Vol. 45:1957
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It was, therefore,
too firmly and clearly established to admit of dispute, that the
Indian tribes residing within the territorial limits of the United
States are subject to their authority, and ... [that] Congress may
by law punish any offence committed there, no matter whether
the offender be a white man or an Indian."
Neither the race of the residents of Indian country nor their tribal
status was relevant; Congress had power to regulate tribal and
nontribal citizens alike.
Immediately upon establishing an apparently unlimited federal
power in Indian country, the Court shielded the exercise of this
power from judicial review:
It would be useless at this day to inquire whether the principle
thus adopted is just or not; or to speak of the manner in which
the power claimed was in many instances exercised.... [Ilt is a
question for the law-making and political department of the
government, and not for the judicial.42
In other words, the duty of the Court was not to question federal
treatment of Indians but to "expound and execute the law as [they
found] it."43 As discussed below, the Rogers vision of federal power
was not "found" law but was instead a radical judicial departure
from previous understandings."' The political question doctrine,
however, masked this judicial lawmaking from view.45
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See discussion infra Part II.A.
45. This was not the first time the political question doctrine had been used to
circumscribe the judicial role in reviewing federal interactions with Indian tribes. Justice
Marshall first used it in Johnson v. M'Intosh in holding that "however extravagant the
pretension of converting the discovery of an inhabited country into conquest may appear," the
"Courts of the conqueror" could not question the legality of the federal assertion of title to
Indian land. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 588-89, 591 (1823). He used it more poignantly in
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, in stating that the Court did not have the power to restrain the
Georgia legislature in its attempt to destroy the Cherokee Nation, because such an action
would
savori] too much of the exercise of political power, to be within the proper
province of the judicial department.... If it be true, that the Cherokee nation
20041 1967
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Having established the power of Congress to legislate with
respect to any person in Indian country, the Court had no trouble
concluding that the exception for crimes between Indians did not
include men like Rogers:
[Wie think it very clear, that a white man who at a mature age
is adopted in an Indian tribe does not thereby become an Indian,
and was not intended to be embraced in the exception above
mentioned. He may by such adoption become entitled to certain
privileges in the tribe, and make himself amenable to their laws
and usages. Yet he is not an Indian; and the exception is
confined to those who by the usages and customs of the Indians
are regarded as belonging to their race. It does not speak of
members of a tribe, but of the race generally,-of the family of
Indians; and it intended to leave them both, as regarded their
own tribe, and other tribes also, to be governed by Indian usages
and customs.... Whatever obligations the prisoner may have
taken upon himself by becoming a Cherokee by adoption ... [, hie
was still a white man, of the white race, and therefore not within
the exception in the act of Congress."
Even though the Court asserted that whether federal power over
Indians was just was not subject to judicial review, 7 it could not
rest without declaring that federal use of this power was in the best
interests of the Indians:
have rights, this is not the tribunal in which those rights are to be asserted. If
it be true that wrongs have been inflicted, and that still greater are to be
apprehended, this is not the tribunal which can redress the past or prevent the
future.
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 20 (1831). The latter part of the quote can be interpreted as a restatement
of the holding of the opinion that the Cherokee Nation was not a "foreign nation" and
therefore could not be heard within the original jurisdiction of the Court. Its eloquence, the
context, and Marshall's attempt to use the case as a tool in the upcoming election, however,
suggest that the "tribunal' to which Marshall was referring was Congress.
46. Rogers, 45 U.S. at 572-73.
47. For an illuminating discussion of the need for American law to mediate between its
history of colonialism and its tradition of constitutionalism in forging Indian law, see Philip
P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation
in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381 (1993). Frickey describes the way in which
Justice Marshall, while bowing to the history of colonialism in Johnson v. M'Intosh by holding
that European countries and subsequently the United States had ultimate title to Indian
lands, subsequently affirmed the competing tradition of constitutionalism in the Cherokee
Nation and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), cases. Frickey, supra, at 385.
1968 [Vol. 45:1957
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It is due to the United States, however, to say, that while they
have maintained the doctrines upon this subject which had been
previously established by other nations, and insisted upon the
same powers and dominion within their territory, yet, from the
very moment the general government came into existence to this
time, it has exercised its power over this unfortunate race in the
spirit of humanity and justice, and has endeavoured by every
means in its power to enlighten their minds and increase their
comforts, and to save them if possible from the consequences of
their own vices.
48
The Court found this assertion to be equally true with respect to the
case at hand. In what one scholar has called the "most substantive
issue behind the Court's ruling,"" the Court argued that federal
jurisdiction was required not only to serve federal interests but also
to protect the Indians themselves:
[I]t would perhaps be found difficult to preserve peace among
them, if white men of every description might at pleasure settle
among them, and, by procuring an adoption by one of the tribes,
throw off all responsibility to the laws of the United States, and
claim to be treated by the government and its officers as if they
were Indians born. It can hardly be supposed that Congress
intended to grant such exemptions, especially to men of that
class who are most likely to become Indians by adoption, and
who will generally be found the most mischievous and dangerous
inhabitants of the Indian country.'
Without federal jurisdiction, in other words, there would be no way
to protect either the Cherokees by blood or the residents of the
frontier from a scourge of lawless white men.
The opinion presents a seamless web of law and fact. The federal
government had complete control over Indian territory and the
people found therein. This control had existed since the first
moment of colonial contact with the Indian tribes and had never
been questioned. Congress, therefore, could assert jurisdiction over
48. Rogers, 45 U.S. at 572.
49. WIUUNS, supra note 29, at 48.
50. Rogers, 45 U.S. at 573.
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men like Rogers and, of course, intended to do so. Even if this
control clashed with the principles of justice established in other
contexts, the Court had no power to question it. In addition, given
Indian vulnerability to unscrupulous outsiders, this control was
nevertheless in the best interests of "this unfortunate race." As the
next part will show, both the law and the facts represented in the
opinion were the stuff of fiction.
II. UNMASKING THE LAW
Virtually every element of the Rogers opinion obscures or distorts
the reality behind the case. (The opinion does not even get the
name of the defendant right; he seems to have spelled his name
"Rodgers.') 5' The errors range from a skewed portrayal of Indian
law and policy to an explicit effort to have the Supreme Court decide
a case without legal jurisdiction to do so. Each of these distortions
suggests that the United States had far more at stake in the case
than a simple question of statutory construction.
A. Indian Law Before Rogers in Congress and the Court
The Rogers opinion presented federal power in Indian country as
boundless, and tribal sovereignty as nonexistent. These relation-
ships, for the Court, were the product of an uninterrupted historical
trend. Earlier cases and congressional documents, however, show a
very different view of the federal-tribal relationship, and even reveal
contemporaneous congressional efforts to increase tribal political
51. In his military records, the man is cross-listed under both William S. Rogers and
William S. Rodgers, but the records indicate that "Rodgers" was the primary spelling.
Compiled Service Records of Volunteers in the Cherokee War, 1836-39, Nat'l Archives,
Washington, D.C., RG 94, Gen. Index Card 382, Card No. 24613989 [hereinafter N.A.R.A.,
Cherokee War Volunteers]; see also Compiled Service Records of Volunteer Soldiers Who
Served During the Cherokee Disturbances and Removal in Organizations from the State of
Tennessee and Field and Staff of the Army of the Cherokee Nation, 1836-39, Nat'l Archives,
Washington, D.C., RG 94, M908, Roll 2 [hereinafter N.A.R.A., Cherokee Removal Volunteers]
(cross-listing William S. Rodgers and William S. Rogers in Tennessee Infantry in Cherokee
Wars). Although the case was styled as "United States v. Rogers" from the beginning, in his
pro se pleadings the defendant at least once referred to himself as "Rodgers." Motion for
Discharge, Rogers (No. 114), microformed on U.S. Supreme Court Records and Briefs
(Scholarly Resources, Inc.). I will, however, adopt the law's choice of his name and continue
to refer to the defendant as "Rogers" to avoid confusion.
1970 [Vol. 45:1957
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power. Rogers, in this light, becomes not the inevitable result of
centuries of history, but a turning point, a moment that might easily
have resulted in solidification of tribal sovereignty but became
instead a sudden expansion of federal power.
Scholars have noted that much of the expansive federal power
described by the opinion stems from the idea that tribes were not
"owners of the territories they ... occupied."52 Just as the United
States had ultimate dominion over Indian land, so the Indians
residing there were "subject to [federal] dominion and control."" The
way the opinion portrayed tribal property rights, however, was a
radical departure from existing precedent. Mitchel v. United States,
the last significant decision on tribal lands before Rogers had called
it "a settled principle, that [the tribal] right of occupancy is consid-
ered as sacred as the fee simple of the whites" and the Indians' right
to "exclusive enjoyment" of their lands was "as much respected,
until they abandoned them, made a cession to the government, or an
authorized sale to individuals."54 The legal protection for tribal
property rights was even greater in the case of the Cherokees, who
had been guaranteed a patent to their lands in the 1835 Treaty of
New Echota, amounting to a fee simple right with right of reversion
to the federal government.55
The 1835 Treaty also provides direct evidence that the United
States intended to shield outsiders who had affiliated with the tribe
from federal jurisdiction. In the Treaty, the United States had
pledged to "secure to the Cherokee nation the right ... to make and
carry into effect all such laws as they may deem necessary for the
government and protection of the persons and property within their
own country belonging to their people or such persons as have
connected themselves with them."56 Although the Supreme Court in
1978 declared that tribes had no criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians," the Treaty of New Echota not only recognized tribal
jurisdiction over non-Indians voluntarily on Cherokee land, but also
52. Rogers, 45 U.S. at 572; see also Newton, supra note 16, at 209.
53. Rogers, 45 U.S. at 572.
54. Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 746 (1835).
55. Treaty of New Echota, Dec. 29, 1835, U.S.-Cherokee, art. 2, 7 Stat. 478, 479-80; see
also Newton, supra note 16, at 210.
56. Treaty of New Echota, supra note 55, at 481.
57. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
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made it a matter of federal law to protect this jurisdiction. With
respect to men like Rogers, therefore, the federal government would
seem to have pledged not to allow federal law to interfere with the
enforcement of Cherokee law.
History reveals an even deeper flaw in the Court's reasoning.
Although Great Britain and the United States had never treated
Indian tribes as equal governments, they had at least treated them
as governments. The relationships between the United States and
Indians were those of one government to another, and the United
States had not assumed the power to regulate tribal members as
individuals. Although the period just before the Rogers decision saw
heightened attention to this relationship, the evidence shows that
this attention might well have resulted in greater protection for the
political sovereignty of Indian tribes. Rogers presented an under-
standing of tribal and federal power in direct conflict with this
trend.
The 1820s and 1830s were decades of intense debate regarding
the future of Indian policy. The Removal Period, in which the
government proposed removing tribes from their treaty-protected
lands to make way for white settlement, drew attention and intense
sympathy to Indian concerns. Communities sent multiple petitions
to Congress arguing for the legal and moral right of the Indians to
remain in their homelands.5 8 Writers in the popular press extolled
the civilization, morality, and industry of the so-called civilized
58. See S. DOC. No. 21-53 (2d Sess. 1831) (containing a petition from Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania decrying the failure of the government to protect the Cherokees from removal
from their land); S. DOC. No. 21-50 (2d Sess. 1831) (containing a similar letter from the
Memorial Board of Foreign Missions); S. DOC. No. 21-34 (2d Sess. 1831) (claiming in a petition
from the inhabitants of Andover, Massachusetts that not to protect Choctaws in their treaty
rights is "denounced with one voice by the civilized world"); S. Doc. No. 21-33 (2d Sess. 1831)
(containing a similar petition from the inhabitants of Pennsylvania); S. DOC. No. 21-18 (2d
Sess. 1831) (claiming in an 1831 petition from the people of Vassalboro, Maine that failure to
protect would be a "palpable violation of national faith"); S. DOC. No. 21-16 (2d Sess. 1831)
(stating in a petition from inhabitants of Chester City, Pennsylvania that not to protect tribes
against removal would "leave an indelible stain on the national honor"); see also SENATE
JOURNAL, 25th Cong., 2d Sess., at 398 (presenting memorials from the inhabitants of
Hamden, Connecticut, New Haven, Connecticut, Southborough, Massachusetts, Durham,
Connecticut, and New Windsor, New York praying that the false removal treaty with the
Cherokees not be enforced); id. at 397 (presenting seven memorials from citizens of
Pennsylvania praying that the treaty be set aside); id. at 386 (presenting a memorial of
citizens of New Jersey praying that treaty not be enforced); id. (presenting a petition of David
Orery and others praying that the treaty not be enforced).
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tribes subject to removal.59 Members of Congress spent hours
debating the competing legal claims of states and tribes to the
land.'o The Cherokee cases, for which the newly widowed and dying
Chief Justice John Marshall61 used the last of his strength to assert
the sovereignty and independence of Indian tribes, provoked a
constitutional crisis.62
The crisis was ultimately resolved not by law but by force. In
1838, federal troops removed the Cherokees from their southern
homelands at point of bayonet. The removal was allegedly in
compliance with the 1835 Treaty.' The United States knew,
however, that the signers of the treaty did not represent the
Cherokee Nation. Unable to get the Cherokee leadership to agree to
removal, the Georgia Guard had imprisoned John Ross, the
Principal Chief of the Cherokees, during its negotiation.6 4 The
Treaty was signed by a handful of Cherokees who knew they did not
have the authority of their government, but believed that removal
was the only hope for survival of the Cherokee people.' Even after
the Treaty was signed, the great majority of Cherokees refused to
leave their homes. Between 1836 and 1838, only a small minority
of Cherokees, many of them signers of the Treaty fearful of retalia-
tion,' or families headed by white men hoping for better lives in the
West, made the journey across the Mississippi. It was not until
59. See Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21
STAN. L. REV. 500, 505 (1969).
60. See id. at 506-08.
61. R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE SUPREME COURT
439(2001).
62. DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CAsES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 102 (4th ed.
1998).
63. See GRANT FOREMAN, INDIAN REMOVAL: THE EMIGRATION OF THE FIVE CIVILIZED
TRIBES OF INDIANS 268-71 (Univ. of Okla. Press 1956).
64. Id. at 268.
65. The signers of the Treaty knew not only that they had no authority to do so, but that
their actions also violated an 1829 law providing that those who signed away Cherokee land
without the authority of the government might forfeit their lives for their actions. Major
Ridge, one of the signers of the Treaty and an architect of the law, said to his friends upon
signing, "I have signed my death warrant." WILLIAM G. McLOUGHLIN, AFTER THE TRAIL OF
TEARS: THE CHEROKEES' STRUGGLE FOR SOvEREIGNTY, 1839-1880, at 15 (1993). His son John
Ridge similarly declared, "I may yet die some day by the hand of some poor, infatuated Indian
deluded by the counsels of Ross and his minions.... I am resigned to my fate, whatever it may
be." Id. Both were killed for their actions. See infra note 273.
66. See MORRIS L. WARDELL, A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, 1838-1907,
at 8, 10 (2d prtg. 1977).
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1838, after federal troops had rounded the Cherokees into "concen-
tration camps" on the banks of the Aquohee River, that the bulk of
the Cherokees finally left."1
Although it ended in force, the crisis produced a powerful legal
legacy." In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,'9 a majority of the Court
agreed that the Cherokee Nation was a sovereign nation, a "distinct
political society, separated from others, capable of managing its own
affairs and governing itself."v° The Cherokees, however, effectively
lost the case, whose only direct holding was that the Cherokee
Nation was not a "foreign state" entitled to assert the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in a suit against Georgia.
Despite this loss, the decision laid the groundwork for the Court's
opinion in Worcester v. Georgia.v" Worcester considered whether
Georgia could assert state law over Samuel Worcester and Elizur
Butler, both non-Indian missionaries living on Cherokee lands.
Building on and incorporating the arguments of the dissenters in
Cherokee Nation, Justice Marshall declared that "the several Indian
nations [were] distinct political communities, having territorial
boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, and having a
67. See id. at 11. Even then, about a thousand Cherokees escaped removal by hiding in
the mountains in North Carolina Cherokee territory. Id. at 11-12. After decades of seeking
to make the North Carolina Cherokee join the rest of the tribe in the West or fully assimilate
into the non-Indian community, the federal government finally recognized them as an
independent tribe deserving of land and protection. See United States v. Wright, 53 F.2d 300,
302-05 (4th Cir. 1931) (summarizing the history of the North Carolina Cherokee).
68. While time has abrogated the direct holding of Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
515 (1832), see Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361 (2002), only three other pre-Civil War
opinions have been cited more since the 1970s: United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 579
(1824); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); and Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). GETCHES ET AL., supra note 62, at 125.
69. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
70. Id. at 16.
71. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). As Kent Newmyer persuasively argues, the connection was
deliberate. NEWMYER, supra note 61, at 450-51. Justice Marshall, while not convinced of the
Court's jurisdiction over the case, was moved deeply by the plight of the Cherokees. See
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 15 ("If courts were permitted to indulge their sympathies, a case
better calculated to excite them can scarcely be imagined."). In order to move the public and
the legislative branch and to help establish the legal foundation for a subsequent case, he
wrote an opinion that did much more than necessary to resolve the case, and encouraged
Justices Thompson and Story to write a dissent to his opinion that would emphasize even
more forcefully the sovereignty retained by the Cherokee people, and the federal government's
obligation to address Georgia's attempts to violate this sovereignty. Id. at 50 (Thompson, J.,
dissenting); NEwMYER, supra note 61, at 450-51.
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right to all the lands within those boundaries, which is not only
acknowledged, but guarantied [sic] by the United States."72 The acts
of Georgia in asserting state law over Cherokee soil, therefore, were
"repugnant to the constitution, laws and treaties of the United
States."73
For the executive branch, the opinions were a political embarrass-
ment, but little more. Although President Jackson persuaded
Georgia to pardon the missionaries, he did nothing to protect the
Cherokees from further state encroachment.74 After the Treaty of
New Echota provided a facade of legality for removal, the spirit of
the Cherokee opinions did not stay the President's hand.7"
The removal crisis had a far different effect on Congress.
Between the 1830s and the 1850s, national shame over removal
continued to color congressional attitudes towards Indian law and
policy. In 1851, the southern states requested indemnification from
Congress for depredations committed by the Choctaws before
removal.76 In recommending rejection of the request, the House
Report condemned federal and Georgian intrusions on Choctaw
sovereignty in the most damning terms. It called Georgia's exten-
sion of state laws over Indian country an act of "disloyalty and
disobedience to the authority of the general government, disregard-
ing the acts of Congress and the plighted faith of the nation, as well
72. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 557.
73. Id. at 561.
74. See Burke, supra note 59, at 530.
75. See NEWMYER, supra note 61, at 455. Alexis de Tocqueville wrote of the observance of
the letter of the law in the removal of the Choctaw tribes, saying. "It is impossible to destroy
men with more respect for the laws of humanity." ALExIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 355 (Philips Bradley ed., Henry Reeve trans., 1945) (1835). As with the Choctaws,
in Cherokee removal the letter of the law was respected as men were destroyed.
76. See H.R. REP. No. 31-37, at 1-2 (1851). Congress laid the blame for any depredations
squarely on the white population, on "lawless people" who flocked to the Indian lands as soon
as the treaty had been signed and drove the Indians from their homes. Id. at 25. Even where
land was allegedly purchased by contract, Congress declared that the purchases were marked
by "dark and shameful outrages" and "large numbers of the Indians were robbed and
despoiled of their lands." Id. As a result of these outrages, the Indians suffered poverty and
starvation, in many cases having only water in which tree bark had been soaked to keep alive.
Id. at 25-26. Congress found that the Choctaws only stole from the whites when driven to it
to survive, and that it was not until whites injured innocents in revenge that some Choctaws
took hostile action against them. Id. at 26.
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as their own duty to obey the enactments of the national legisla-
ture."7 7 Nor was the federal government free from blame:
Under these circumstances it became the duty of the President
to see the laws for the protection of the Indians faithfully
executed; or, disregarding his duty, tamely to acquiesce in
practical nullification and the insolent usurpations of these
States. To the lasting reproach of the government and the
country, the latter course was adopted.78
The heightened concern for Indian tribes generated by the
removal crisis suggested two possible paths for future Indian policy.
While both were intended to benefit the tribes, they were very
different and had very different consequences. The first path was to
address abuse of Indians by increasing their political power as
governmental entities incorporated within, yet partially independ-
ent from, the American political system. The second was to increase
the federal role in overseeing and improving the lives of the Indians.
The need to choose between these paths reflects a tension in the
Cherokee decisions themselves. The opinions had established that
states had no authority in Indian country, but left the scope of
federal power undecided. Justice Marshall's decision in Cherokee
Nation described Indian tribes as "domestic dependent nations,"79
a paradoxical phrase leaving unclear whether questions of federal
power nationhood or dependency should win out. The opinion de-
scribed the relation of tribes to the United States as "that of a ward
to his guardian,"8 ° another ambiguous phrase. Was the federal-
tribal relationship like that of a parent to his child, allowing the
United States to do virtually anything it considered in the best
interests of its child; or was it more like that of a trustee to the
owner of the trust, in which power was limited to the purposes of
the trust?
Close reading of the Cherokee opinions suggests that the latter
is the better interpretation. 81 Federal power was limited to a
77. Id. at 2.
78. Id.
79. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1841).
80. Id.
81. For a good discussion of the development of Justice Marshall's Indian law
jurisprudence, see Frickey, supra note 47, at 395-96, discussing the ways that the Cherokee
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particular purpose: the protection of tribal sovereignty. In contrast
to the now-established principle that dependency subjects tribal
sovereignty to "complete defeasance" by the federal government,
82
Marshall believed that "[pirotection does not imply the destruction
of the protected."83 Rather, like the European protectorates, a tribe
might be considered as "holding its right of self-government under
the guarantee and protection of one or more allies." 4 The Court
understood "dependence" to be limited to acceptance of supplies and
the restraint of dangerous intruders from entering Indian country,
and to leave "their actual independence ... untouched, and their
right to self-government acknowledged."'
Although the opinion stated that tribes were "within the jurisdic-
tional limits of the United States, subject to many of those re-
straints which are imposed upon our own citizens," such restraints
were limited to situations arising in "our intercourse with foreign
nations, in our commercial regulations, in any attempts at inter-
course between the Indians and foreign nations."86 Federal restric-
tions on tribal sovereignty were limited to the "exclusive right of
purchasing such lands as the natives were willing to sell,"87 and loss
of the tribal power to enter into relationships with foreign nations.8
Outside of these two limitations, Congress could interfere with
tribal governments only with the permission of the tribes them-
selves.89
opinions tempered the implications of Johnson v. M'Intosh by drawing a distinction between
the powerlessness of the Court to review "historical aspects of colonization," and its ability to
protect tribes against "efforts to destroy whatever rights they still possess."
82. See, e.g., Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 857 (1982).
83. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 552 (1832).
84. Id. at 561.
85. Id. at 547.
86. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
87. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 545.
88. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
89. According to Marshall:
[Our history furnishes no example, from the first settlement of our country, of
any attempt on the part of the crown, to interfere with the internal affairs of the
Indians, further than to keep out the agents of foreign powers, who, as traders
or otherwise, might seduce them into foreign alliances. The king purchased their
lands, when they were willing to sell, at a price they were willing to take, but
never coerced a surrender of them. He also purchased their alliance and
dependence by subsidies, but never intruded into the interior of their affairs, nor
interfered with their self-government, so far as respected themselves only.
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Contemporaneous congressional understandings of federal
power over Indians confirm this reading. Two years after Worcester,
Congress proposed a comprehensive bill to amend the Indian
Trade and Intercourse Act, reorganize the Indian Department, and
organize the Western Territory to which the tribes were removed.
The House Report on the bill showed a vision of Indian sovereignty
in tune with the first reading of Worcester, one that was far more
expansive than that held in the modern era.90
The bill was based on the principle that Indian tribes were to be
"secured in ... [their right] to self-government" and that they would
"be eventually placed on an equality, with respect to their civil
and political rights."9 This governmental equality included that
"whenever their advance in civilization should warrant the measure,
and they desire it ... they may be admitted as a State to become a
member of the Union."92 Immediately, the arbitrary power that the
executive had previously exercised over Indian relations was to be
put to an end.
An early writer on the Western Territory bill suggested that its
pro-sovereignty provisions could be explained by ongoing removal
negotiations with the Cherokee Nation and the hope that a favor-
able bill would lure the tribe to the Indian territory.93 House Report
474, however, supported the opposite conclusion: because Congress
felt less concern about preventing an Indian war, it felt more
powerfully obligated to act in the interests of the Indians:
The time has been when conciliation was sought; but the time is
now passed when the fear of Indian hostility should be a leading
feature of our Indian intercourse. Our relation to them is now
that of the strong to the weak, and demands at our hands a more
Worcester, 31 U.S. at 547. Any other interference with tribal affairs would have to be with
both the consent of the tribe and the permission of Congress. The laws of Georgia, for
example, could have no force on Cherokee land "but with the assent of the Cherokees
themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of congress." Id. at 561
(emphasis added). The juxtaposition of "or" to connect the two elements representing tribal
consent with "and" to indicate the federal consent, shows that both were necessary for
intrusion on tribal affairs.
90. H.R. REP. No. 23-474 (1834).
91. Id. at 17.
92. Id. at 14.
93. Annie H. Abel, Proposals for an Indian State, 1778-1878, in 1 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
AMERICAN HIsTORIcAL ASSOcIATION 89, 96 (1907).
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liberal policy, as well directed to promote their welfare as our
political interests.'
The first impulse resulting from this new obligation was to increase
the political power of the tribes.
While the pro-sovereignty statements of a failed bill might seem
to have little weight, the Western Territory bill failed to pass not
because it recognized too much sovereignty in Indian tribes, but
because it recognized too little. Under the bill, the Five Civilized
Tribes in the Indian territory were to form a confederated govern-
ment and elect a representative together.95 The federal government
would appoint a governor who would have the power to approve or
disapprove laws of the confederacy.96 Opponents of the bill objected
that such provisions were beyond the power of the government, 97
and inconsistent with the sovereign rights of tribes.98 Representa-
tive Archer, for example, objected to the bill because "it established
military despotism, under the authority of the United States, within
the territory which we guaranty [sic] to the Indians. At the very
time that we propose to protect them and respect their rights, we
subject them to a proconsular government."99 Because of these
objections, the bill was shelved."°
The portion of House Report 474 concerning tribal jurisdiction is
equally significant. A tribe was assumed to have "jurisdiction over
94. H.R. REP. No. 23.474, at 10-11.
95. See id. at 35-37.
96. See id. at 36.
97. Representative John Quincy Adams, for example, asked: "What constitutional right
had the United States to form a constitution and form a government for Indians?" 10 REG.
DEB. 4763 (1834). Responding to the suggestion that the power came from the federal power
to govern territories, he asked: "Were human beings the 'property of the United States,'
although in a savage condition? Surely not." Id. at 4769. Upon resurrection of these proposals
in 1838, the Cherokee government also objected, expressing "fears that a form of government
might be imposed which they were neither prepared for nor desirous of." S. EXEC. DOc. No.
376, 25th Cong., 2d Sess., vol X. (1838).
98. Representative Archer objected that Congress
had pledged ... that [the removing tribes] should enjoy a real national
independence .... But what was the government set up by this bill? A
government of the Indian tribes over themselves? No; it was the Government of
the United States over them; and in a form which had well been characterized
... as the very worst form of despotism.
10 REG. DEB. 4776 (1834).
99. CONG. GLOBE, 23d Cong., 1st Sess. 472 (1834).
100. 10 REG. DEB. 4779 (1834).
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all persons and property within its limits."'0 ' Federal law did not
create this power; rather it was understood to be inherent in tribes.
The proposed bill was necessary, therefore, not to provide for tribal
jurisdiction but to place certain limitations on it, by empowering
the United States to pardon American citizens convicted by the
tribe of capital offenses. °" Original federal jurisdiction was limited
to individuals sent to Indian country as agents of the United States
and those merely traveling across the country, under principles
analogous to protections provided by international law. 3 Even
these people, however, were subject to expulsion from Indian
country if they violated tribal law."' Outside these limited catego-
ries, tribal jurisdiction was plenary: "As to those persons not
required to reside in the Indian country, who voluntarily go there to
reside, they must be considered as voluntarily submitting them-
selves to the laws of the tribes."" 5
The report is also significant for its understanding of the limits on
congressional power. Although the Trade and Intercourse Act of
1817 provided for federal criminal jurisdiction in Indian country,
Congress believed that its treaties with the Indian tribes barred the
exercise of this jurisdiction. Though the federal government in
practice exercised jurisdiction over crimes committed by or against
U.S. citizens, this was "rather of courtesy than of right.""° With
regard to Indians themselves, Congress believed it had no power to
exercise jurisdiction: "It is not perceived that we can with any
justice or propriety extend our laws to offences committed by
Indians against Indians, at any place within their own limits."0 7
An unpublished 1840 report by the Senate Committee on Indian
Affairs has a similar tone.18 According to the report, "[t]he policy of
101. H.R. REP. No. 23-474, at 18 (1834).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. Ironically, the Supreme Court cited this report in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe as support for its conclusion that "Congress shared the view of the Executive Branch
and lower federal courts that Indian tribal courts were without jurisdiction to try non-
Indians." 435 U.S. 191, 203 (1978).
106. H.R. REP. No. 23-474, at 13.
107. Id
108. Mr. Bell's Suppressed Report in Relation to Difficulties Between the Eastern and
Western Cherokees (on file with author) [hereinafter Mr. Bell's Suppressed Report]. See infra
notes 277-280 and accompanying text for more on this opinion.
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the Federal Government has been to regard the country secured to
the Indian tribes as foreign to the citizens of the United States, and
as exclusively under the jurisdiction and political sovereignty of the
Indian, as any foreign country whatever.""° Whether this was the
best policy that could have been pursued was no longer an open
question, as it had been memorialized in long-standing practice and
law. The Committee condemned the efforts of the executive branch
to exercise criminal jurisdiction over Cherokees in a political dispute
as "the most inexplicable, and, in the opinion of the [Senate]
committee, one of the most exceptionable orders that ever emanated
from the Executive Department of the United States.""10 The
assumption of such a power, the Committee felt, "would effect an
entire revolution in our Indian relations and policy.""'
By contrast, in Rogers, the Supreme Court presented federal
power over individuals in Indian country as plenary, and tribal
power as virtually nonexistent. It claimed that this expansive vision
of federal power was "a question for the law-making and political
department of the government, and not for the judicial.""' As I have
shown, there was a stark contrast between this judicial vision and
Congress' own understanding of its power with respect to tribes.
While disclaiming judicial power to define the relationship between
the United States and Indian tribes, the Court was creating it out
of whole cloth.
B. Back to the Facts
This legal sleight of hand was accompanied by equally great
distortions of the facts of the case. The opinion distorted three
central facts: the role of white citizens in Indian country; the ability
and desire of the Cherokee government to control these citizens;
and, most striking, the fact that Rogers had died long before the
case ever came to the Court.
109. Mr. Bell's Suppressed Report, supra note 108, at 6.
110. Id. at 5.
111. Id.
112. United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572 (1846).
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1. Developing the Test Case
Federal officials often portrayed white men in Indian country as
opportunists, there to escape the restraint of civilized society and
exploit the loose morals and economic benefits of marriage to Indian
women."' Federal jurisdiction was needed to protect the Indians
from this scourge of white men. The Supreme Court accepted this
characterization. The reality was more complex.
It is true that William S. Rogers did not come to Indian country
out of sympathy for the Indians. A native of Tennessee, he first
came to Cherokee country as a volunteer in what came to be known
as the "Cherokee War," in which troops assembled to help remove
the Cherokees from their eastern homelands. He enrolled at the
beginning of the operation, in June 1836.114 Just over a month later,
by the end of July, Rogers had been discharged from the army."' In
November of that year, Rogers married a Cherokee woman and with
her began the long journey across the Mississippi.
Why did Rogers abandon his army and his people? Is this a story
of true romance, of star-crossed lovers that began as enemies and
113. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 23-474, at 98 (1834) ("If the Indians are exposed to any danger,
there is none greater than the residence among them of unprincipled white men. Some have
eluded the pursuit of justice, and located themselves here, where they fancy themselves free
from punishment for the past, and without restraint for the future."); see also COMMR INDIAN
AFFAIRS ANN. REP. 1843, S. Doc. No. 28-1, at 416-17 (1st Sess. 1843). The Commissioner of
Indian Affairs stated that his concern was also the Indians':
One of the greatest evils of which the Cherokees have cause to complain, and of
which they do complain, is the habit of irresponsible and transient white men
intruding themselves upon them. This is a class of people that would be of little
value any where, and exercise a mischievous influence on the more unthinking
portion of the Indians.
CoMM'R INDIAN AFFAIRS ANN. REP. 1843, S. DOC. No. 28-1, at 416-17. For a more recent
iteration of this portrayal, see GLENN SHIRLEY, LAW WEST OF FORT SMITH: A HISTORY OF
FRONTIER JUSTICE IN THE INDIAN TERRITORY, 1834-1896 (1957). The author explains:
This march of civilization and primitive condition of the country attracted a
horde of riffraff, the refuse of humanity. There were no extradition laws effective
by which a criminal entering the area could be removed to answer for his offense
elsewhere, and the country became infested with hundreds of fugitives from
justice. Many of this type married among the Indians, and the half-breed was
reputed to be a product "inheriting the bad traits of both races and the good ones
of neither."
Id. at 21.
114. N.A.R.A., Cherokee War Volunteers, supra note 51; N.A.R.A., Cherokee Removal
Volunteers, supra note 51.
115. N.A.R.A., Cherokee War Volunteers, supra note 51.
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ended as husband and wife? Probably not. More likely Rogers signed
up with the army to be all that he could be, and then, after clashing
with military discipline, decided that what he really wanted to be
was a western settler with an Indian bride. The radical nature of
the shift from volunteer soldier seeking to assert Tennessee's power
over the Cherokees to a citizen of the Cherokee Nation suggests that
the decision was not made lightly. Rogers was not recorded as
claiming compensation for property left behind," 6 which could be a
motivation for white citizens to leave the territory. Immediately
upon his marriage he and his bride began the "Trail of Tears," the
thousand mile walk from the Southeast to the Indian Territory in
what is now Oklahoma. Many of the emigrants suffered and died on
the hard journey west, 17 which became a defining experience for the
Cherokee people. Although as a citizen of the Cherokee Nation
Rogers would have been entitled to "annuities," federal rations
pledged by treaty, these annuities were withheld for years after the
settlers arrived." 8 Settlers struggled to get through the first years
in the new country, and many died from hardship and disease."'
Despite this, Rogers remained in Cherokee country even after his
wife died in 1843, leaving only when he was dragged away by the
Cherokee sheriff in 1845.
Jacob Nicholson, Rogers' victim, was another white man who had
married into the Nation. According to the Cherokee press, Nicholson
was Rogers' brother-in-law.2 The names of the sisters that brought
these men together are not recorded-instead, they were what
Indian women often were in federally recorded history, nameless
vectors between the races.' 2 ' Nicholson, however, was at least a
citizen of longer standing than Rogers. In 1835 the federal govern-
116. See Natl Archives, Washington, D.C., RG 75, M234, Rolls 114-16 (emigrant rolls). He
would have received, however, annuities to support him on the journey. At least one white
man without any Indian connections did travel to the Indian territory with the Cherokees,
presumably because he thereby received support on the way. See Letter of Apr. 11, 1837, Natl
Archives, Washington, D.C., RG 75, M234, Roll 114.
117. FOREMAN, supra note 63, at 279-85 (describing suffering among early emigrants).
118. See COMM'R INDIAN AFFAiRS ANN. REP. 1840, S. Doc. No. 26-1, at 240-41 (2d Sess.
1840) (reporting annuities ordered withheld until the end of Cherokee difficulties);
McLOUGHLIN, supra note 65, at 31 (describing need for annuities).
119. MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 65, at 7 (describing hardship after arrival).
120. CHEROKEE ADvoc., May 22, 1845, at 3.
121. See Bethany Ruth Berger, After Pocahontas: Indian Women and the Law, 1830-1934,
21 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 1, 28-29 (1997) (discussing implications of the Rogers case for women).
2004] 1983
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
ment compiled a census of the Cherokees to determine how many
there were and how much it would cost to remove them. On the
census of Cherokees in Georgia, Nicholson appears as a head of
household of four with a small farm producing 100 bushels of corn
a year.'22 Despite his establishment in the East, Nicholson, like
many intermarried white men, did not wait to be forced out by
bayonet before joining the vanguard across the Mississippi; he is
listed on the emigration rolls as early as 1837. 123
There is no record of the reason for the dispute between the two
men. Maybe the recently widowed Rogers turned to alcohol and
attacked Nicholson in a drunken rage. Maybe he shirked his
responsibilities to his children, and Nicholson resented caring for
them. Maybe Rogers, who was never tried for the crime, was falsely
accused. According to the indictment, however, on September 1,
1844:
Rogers, with a certain knife, of the value of five dollars, which he
... in his right hand then and there had and held ... feloniously,
willfully, and of his malice aforethought, did strike and thrust,
giving to the said Jacob Nicholson ... one mortal wound, of the
breadth of two inches, of the depth of six inches, of which mortal
wound the said Jacob Nicholson ... instantly died.12
After Nicholson's death, Rogers escaped capture for seven months
by dodging along the Arkansas/Cherokee border. Finally, on April
2, 1845, Alexander Foreman, a sheriff. of the Cherokee Nation,
arrested him near the Cherokee capital ofTahlequah. 5 Because the
Cherokee Nation did not have its own jail, the sheriff brought him
for safekeeping to Fort Gibson, the U.S. military base just outside
the borders of the Nation. 126 The next day, the Cherokee Advocate
reported the arrest, and its expectation that Rogers would soon be
122. Census Roll, 1835, of the Cherokee Indians East of the Mississippi, and Index, Nat'l
Archives, Washington, D.C., T496, at 56.
123. When Nicholson removed to the West, he claimed the value of the improvements he
left behind was $1299.77. Nat'l Archives, Washington, D.C., RG 75, M234, Roll 114 (listing
Nicholson as emigrant 88).
124. Indictment, United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846) (No. 114),
microformed on U.S. Supreme Court Records and Briefs (Scholarly Resources, Inc.).
125. CHEROKEE ADVOC., Apr. 3, 1845, at 3.
126. Id.
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remanded to the Cherokee authorities.'27 Shortly afterwards, a
Cherokee officer asked the officer of the fort to turn Rogers over for
trial. 12' By this time, however, the military commander of the fort
already had begun work on a different plan.
The fort's logbooks of April 2, 1845 contain two letters to Pierce
M. Butler, the federal Indian agent in Cherokee country. The first
letter states that the commanding officer
has been directed that whenever a citizen of the Cherokee
Nation (meaning a white man) is arrested under the provisions
of General Taylor's order of the 3d of October 1843, to keep him
in confinement at this post until the orders of the President of
the United States can be given in the case. It is supposed that
Rogers, the man this day arrested, comes within the scope of
that order. I have, therefore, to request that you will inform me
of facts charged against him, that I may be enabled to lay the
case fully before the authorities at Washington.'29
This letter is not signed, and only the name of the addressee and not
the sender is given. Another letter in the logbook for this period,
which was similarly not signed, also indicated that it had not been
sent,' and this is likely the case with this letter as well.
Immediately after the unsigned letter in the logbook is a second
letter with the same date. This letter is also from Fort Gibson to
Butler, and also concerns the Rogers case. The second letter does not
mention the Cherokee citizenship of the defendant or the Presi-
dent's order, but instead simply states that, "the man Rogers, who
has since been arrested, was a white man, and charged with the
murder of another white man in the Cherokee Nation."'3' The letter
then asks Butler to provide facts and the names of witnesses for the
District Attorney at the federal court in Little Rock, so that Rogers
could be sent to Little Rock for trial that Saturday.'32 Unlike the
127. Id.
128. CHEROKEE ADvoc., Apr. 17, 1845, at 3.
129. Letter to Pierce M. Butler, Apr. 2, 1845, Natl Archives, Washington, D.C., RG 94,
M1466, Roll 1, at 222.
130. Letter, July 28, 1846, Nat'l Archives, Washington, D.C., RG 94, M1466, Roll 1, at 322
(marking unaddressed letter "annulled").
131. Letter from Lieutenant Colonel Mason to Pierce M. Butler, Apr. 2, 1845, NatI
Archives, Washington, D.C., RG 94, M1466, Roll 1, at 223.
132. Id.
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preceding letter, Lieutenant Colonel Mason, the commander of the
fort, signed this one.
This exchange was followed by a flurry of letters in which Mason
sought to build the record against Rogers and speed his transfer to
federal court. On April 4, 1845, Mason wrote to Butler that Rogers
had been arrested pursuant to an oral request by Mr. M. Duval, who
had been acting Cherokee agent during Mr. Butler's absence from
the territory.'33 The letter asked for the request in writing so that
it could become part of the record. 3 4 If the written request was
provided, it has not been recorded. Instead, it appears that Butler
questioned the legality of federal jurisdiction and urged Mason to
hold Rogers until this question could be resolved. On April 5, Mason
responded:
I do not think I have any right to detain [Rogers] longer than a
reasonable time preparatory to sending him to the civil author-
ity ... Rogers has either been arrested rightfully or wrong-
fully-if rightfully, the law will do justice; if wrongfully, I will
not increase that wrong by keeping him a prisoner longer than
I can turn him over to the civil authority.'35
The same day Mason wrote another letter on the same point,
apparently responding to a suggestion by Butler that Mason should
"keep him some two or three weeks until [Butler heard] from the
district attorney."'36 Mason, however, insisted that
[I have] no authority to detain for an indefinite period until legal
and doubtful questions are settled .... If there be any law or
treaty stipulation by which the Cherokees can demand a white
man from any U.S. Indian Agent or other officer then I suppose
Rogers could be delivered up to them at Little Rock, as well as
here .... These are not points for me but the proper law officers
to decide. 137
133. Letter from Lieutenant Colonel Mason to Pierce M. Butler, Apr. 4, 1845, Nat'l
Archives, Washington, D.C., RG 94, M1466, Roll 1, at 225.
134. Id.
135. Letter from Pierce M. Butler to Lieutenant Colonel Mason, Apr. 5, 1845, Nat'l
Archives, Washington, D.C., RG 94, M1466, Roll 1, at 226.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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That day, Mason sent Rogers to Little Rock. 13 8 Both Butler and
Mason apparently spent some effort to form their own opinions as
to these "doubtful and legal questions." On April 7, 1845, Mason
wrote Butler saying that he had turned Rogers in and that he had
received Butler's book of treaties, and asking Butler to return
Mason's "as promised some time since." 39
As the last comment suggests, personal animosity colored Mason
and Butler's disputes over jurisdiction in Indian country. The
previous December, Butler had moved his agency from Fort Gibson
in order to be farther from "one or two commanding officers at Fort
Gibson" with whom it was "impossible to preserve peace and quiet....
Law or restraint finds no favor with an arbitrary officer on the
frontier, long unaccustomed to any control but his own will."" 4 It
seems, however, that Mason could give as good as he got: When
Butler charged that commissioned officers participated in prostitu-
tion and drinking with the Cherokees around the fort, Mason
retorted that "if the reports through the Country be true, the same
charge applies to the Cherokee agent."'
But far more was at stake than personal animosity. The dispute
regarding the disposition of Rogers' case involved sharply diverging
understandings of federal and tribal power in Indian country. The
existence of the fort was a sore point with the Cherokee government,
which felt that the presence of soldiers encouraged trafficking in
alcohol and prostitution as well as federal interference with
Cherokee affairs. Agent Butler, who was popular among the
Cherokees, seems to have shared this view. This ongoing dispute
was at a head at the time of Rogers' arrest. A few weeks earlier, in
retaliation for the death of a soldier in a fight at the home of a
Cherokee woman, eight or ten soldiers had burned the woman's
home to the ground and clubbed her and other women as they fled
the fire. 42 When Rogers was arrested, the accused soldiers were
138. Id. at 227.
139. Letter from Lieutenant Colonel Mason to Pierce M. Butler, Apr. 7, 1845, Nat'l
Archives, Washington, D.C., RG 94, M1466, Roll 1, at 228-29.
140. Letter from Pierce M. Butler to T. Hartley Crawford, Dec. 1844, Nat'l Archives,
Washington, D.C., RG 75, M234, Roll 91, at 91 (letter is undated, but is logged after a letter
of December 6, 1844 and before Butler's removal on December 21, 1844).
141. Letter from Lieutenant Colonel Mason to Pierce M. Butler, Apr. 30, 1845, Natl
Archives, Washington, D.C., RG 94, M1466, Roll 1, at 230.
142. CHEROKEE ADvoc., Mar. 20, 1845, at 3.
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being held at the Fort awaiting their journey to the Little Rock
court. 
143
The incident inspired outrage among the Cherokees and calls for
the removal of the fort. 44 These complaints only increased the
resentment of the military, as exemplified in the following editorial
from an anonymous "Officer of the Army," who claimed that "[tihe
military would gladly quit the Territory and leave you all to the part
of Kilkenny-cats," the legendary Irish cats who loathed each other
so much that they fought until nothing was left of either but their
tails. 45 According to the officer, the soldiers complained that their
commanders indulged the Cherokees,
regarding them ... as making a feeble effort, which ought to be
encouraged, to rise from their degradation. How have you met
this disposition to aid you? In the spirit of the Negro, who
regards the indulgence of a master as a license for the commis-
sion of all kinds of excesses ... [, m]ay [the Cherokees] be freed
from the burdensome protection of the United States and be left
to their boasted refinement. 146
Any respect for Cherokee legal rights also would have posed a
personal threat to Lieutenant Colonel Mason. The week before
Rogers' arrest, the Cherokee Advocate had published an 1843 speech
by Mason objecting to the admission of Indian testimony in a
military proceeding against him.147 Mason had argued that if this
precedent were established, "you will soon see a plenty of charges
with no other witnesses to support them but Indians," and every
Indian who felt his rights or dignity violated would bring a case."
Those with an axe to grind against the military could purchase
Indian testimony with a "barrel of whiskey."149 He continued,
143. Letter from Lieutenant Colonel Mason to Pierce M. Butler, Apr. 1, 1845, Nat'l
Archives, Washington, D.C., RG 94, M1466, Roll 1, at 222.
144. Letter from Lieutenant Colonel Mason to John Prentiss, Nov. 14, 1845, Nat'l Archives,
Washington, D.C., RG 94, M1466, Roll 1, at 221 (claiming that Butler instigated calls for
removal for "selfish and vindictive purposes").
145. CHEROKEE AnVoc., May 15, 1845, at 3. William Ross, in responding to the letter,
called the anonymous officer Captain Wood. Id.
146. Id.
147. CHEROKEE ADvoc., Mar. 27, 1845, at 3.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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"[sloured as ignorant Indians generally are against the military,
(the Cherokees and Seminoles who have been removed to this
country at the point of bayonet, in particular,) if you establish that
they are legal witnesses-who of us are safe?"5 0 Such opinions
doubtless influenced Mason's determination that white men could
not safely be turned over to the Cherokee courts.
With Rogers in federal custody, Mason's wishes prevailed.
Within two weeks after his arrest, Rogers was sent to Little Rock
with the soldiers. An officer went with them to act as a witness
against the soldiers, but no witnesses went to present evidence
against Rogers. 51 The practice of the court was to dismiss defen-
dants if the prosecution could not present witnesses against them,'52
and the soldiers sent with him were soon "discharged for want of
testimony."53 But the Rogers case was not dismissed for lack of
evidence. This may have been because the trial court judge felt the
case could be dismissed on other grounds. Or it may have been that
both the trial and appellate court judges wanted the case to be
heard by the Supreme Court, regardless of the legality of the
indictment.
On April 18, 1845, Rogers, apparently pro se, pled that because
of his Cherokee citizenship, the federal courts had no jurisdiction
over him at all.5 4 Although the Supreme Court quickly dismissed
the suggestion that men like Rogers were included in the definition
of "Indian,"' this resolution was not so obvious to either the
executive branch or the lower courts. In the fall of 1843, the
Cherokee Nation had tried a white man, Jacob West, for participat-
ing in the murder of a Cherokee and sentenced him to death.'56
150. Id.
151. Letter from Lieutenant Colonel Mason to Samuel H. Hempstead, Apr. 5, 1845, Natl
Archives, Washington, D.C., RG 94, M1466, Roll 1, at 227.
152. Letter from Lieutenant Colonel Mason to Pierce M. Butler, supra note 143; see also
CHEROKEEADvOC., May22, 1845, at 3 (reporting that"it is almost impossible to get testimony
against offenders ... (who] so often get off unpunished after a short confinement in jail, that
the fact of a culprit being sent to Little Rock for trial amounts in public estimation almost to
an acquittal").
153. CHEROKEE ADvoc., May 15, 1845, at 3 ("So the rascals go unwhipt ofjustice.").
154. Plea to Jurisdiction, United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846) (No. 114),
microformed on U.S. Supreme Court Records and Briefs (Scholarly Resources, Inc.).
155. Rogers, 45 U.S. at 572-73.
156. COMM'R INDIAN AFFAIRS ANN. REP. 1844, S. ExEc. Doc. No. 28-2, at 457 (2d Sess.
1844).
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After West filed a writ of habeas corpus with the federal district
court in Little Rock, "[t]he judge decided that West, by marrying an
Indian, and living in the Indian country, had, for all legal purposes,
become one of the tribe. The application was refused, and West was
hung."'57 In the fall of 1844, the Acting Superintendent of the
Western Territory reported this case with consternation to the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, saying it was "important that the
officers and agents of the Indian Department should understand
this matter distinctly in all its bearings."5 8 Would all tribes come
within the same rule? Might the Osages "be suffered to scalp any
white man married among them, whenever, according to their
peculiar customs, he may have incurred that penalty?"5 9 Could
white men conversely insist that they were not subject to federal
jurisdiction, and that the federal government could not regulate
their presence in Indian country absent a request from the tribe?6 °
The superintendent did not assert that the decision was wrong
under the law, but rather pointed to a need for the legislature to
define "with greater precision, the rights of white men in the Indian
country."' 6'
The day before Rogers was sent to Little Rock, the Arkansas
Banner had reported an even more closely related case.'62 According
to the report, Judge Benjamin Johnson, the judge presiding over
the District Court for the District of Arkansas, had heard a case
involving the federal prosecution of Harvey Wyatte, an intermarried
white man, for allegedly passing counterfeit gold eagles.6 3 The
court held that the federal courts had no jurisdiction, and ordered
the man turned over to the Cherokee authorities.' Although the
decision was not reported, the paper quoted the judge as remarking
that a citizen of the United States might expatriate himself and
become a citizen of the Cherokee Nation, in any form that the
government of that Nation might prescribe or recognize-and
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 458.
162. ARK. BANNER, Apr. 16, 1845, reprinted in CHEROKEE ADVOC., May 1, 1845, at 3.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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then he would be an Indian within the meaning of the act of
Congress, amenable to the laws, and subject to the jurisdiction
of the Courts of that Nation, and without the jurisdiction of the
Courts of the U.S.165
In making his argument in Little Rock, therefore, Rogers faced a
judge who had upheld an identical argument a few weeks earlier.
Unfortunately for Rogers, however, Justice Peter Daniel was in
Little Rock at the time. During this period U.S. Supreme Court
justices served double duty as circuit judges for the various
appellate courts.166 Justice Daniel, much to his displeasure, rode
circuit for Arkansas and Missouri, and was required to sit in the
Little Rock court for the last two weeks of April every year.
1 67
Daniel and Johnson were unable to agree on whether the court
had jurisdiction over Rogers. Pursuant to the law in effect at the
time, this resulted in their questions being certified directly to the
Supreme Court."
Both the Cherokee and Arkansas communities recognized the
importance of the case. The Cherokee Advocate incorrectly concluded
that the refusal to turn Rogers over to Cherokee authorities was
motivated by a belief that "a citizen of the United States by birth...
is not subject to the laws of the Cherokee Nation."'69 This principle
was felt to be "repugnant to the plainest dictates of common
justice."7 ° It editorialized that the case involved "questions of para-
mount importance to [Cherokee] social and political relations."' If
Cherokee jurisdiction was not upheld, the Advocate continued, the
165. Id.
166. JOHN P. FRANK, JUSTICE DANIELDISSENTING: A BIOGRAPHYOF PETERV. DANIEL, 1784-
1860, at 275 (1964).
167. Id. at 275-76.
168. Judiciary Act of 1793, ch. 22, § 2, 2 Stat. 333, 334 (1793). There was thus nojudgment
or opinion in the case when it went before the Supreme Court. Although there is an 1845
circuit court opinion, United States v. Rogers, 27 F. Cas. 886 (C.C.D. Ark. 1845) (No. 16,187),
this opinion was authored by Justice Taney, not Justice Daniels, and is identical to the
Supreme Court opinion announced on March 12, 1846. See United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S.
(4 How.) 567, 571 (1846). It appears that the circuit court opinion is not, in fact, an earlier
opinion, but that it is the Supreme Court opinion postdated by the U.S. Attorney for
Arkansas, Samuel H. Hempstead, in compiling the decisions. See Rogers, 27 F. Cas. at 886,
888.
169. CHEROKEE ADVOc., Apr. 17, 1845, at 3.
170. Id
171. CHEROKEE ADVOC., May 22, 1845, at 3.
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"enforcement of law and justice will be, beyond remedy, extremely
partial and that the foundations of society, the peace and harmony
of the Cherokee people will be shaken to their centre, perhaps
entirely uprooted."72
The non-Indian take on the case was no less dramatic. The
Arkansas press agreed that the peace of their community depended
on the decision, but, for them, peace required federal jurisdiction:
"Of this much, we can be sure, if the present law of Congress denies
to the court jurisdiction in such cases, it ought to be amended, and
jurisdiction conferred beyond a doubt. The peace of the frontier, and
the enforcement of law and justice require this."173 According to U.S.
Attorney Hempstead, "if the plea was sustained, it would be an
encouragement to our worthless citizens to harbor among them, for
the purpose of freeing themselves from the rigor of the laws of the
United States."74
2. Fabricating a Jurisdictional Gap
The need for federal jurisdiction to control unscrupulous white
men echoed arguments that policymakers had been making and
would continue to make for years: Such men must be controlled, not
only to protect the frontier citizens, but also to protect the tribes and
fulfill federal responsibilities to them.7 5 Although white intruders
had been and continued to be a significant problem for Indian
peoples, policymakers needed to make two further assumptions to
justify federal jurisdiction: first, that the tribes were in favor of
federal jurisdiction over their naturalized citizens, and second, that
there were no tribal justice systems that could or should do the
job.176
172. Id.
173. ARK. ST. GAZET=E, Apr. 21, 1845, at 2.
174. Id.
175. See, e.g., COMM'R INDIAN AFFAIRS ANN. REP. 1843, S. Doc. No. 28-1 (1st Sess. 1843);
ROGER H. TULLER, "LET No GUILTY MAN EscAPE": A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY OF 'HANGING JUDGE'
ISAAC C. PARKER 5 (Univ. of Okla. Press 2001) (declaring that federal court had done "more
than all agencies ... to make civilization a reality in the Indian country").
176. See, for example, the message of the President of the United States on extending
federal jurisdiction into Indian country: "Such a modification of existing laws is suggested,
because, if offenders against the laws of humanity in the Indian country are left to be
punished by Indian laws, they will generally, if not always, be permitted to escape with
impunity." H.R. DOC. No. 29-185, at 2 (1st Sess. 1846); see also CHEROKEE ADVoc., Jan. 9,
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Both assumptions were unfounded. First, the Cherokee govern-
ment was wholly opposed to federal jurisdiction over intermarried
white men. The Cherokee press, as we have seen, was very much
against federal jurisdiction in Rogers. Even after the case had been
decided, the Cherokee government continued to argue that neither
the Cherokee treaty nor the Trade and Intercourse Act permitted
federal jurisdiction over naturalized Cherokee citizens.' In 1853,
the Cherokees sent a delegation to Washington to complain that the
exercise of federal jurisdiction over adopted whites and blacks was
"unjust, it is an incompatible power-it is harassment-it is
oppressive-and in its process it is abolishing the Cherokee govern-
ment."178 Upholding such jurisdiction, the delegation argued, was
not only contrary to the treaty between the United States and the
Cherokee government, but also to the tenor of the Trade and
Intercourse laws, whose administration had been distorted by the
conflicting interests of the border states. 79 Equally telling, the 1861
Cherokee treaty with the Confederate States of America, a treaty
which John Ross called the strongest he had ever negotiated,
specifically provided that adopted citizens would not be subject to
the jurisdiction of the Confederacy."s The Cherokee government,
therefore, certainly did not feel jurisdiction was necessary to save it
from the dangerous white men.
1845, at 3 (reprinting speech of Secretary of War that federal government must intervene to
"save the minority from the barbarity of 'Indian law'").
177. Even at that late date, the question of jurisdiction over adopted citizens was not yet
resolved. As discussed below, it certainly was not resolved for the Cherokees, who continued
to insist that the federal government had no jurisdiction over any Cherokee citizens, whatever
their race. It also was not resolved in the courts. When the issue of jurisdiction over an
intermarried white man came before the Arkansas district court in 1847, the court construed
an 1846 treaty to divest the court of jurisdiction in the case. United States v. Ragsdale, 27 F.
Cas. 684, 686 (C.C.D. Ark. 1847) (No. 16,113). In fact, when the question came before the
Supreme Court again in 1897, the Court went in the opposite direction, holding that the Court
did not have jurisdiction over two Cherokees by blood who had killed an intermarried white
man because the victim came within the Indian against Indian exception. Nofire v. United
States, 164 U.S. 657, 661-62 (1897).
178. Petition of Elijah Hicks and William Adair, Apr. 15, 1853, Natl Archives, Washington,
D.C., RG 75, M234, Roll 96, at 299.
179. Letter from Elijah Hicks to William Manypenny, June 8, 1853, Natl Archives,
Washington, D.C., RG 75, M234, Roll 96, at 309.
180. 1 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN INDIAN DIPLOMACY: TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, AND
CONVENTIONS, 1775-1979, at 669 (Vine Deloria, Jr. & Raymond J. DeMallie eds., 1999).
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Turning to the second assumption, despite Cherokee objections,
was federal jurisdiction nevertheless necessary to preserve the
peace? Newspaper and government reports portrayed Indian
country in general and Cherokee country in particular as a lawless
place, a haven for fugitives from justice of all races.' Greater
federal or state control might have been necessary to address this
turmoil. Again, however, the truth was just the opposite: it was the
land immediately outside the borders of the reservation that was
the haven for outlaws, and federal interference and restrictions on
tribal jurisdiction were to blame.
At the time Rogers was decided, the Cherokee Nation had an
established police force, nine judicial districts, appellate courts, and
a supreme court. 8 2 Criminals were tried before juries,'83 who appear
to have been scrupulously insistent on adequate evidence before
conviction. The Cherokee Advocate regularly reported on the murder
trials taking place in the Cherokee courts; a review of these reports
shows that a majority of the defendants tried at this time were
acquitted of the charges,"' a figure that gives the lie to popular
reports of the vengeful nature of the Cherokees. Further evidence
of the balanced nature of Cherokee justice is provided by the
transcription of an 1840 murder trial by a white reporter, John
Howard Payne.' The judicial instructions can only be read as
encouraging the faithful pursuit of truth and justice, including the
admonition that "it is better for ten guilty to escape than for one
181. See, e.g., TULLER, supra note 175, at 3-4.
182. THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE CHEROKEE NATION: PASSED AT TAHLEQUAH,
CHEROKEE NATION, 1839-51, at 21-26 (1852) [hereinafter LAWS OF THE CHEROKEE NATION],
reprinted in 5 THE CONSTITUTIONS AND LAWS OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBES (Scholarly
Resources, Inc. 1973).
183. Id. at 21.
184. A review of these reports over a six month period in 1845, for example, shows that five
out of seven cases ended in acquittal or failure to reach a verdict. See CHEROKEE ADVOc., Feb.
2, 1845 (one defendant convicted and one acquitted); CHEROKEE ADVOC., Feb. 13, 1845 (man
convicted for murder of wife; two acquitted); CHEROKEE ADVOC., Apr. 17, 1845 (man acquitted
for murder); CHEROKEE ADVOC., May 15, 1845 (acquittal for murder); CHEROKEE ADVOC., May
29, 1845 (defendant escaped after being tried twice without a verdict; another defendant tried
and acquitted); CHEROKEE ADVOC., July 24, 1845 (acquittal for murder). This phenomenon is
perhaps in line with that in American courts in the nineteenth century, in which acquittal
rates were higher than today. LAURENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 283-84
(2d ed. 1986).
185. See generally JOHN HOWARD PAYNE, INDIAN JUSTICE: A CHEROKEE MURDER TRIAL AT
TAHLEQUAH IN 1840 (Grant Foreman ed., Univ. of Okla. Press 2002).
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who is innocent to suffer."186 The first jury, moreover, was unable to
agree on a verdict. The second jury was also undecided until they
themselves questioned the witnesses as to what they saw. This
account of Cherokee justice is even more striking in light of the fact
that the defendant was a member of a minority that had signed the
fraudulent 1835 removal treaty and that was still protesting against
the legitimacy of the Cherokee government, 8 ' and in whose name
the federal authorities insisted that Cherokee law could not be
186. Id. at 46. Judge Price was too ill to preside over the second trial, and was replaced by
the Chief Justice of the Cherokee Supreme Court, Jesse Bushyhead. Id. at 49-50. Justice
Bushyhead's instructions also demanded that the jury decide according to the facts before
them and not prejudice:
In carefully sifting this evidence and in concluding upon the case, I would
farther [sic] enjoin upon you, Jurors, and that emphatically, to remember that
the only point which you have a right to consider in this matter is the charge
against Archilla Smith for murdering John Macintosh. Whatever you may know
or have heard about him or his actions or his character before, must be
dismissed entirely from your minds. You break your oath if you allow any
impression whatever to mingle with the proofs for or against this single charge.
You break your oath equally if you permit the political difficulties under which
the nation laboured not long since, and to which the counsel on both sides have
made some allusion, in any way to influence your judgment. You have no right
to believe evil of Archilla Smith, because you may object to his course in
politics;-you have no right to shrink from condemning him, if guilty, from the
fear that your condemnation may be ascribed to political prejudices. You must
keep yourselves equally free from the desire to be vindictive or to show
mercy;-the one would make you the criminal instead of him whom you would
condemn;--the other is the prerogative of a department of our government, to
which we have ourselves prescribed regulations for its exercise. Your duty bids
you examine testimony; and to give your honest verdict fearlessly, whenever you
are convinced; and may you be guided to such a judgment as your conscience
may never hereafter disapprove.
Id. at 69-70. After several days of deliberation, the jury asked for instructions on how to
evaluate the evidence. In response, Justice Bushyhead cautioned the jury about the dangers
of relying on circumstantial evidence: "No matter how strong the proofs may appear, it is
never prudent to condemn upon evidence merely 'circumstantial.' An act for which a life is to
be forfeited, should be seen and seen by more than one." Id. at 78. These instructions are all
the more striking when contrasted with the instructions of Judge Isaac Parker, who became
the federal judge for the area in 1876. He was of the belief that scruples as to law and
evidence often got in the way of justice, and expressed this belief through jury instructions
as much as seventy pages long, with frequent admonitions about biblical justice. For example,
he instructed a jury in a murder trial that any claim that a criminal should not be convicted
on circumstantial evidence alone was "a declaration of either fools or knaves [or] sympathetic
criminals." Hickory v. United States, 151 U.S. 303, 310 (1894).
187. See PAYNE, supra note 185, at 1 n.ll, 2.
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trusted. It seems that contrary to these reports, the Cherokee courts
provided a measure of fairness that many governments might envy.
Other observers affirmed the efficiency of Cherokee justice. In
1844, the President appointed an independent commission to
investigate claims of oppression by the Cherokee government. As
part of this commission, Captain A. Cady prepared a report on the
Cherokee laws.' In examining these laws, Cady wrote, he had
"been forcibly impressed with the moderation, fairness, and evident
regard to the general and individual rights and interests of the
people affected thereby."" 9 With two possible exceptions,' 90 neither
the laws nor their execution were unduly harsh or oppressive.
Rather, they were "framed with much wisdom, and admirably
adapted to the character and wants" of the Cherokee people. 9'
The federal agent to the Cherokees argued that although
Cherokee justice was fair and efficient, federal justice was not.
Reacting to a proposal to increase the federal role in preventing
alcohol from entering Cherokee country, Agent Butler responded
that federal interference would only hinder Cherokee enforcement
of Cherokee laws against traffic in alcohol.'92 The agent was
"decidedly of [the] opinion that all restrictive laws or arbitrary
action by superior power is productive of evil consequences" and
failed to stop trade in liquor. 93 During a period in which federal
188. The majority of the report of the commission was published as a government document
and is reprinted in the official compilation of documents of the federal government as:
WILLIAM WILKINS, THE REPORT AND CORRESPONDENCE OF THE BOARD OF INQUIRY, To
PROSECUTE AN EXAMINATION INTO THE CAUSES AND EXTENT OF THE DISCONTENTS AND
DIFFIcULTIEs AMONG THE CHEROKEE INDIANS, S. Doc. No. 28-140 (2d Sess. 1845). Captain
Cady's separate report on the Cherokee laws is referred to as Appendix V of that report and
the letter transmitting the full report specifically addresses the attention of the Secretary of
War to this report, with which the full board concurred. Id. at 4 (letter from Adjutant General
R. Jones to Secretary of War Wilkins). Despite this, Cady's report itself was not included in
the published report. The reasons for this failure are not disclosed, but the omission may
indicate that it contrasted too strongly with the dominant views of tribal justice systems.
Fortunately, the Cherokee Advocate reprinted Captain Cady's report. See CHEROKEE ADVOC.,
June 21, 1845, at 3.
189. CHEROKEE ADvoc., June 21, 1845, at 3.
190. The first exception was the possibility that a decades old law declaring salines, or salt-
producing lakes, on Cherokee land the common property of the nation might be interpreted
to include artificially created salines, and the second was the law providing that the signers
of the false 1835 treaty were outlaws to the nation. Id.
191. Id.
192. COMM'R INDIAN AFFAIRS ANN. REP. 1844, S. Doc. NO. 28-2, at 459 (2d Sess. 1844).
193. COMM'R INDIAN AFFAIRS ANN. REP. 1845, S. Doc. No. 29-1, at 511 (1st Sess. 1845).
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enforcement of the non-intercourse laws was suspended, he claimed,
"it was ascertained that as little or less liquor was introduced
during its suspension than there was under its operation."194 The
military construction of the intercourse law, on the other hand, was
"as variable as the climate is changeable."'95
Federal forces also directly prevented the Cherokees from
enforcing their laws, making it far more difficult for the Cherokee
police to capture lawbreakers. The military post at Fort Gibson
prevented the Cherokee police from crossing the line into Arkansas
to pursue fleeing criminals," but rarely captured the criminals or
turned them over to Cherokee authorities themselves. 97 For one
notable period they even provided refugees from the Cherokee
government with food and assistance.'98
These actions created a haven for outlaws along the Chero-
kee/Arkansas border. During the 1840s, the Cherokee nation was
tormented by a group of"banditti" that committed numerous crimes
in Cherokee country'99 but eluded capture by the Cherokee police
and resided with impunity among the residents of Arkansas.2" The
facts of the Rogers case are emblematic of this situation. Rogers
escaped justice for many months after the murder, not by hiding
deep within Cherokee territory, but by dodging along the line, first
in Cherokee territory then in Arkansas. Although the Cherokee
Agent had asked the military to help capture him, it was the
Cherokee sheriff that finally did so.
Even when federal justice was administered, it was very partial.
In 1846, the Superintendent of the Western Territory reported that
although the crimes by whites against Indians were "doubtless very
194. Id.
195. COMm'R INDIAN AFF7AMS ANN. REP. 1844, S. Doc. No. 28-2, at 463.
196. MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 65, at 104; Letter from Lieutenant Colonel Mason to John
Prentiss, Nov. 14, 1845, Nat'l Archives, Washington, D.C., RG 94, M1466, Roll 1, at 262
(suggesting that Prentiss send out both dragoons to prevent Cherokees from crossing the
border to capture bandits).
197. See CHEROKEE ADvoc., May 1, 1845, at 3.
198. H.R. Doc. No. 29-185, at 162-64 (1st Sess. 1846) (printing a Dec. 1, 1845 report
entitled, Report and Resolutions Made by a Select Committee, and Unanimously Adopted by
the National Council of the Cherokee Nation, Respecting Disturbances and the Extraordinary
Course and High-Handed Conduct of Brigadier General Arbuckle); see also McLoUGHLIN,
supra note 65, at 51.
199. See S. Doc. No. 28-140, at 9-10 (2d Sess. 1845).
200. CHERoKEE ADVoc., Jan. 15, 1846, at 3.
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numerous," he did not recollect "a single instance of a white man
having been tried and punished, under the [Trade and Intercourse
Act], for a crime against the person or property of an Indian," in the
seven years he had been Superintendent.2"'
Nor did the record improve once federal jurisdiction was better
established. Between 1875 and 1896, the Western District of
Arkansas presided over seventy-nine hangings under Judge Parker,
who earned the sobriquet "Hanging Judge Parker." °2 As far as it is
possible to tell from the accounts of these hangings, in not one was
the defendant tried for a crime against an Indian. °s Many of the
defendants, however, were Indian and there is evidence that they
had little reason to trust the justice that the court dispensed. When
the marshals informed one full-blood Cherokee that he was being
charged with the murder of a white man, for example, he seemed to
know what would be his fate: "Don't take me to Fort Smith; kill me
right now."0 4 Another Cherokee, Smoke Mankiller, who spoke no
English, declared through his interpreter to the crowd waiting to
see him hanged: "I did not kill Short; I would admit it if I did. I
stand before you convicted by prejudice and false testimony."0 5
Jack Spaniard, half-Cherokee and half-Spanish, was convicted by
a jury on purely circumstantial evidence after only an hour of
deliberation.2" Whatever federal jurisdiction provided the Chero-
kees, it was neither protection nor justice.
3. Prosecuting the Dead Defendant
With all of the attention to the case at the time it was argued in
Arkansas, it might be surprising that neither the Arkansas nor
Cherokee press even mentioned the decision of the Supreme Court
201. S. Doc. No. 29-461, at 6-7 (1st Sess. 1846).
202. See TULLER, supra note 175, at 3-4.
203. SHIRLEY, supra note 113, at 209-31 (describing crimes). To be fair, the defendants
might be accused of crimes against Indians. Nevertheless, it was their subsequent crimes
against non-Indians that brought them into court.
204. Id. at 222.
205. Id. at 238.
206. Id. at 225. This was likely due in part not only to prejudice of the jury, but also the
judicial philosophy of Judge Parker, who believed that punishing those he believed to be guilty
was more important than technicalities of law and evidence. His jury instructions, between
twenty and seventy pages in length, almost invariably were reversed as prejudicial when
reviewed by the Supreme Court. See id. at 184, 239-42 (summarizing appeals).
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the following March. On closer examination, however, the reason for
this omission seems clear: Both communities knew that Rogers had
died shortly after first appearing in the Little Rock court and
understandably assumed that the case had ended with his life.
On May 12, 1845, Rogers and another prisoner escaped from the
Little Rock jail.207 The other man was soon recaptured but claimed
that Rogers had drowned trying to swim across the Arkansas River
to freedom. 2' Although the authorities initially thought that he was
lying to help Rogers in his escape, Rogers' drowned body was
recovered two days later.2' The Cherokee and Arkansas newspapers
quickly reported this fact,210 and the local U.S. Attorney knew it as
well, noting it in his compilation of cases arising from the Arkansas
court.21' It was not until July 28th, over two months later, that the
district court clerk in Little Rock certified the record on appeal for
the Supreme Court. 12 The record failed to mention, however, that
the defendant was long dead. When the Supreme Court heard
arguments in the case the following March, U.S. Attorney General
John Mason argued the case for the United States, but (not
surprisingly) no one argued for the defendant .2 " Although the
decision referred to the Court's expectation that Rogers would be
tried,2" the Attorney General must have known that this would not
and could not happen. It seems clear that the executive branch had
knowingly gone through the time and expense of arguing before the
Supreme Court for its right to prosecute a man who was at the time
ten months dead.
Federal Indian law has often been made in the absence of the
people it most intimately affects.21' The Rogers case is a unique
207. ARK. ST. GAZETmE, May 19, 1845, at 2.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.; CHEROKEE ADvoc., June 5, 1845, at 2.
211. See United States v. Rogers, 27 F. Cas. 886, 890 n.2 (C.C.D. Ark. 1845) (No. 16,187)
(reporting that Rogers drowned before the Supreme Court case was decided).
212. See Clerk's Certificate, United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846) (No. 114),
microformed on U.S. Supreme Court Records and Briefs (Scholarly Resources, Inc.).
213. FRANK, supra note 166, at 284. Given the lack of a recognized right to appointed
counsel at the time and the distance from Little Rock, the lack of representation would not
have raised eyebrows in the Court. Id.
214. Rogers, 45 U.S. at 573-74.
215. Perhaps the case that resonates most closely with the Rogers story is Ex parte Crow
Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883), which led to congressional extension of federal law over internal
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exemplar of this absence. This prosecution of a dead white Indian
was not only well calculated to prevent a full understanding of the
law and facts of the case, but also was illegal.
It is clear today that federal courts have no power to decide cases
regarding the rights of dead criminal defendants.216 It is also
unquestioned that if the parties on both sides of a case do not have
an actual interest in its outcome, the federal courts have no power
to hear it. 217 Outside certain limited exceptions, 218 it is not enough
that a live controversy existed when the case began: if the contro-
versy between the parties no longer exists at the time of appeal, it
is moot.
219
Although the constitutional basis for this rule may not have been
established at the time Rogers was decided, the rule itself certainly
had. As early as 1736, English courts had held that attempting to
feign a dispute in order to have it decided by the courts constituted
contempt of court.220 In 1810, Supreme Court Justice Johnson
Indian affairs. As discussed further below, the matter already had been resolved under BrlA
Sioux law, but was used by the executive branch in the absence of any real controversy to
further its campaign to obtain jurisdiction over crimes between Indians. SIDNEY L. HARRING,
CROW DoG's CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL LAW, AND UNITED STATES LAW IN
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 100-41 (1994). There are, however, many more examples. See, e.g.,
Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 525-27 (1877) (establishing the principle that would
ultimately allow the federal government to take aboriginal title without being subjected to the
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause in a timber dispute between two white men); Johnson v.
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 603 (1823) (establishing U.S. title to Indian land in a
controversy between two non-Indian claimants); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 121-
25 (1810) (discussing Indian property rights in a feigned case between collusive land
speculators); see also Eric Kades, History and Interpretation of the Great Case of Johnson v.
M'Intosh, 19 LAW & HIST. REV. 67, 98-101 (2001) (arguing that Johnson v. M'Intosh was a
feigned case).
216. See Mintzes v. Buchanon, 471 U.S. 154, 154 (1985).
217. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317 (1988) ("[Tihis Court may only adjudicate actual,
ongoing controversies.... That the dispute between the parties was very much alive when suit
was filed, or at the time the Court of Appeals rendered its judgment, cannot substitute for the
actual case or controversy that an exercise of this Court's jurisdiction requires.").
218. See, e.g., County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 51-52 (1991) (holding class
action not moot where any class members still have live claims although class representative's
claims now moot); Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 546 (1976) (finding case not moot
where capable of repetition yet evading review).
219. See Honig, 484 U.S. at 317.
220. See Coxe v. Phillips, 95 Eng. Rep. 152, 152 (I-B. 1736); see also In re Elsam, 107 Eng.
Rep. 855, 856 (K.B. 1824) (fining plaintiff in feigned case forty pounds and ordering
imprisonment until paid even though he did not intend fraud). Although the English courts
would hear certain "feigned cases"--cases where the controversy giving the court jurisdiction
2000
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reiterated this rule in Fletcher v. Peck, stating that he had been
"very unwilling" to decide that case, because it bore marks of being
"a mere feigned case," and, he declared, "[ilt is our duty to decide on
the rights, but not on the speculations of parties." 2 ' Only his belief
that honorable attorneys would not seek to violate this rule
persuaded him to decide the case: "My confidence, however, in the
respectable gentlemen who have been engaged for the parties, has
induced me to abandon my scruples, in the belief that they would
never consent to impose a mere feigned case upon this court."222
Four years after deciding the Rogers case, Justice Taney made
this point even more forcibly in Lord v. Veazie.223 In Veazie, the
Court dismissed a writ of error because there was no real dispute
between the parties. 224 According to Justice Taney:
[A] ny attempt, by a mere colorable dispute, to obtain the opinion
of the court upon a question of law which a party desires to know
for his own interest or his own purposes, when there is no real
over the dispute was fictitious-an attempt to bring a feigned case without the knowledge and
permission of the court was punishable as a contempt of court. See, e.g., Hoskins v. Berkeley,
100 Eng. Rep. 1086, 1086 (K.B. 1791). For origins of the feigned case in England, see Lindsay
G. Robertson, 'A Mere Feigned Case": Rethinking the Fletcher v. Peck Conspiracy and Early
Republican Legal Culture, 2000 UTAH L. REv. 249, 260.
221. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 147 (1810).
222. Id. at 147-48. There is good evidence, of course, that this belief was unjustified, and
that the parties mutually agreed to create the suit for purposes of establishing that their title
was valid despite a Georgia act invalidating land purchases including the land at issue. See
NEWMYER, supra note 61, at 225. There is also no reason to believe that either Justice
Marshall or Justice Johnson was deceived as to the feigned nature of the case. Justice
Marshall was a savvy politician, not easily duped by his trust in human honor. It is more
likely that Marshall knew the suit was collusive, but used it as a vehicle to resolve an
important point of law, and that Johnson was using his concurrence to accuse Marshall of
countenancing this collusion. See Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 233 (Johnson, J., concurring). By 1846,
however, the assertion that the Court could not decide a feigned suit and that honorable
attorneys would not seek to impose one upon the Court was firmly established despite the
reality taking place behind the opinion. See Robertson, supra note 220, at 263 (suggesting that
the use of feigned cases was accepted in the period before Fletcher but that popular opinion
had turned against them by the time the case was decided).
223. 49 U.S. (8 How.) 251 (1850).
224. Id. at 254. Nathaniel Lord had sued John Veazie concerning a covenant purporting
to transmit Veazie's right of way on the Penobscot River to Lord. Id. at 252. The issue in the
suit was not whether Veazie had refused to transmit the right to Lord, but whether Veazie
had the right of way at all, the state having awarded an exclusive right of way to William and
Daniel Moor, who were not named in the suit. Id. at 251. The Circuit Court of the United
States for the District of Maine had issued an order pro forma in favor of the defendant so
that the case might be heard on writ of error to the Supreme Court. Id. at 256.
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and substantial controversy between those who appear as
adverse parties to the suit, is an abuse which courts of justice
have always reprehended, and treated as a punishable contempt
of court.2 2 5
The circuit court judgment upon which the writ of error was based
was also invalid: "A judgment in form, thus procured, in the eye of
the law is no judgment of the court. It is a nullity, and no writ of
error will lie upon it."226
When Rogers was heard, moreover, numerous state supreme
court opinions had also established that where events subsequent
to the commencement of a suit had ended the controversy between
the parties, the case could not be heard.227 In the decades after the
Rogers decision, the U.S. Supreme Court would accept without
question the principle that the Court "does not sit here to decide
questions arising in cases which no longer exist, in regard to rights
which it cannot enforce."225
225. Id. at 255.
226. Id. at 256.
227. In 1817, the New York Chancery Court refused to decide a lawsuit that had been
settled except for the issue of costs, holding that 'sound policy would seem to condemn" a
decision on the merits of a case in which there was no longer any real controversy between
the parties. Eastburnv. Kirk, 1 N.Y. Ch. Ann. 393,393-94 (1817). In 1844, the Supreme Court
of Illinois decided that where the defendant had relinquished his claim to a disputed property,
and transferred it to the plaintiff, "[t]here was no subject matter left to be tried" and the
appeal was correctly dismissed. Morgan v. Griffin, 6 Ill. (1 Gilm.) 565, 566 (1844). The
Supreme Court of Louisiana ruled in 1843 that where, during the pendency of an action to
remove a minor from the control of her grandmother, the minor had married and thereby
legally freed herself from her grandmother's guardianship, "lilt is clear, that the present
appeal is now without any object, and that, under the circumstances, it should be dismissed
at the costs of the appellant." In re Wilds, 6 Rob. 31, 31 (La. 1843). The U.S. Supreme Court
finally did so as well, in 1861, by dismissing a writ of error because the appellant had
purchased the interest of the appellee during the pendency of the suit. Cleveland v.
Chamberlain, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 419, 419 (1861).
228. Cheong Ah Moy v. United States, 113 U.S. 216, 218 (1885) (dismissing challenge to
deportation order where petitioner deported during pendency of suit); see also California v.
San Pablo & Tulane R.R. Co., 149 U.S. 308, 314 (1893):
(rihe court is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions,
or to declare, for the government of future cases, principles or rules of law which
cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. No
stipulation of parties or counsel, whether in the case before the court or in any
other case, can enlarge the power, or affect the duty, of the court in this regard.
San Pablo & Tulane R.R. Co., 149 U.S. at 314; cf Gardner v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co.,
131 U.S. 103 (1873) (dismissing writ where parties reached compromise during course of
appeal); Wood Paper Co. v. Heft, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 333,336-37 (1869) (dismissing writ of error
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It was also very clear that a criminal appeal could not be heard
after the death of the defendant. The rule at common law was that
a suit abated at the death of either of the parties. 29 Although
Congress modified this rule with respect to suits for compensation
in 1789,230 a cause of action that was punitive in nature did not
survive the death of the defendant. 231 A criminal case thus ended
with the life of the accused.32
By trying a dead white Indian in the Supreme Court, therefore,
the Attorney General asked the Court to preside over a "nullity,"233
contravening the rules observed by "respectable gentlemen,"" and
committing an "abuse which courts of justice have always repre-
hended."235 I will next examine the reasons behind this extraordi-
nary step.
III. THE QUEST FOR FEDERAL POWER
In the Rogers case, the executive branch, likely aided by the
district court in Arkansas, incurred time, expense, and risk of
contempt of court to argue for its right to prosecute a dead man.
Why was the federal government so eager to establish its power to
exercise criminal jurisdiction in Indian country? Why was it so
intent to establish its ability to say who was an Indian for purposes
of federal law?
The answer is complex: The Rogers case came at a time when
national military aspirations, the organizational interests of the
developing Indian Department bureaucracy, and the growth of the
scientific discipline of ethnology all converged to support the
increase in federal power over individual Indians.
where plaintiffs had purchased assets of defendants during pendency of suit); Cleveland, 66
U.S. at 425-26 (dismissing writ of error by appellant that had purchased interest of appellee
and finding contempt of court).
229. See, e.g., Macker's Heirs v. Thomas, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 530, 531 (1822).
230. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 31, 1 Stat. 73, 90 (1789).
231. See Ex parte Schreiber, 110 U.S. 76, 80 (1884); see also Little v. Conant, 19 Mass. (1
Pick.) 527, 527 (1824); People v. Gibbs, 9 Wend. 29, 30 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832); Reed v. Cist, 7
Serg. & Rawle 183, 183 (Pa. 1821).
232. List v. Pennsylvania, 131 U.S. 396, 396 (1888).
233. Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 251, 256 (1850).
234. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 147-48 (1810).
235. Veazie, 49 U.S. at 255.
2004] 2003
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
A. Why Did the Court Go Along?
As discussed above, the rules announced in Rogers regarding
federal power and tribal sovereignty constituted a significant break
with the prior jurisprudence of the Court. Other scholars have
blamed this disregard for precedent on the Court. In particular,
authors have condemned Justice Taney for the Rogers opinion,236
often linking its disregard for tribal rights to his dehumanization
of African Americans in the infamous Dred Scott opinion.237 The
evidence suggests, however, that Taney did little more than rubber
stamp the opinions presented to him by the Attorney General. Much
of the opinion seems directly drawn from the arguments that U.S.
Attorney Samuel Hempstead had made in Little Rock almost a year
earlier.238 Attorney General Mason probably contributed the rest
of the opinion in his argument before the Supreme Court. Given
the death of the defendant, there was no one to present Taney
with an alternative opinion. The only argument against jurisdiction,
therefore, was the one page objection that Rogers had drafted in his
jail cell.
The disconnect between Rogers and Justice Taney's other
comments on Indian law provides further evidence that Taney
had little to do with writing the opinion. Famously, in Dred Scott,
Justice Taney remarked that:
The situation of [the African] population was altogether unlike
that of the Indian race .... [The Indians] were yet a free and
independent people, associated together in nations or tribes, and
governed by their own laws .... These Indian Governments were
regarded and treated as foreign Governments, as much so as if
an ocean had separated the red man from the white; and their
freedom has constantly been acknowledged, from the time of the
first emigration to the English colonies to the present day.....
236. Rotenberg, supra note 16, at 420.
237. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856); WIUKINS, supra note 29, at
44; Frank Shockey, "Invidious American Indian Tribal Sovereignty, 25 AM. INDIAN L. REv.
275, 284 (2001).
238. See ARK. ST. GAZETTE, Apr. 21, 1845, at 2.
239. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 403-04
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Can this be the same man who wrote that Indian tribes had
"never been acknowledged or treated as independent nations by the
European governments" in the Rogers opinion?24°
Dred Scott also turns the Rogers perspective on Indian property
rights on its head:
Many of these political communities were situated in territories
to which the white race claimed the ultimate right of dominion.
But that claim was acknowledged to be subject to the right of the
Indians to occupy it as long as they thought proper, and neither
the English nor colonial Governments claimed or exercised any
dominion over the tribe or nation by whom it was occupied, nor
claimed the right to the possession of the territory, until the
tribe or nation consented to cede it.'
What had become of the view that tribal land could be "divided
and parcelled out ... as if it had been vacant and unoccupied
land"?4 '2 These reversals led to David Wilkins' apt demand that "the
real Justice Taney please stand up."2"
One might understandably read the disjunction between the
Rogers and Dred Scott opinions as opportunistic. When the question
was one of Indian rights, race was equivalent to political status, and
tribal sovereignty was nonexistent. In Dred Scott, one could argue,
the Court affirmed tribal sovereignty and divorced Indian race from
status only to highlight their unity for the African American
plaintiff.2" It is hard to deny that Indian race and sovereignty are
conveniently malleable depending on the federal needs at the
240. United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572 (1846).
241. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 403-04.
242. Rogers, 45 U.S. at 572. In the one bit of evidence that Taney retained any memory of
the Rogers opinion, he conceded that
[ilt is true that the course of events has brought the Indian tribes within the
limits of the United States under subjection to the white race; and it has been
found necessary, for their sake as well as our own, to regard them as in a state
of pupilage, and to legislate to a certain extent over them and the territory they
occupy.
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 404. This qualified expression of federal power is still a far cry from the
expansive "dominion and control" asserted in Rogers. Rogers, 45 U.S. at 572.
243. WILKINS, supra note 29, at 49.
244. See, e.g., Milner S. Ball, Stories of Origin and Constitutional Possibilities, 87 MICH.
L. REV. 2280, 2299 n.89 (1989) ("Perhaps the endorsement of Indian autonomy in Dred Scott
had the sole purpose of comparing Indians with black people to the detriment of the latter.").
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time.245 While Taney was on the Court, however, he presided over
several cases affirming Indian rights against those of non-Indians.
Taney was Chief Justice when the Court issued its most powerful
opinion on tribal property rights, declaring it "a settled principle,
that [the Indians'] right of occupancy is considered as sacred as the
fee-simple of the whites."2" Two years before Rogers, Taney
presided over the Court when it issued its opinion in Ladiga v.
Roland affirming the duty of the federal courts to review and correct
federal miscarriages of justice to the Indians." 7 In 1856, moreover,
his Court prohibited state citizens from ejecting Indians even from
lands to which the government had extinguished the Indian right of
occupancy, holding that because the agreement to leave the lands
had been made with the tribe "as a quasi nation, possessing some of
the attributes of an independent people," only the federal govern-
ment could remove them from the lands.2"
In addition, in his brief tenure as Secretary of War, Justice Taney
had written several opinions for the attorney general that were
fairly respectful of Indian rights. In particular, Justice Taney
appears to have articulated the method of interpreting Indian
treaties that was a cornerstone of Justice Marshall's pro-tribal
jurisprudence before Marshall himself did. Concerning the interpre-
tation of the Choctaw Treaty of 1828, Justice Taney opined:
In an instrument of this sort, and made with such persons as the
Choctaws, I do not think that strict and technical rules of
construction should be applied to it. It ought to be expounded
liberally, according to its spirit, so as to give the Indians all the
advantages and facilities in their removal, which appears to
have been contemplated by the general scope and spirit of the
treaty.249
This principle of liberal construction of Indian treaties would
become one of the most influential elements of Justice Marshall's
245. See Conference, Race, Law and Justice: The Rehnquist Court and the American
Dilemma, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 567, 608-11 (1996) (Professor Nell Newton speaking).
246. Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 746 (1835).
247. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 581 (1844).
248. Fellows v. Blacksmith, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 366, 371 (1856).
249. Choctaw Reserves Under Supplemental Treaty, 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 465, 467 (1831).
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Cherokee opinions." ° Marshall, however, would not articulate it
until 1832-a year after Taney's letter."'
This divergence between Taney's other statements of Indian law
and Rogers suggests that the case should not be considered as
primarily an opinion about Indian law. For the Court, the case
likely was not about federal power over tribes, but instead about the
power of the federal government over the North American continent.
On March 1, 1845, Congress had annexed Texas to the United
States, a move quickly followed by military buildup by both sides on
the U.S.-Mexico border.252 On March 4, 1845, President Polk had
declared the "unquestionable" right of the United States to
Oregon, 53 whose ownership it had previously shared with the
British. On December 2, 1845, President Polk used his first annual
message to declare that the "continent [was] a unity" under
American control.25 4 The tensions with Mexico and Great Britain
came to a head at the time Rogers was being argued before the
Court, culminating in a declaration of war against Mexico in May
1846, and the establishment of the forty-ninth parallel between the
United States and Canada that June.2 5 The Court probably saw the
Rogers case as one about federal power over North American
territory-a question over which the country was about to enter one
if not two wars, and hardly one over which the Court would wish to
question the Attorney General.2"6 For the Court, at least, the case
250. See, e.g., Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 199 (1975) (citing Worcester v. Georgia,
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), as origin of the canons of construction of Indian treaties); see also
Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 193-200 (1999) (relying on
Indian canons of construction to hold that off-reservation hunting and fishing rights had not
been extinguished); Frickey, supra note 47, at 398 (discussing indebtedness of modern Indian
law to Marshall's interpretive strategies).
251. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 551-56 (interpreting treaties with the Cherokees).
252. See MARTIN SIEGEL, THE TANEY CoURT: 1836-1864, at 32 (1987).
253. Id.
254. Id. at 33.
255. Id. at 35-36.
256. Three of the four decisions preceding Rogers in 1846 similarly emphasized the
supremacy of federal power. See Hunt v. Palao, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 589 (1846) (invalidating a
Florida law declaring federal territorial court records part of the records of the new state of
Florida); United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 286 (1846) (holding the United States
exempt from suits or decrees pertaining to court costs); Jourdan v. Barrett, 45 U.S. (4 How.)
169 (1846) (holding that title to public domains of the United States could not be granted by
state law).
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was not seen as a considered opinion concerning Indian law, but
rather as one about control over American lands in a time of war.
B. The Executive Push for Power
The same cannot be said for the executive branch. While Congress
and the courts were promulgating a fairly robust view of tribal
sovereignty and a concomitantly restrained view of federal power in
Indian relations, the executive branch was advocating the extension
of broad power over Indian lives.
1. Bureaucratic Consolidation
Before the 1830s, the exercise of executive power over Indians
was haphazard, guided by no legislation and without accountability
to Congress. According to the 1834 House Report on reorganization,
"[tihe present organization of [the Indian Department was] of
doubtful origin and authority. Its administration is expensive,
inefficient, and irresponsible."2"7 The tribes were too far from the
Government
to make their complaints against the arbitrary acts of our agents
heard; and it is believed they have had much cause of complaint.
Hitherto they have suffered in silence. The agents, being subject
to no immediate control, have acted under scarcely any other
responsibility than that of accountability for moneys received.'
The proposed reorganization was designed to reign in the arbitrary
power of federal Indian agents and the resulting abuses of the
Indians.259 Agents were made accountable to superintendents, who
were in turn accountable to the newly created Commissioner of
Indian Affairs and finally the President.2" This process was the
culmination of a gradual process of bureaucratization of Indian
policy, beginning with the creation of the Indian Department in
257. See H.R. REP. No. 23474, at 2 (1834).
258. Id. at 8.
259. Id.
260. Id.
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1822, and the designation of an appointed Commissioner of Indian
Affairs in 1832.
In trying to reduce executive power, however, Congress created
the incentive and means to increase it. By creating direct lines of
accountability and reporting, the Reorganization Act of 1834261
created a centralized bureaucracy and a direct channel to influence
national Indian policy. Each year, individual agents would report to
their superintendents, who in turn reported to the Commissioner
of Indian Affairs, who then reported to the Secretary of War. All
of these reports were compiled in the Annual Report of the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, which was presented to the
President and Congress. What had been a diffuse exercise of power
by many individual agents now became a centralized administra-
tive agency.2
These forces came together in 1845 with President Polk's
appointment of William Medill as the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs. 63 Medill, a former U.S. Representative, had leapfrogged
into the commissionership a few months after his appointment as
second assistant postmaster general.264 He was an ambitious man
who sought to transform the post into a springboard to greater
political positions, and who became Governor of Ohio soon after his
commissionership ended.2  Under him, the Indian Department
began to formulate its ambitious reservation policy, under which
reservations would be seen not as sovereign territories of the tribes,
but essentially as schools in which the Indians would be groomed for
assimilation.2
261. H.R. 488, 23d Cong. (1st Sess. 1834) (enacted).
262. See ROBERT A. TRENNERT, JR., ALTERNATIVE TO EXTINCTION: FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY
AND THE BEGINNINGS OF THE RESERVATION SYSTEM: 1846-51, at 3-5 (1975).
263. See id. at 17.
264. OHIO HIST. SOCkY, OHnO FUNDAMENTAL DOCUMENTS, available at http:/Iwww.
ohiohistory.org/onlinedoc/ohgovernment/governorshnedill.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2004).
265. Id.
266. See TRENNERT, supra note 262, at 29-31; see also United States v. Clapox, 35 F. 575,
577 (D. Or. 1888) ("[Tlhe reservation itself is in the nature of a school, and the Indians are
gathered there, under the charge of an agent, for the purpose of acquiring the habits, ideas,
and aspirations which distinguish the civilized from the uncivilized man.").
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2. Emergence of Ethnology
This bureaucratic growth in interest in the lives of Indians was
accompanied by a parallel scientific development. The 1830s saw
the emergence of the science of ethnology, the study of the distinc-
tive characteristics of races and peoples.26 People like George
Caitlin, Thomas McKinney, and Henry Schoolcraft began to collect
data, artifacts, and stories regarding the history and culture of
Indian people."26 Like the reorganization of the Indian Department,
this development was also an outgrowth of the increased concern for
Indian tribes. Like reorganization, it would also backfire against
tribes. Although many of the new scientists were motivated by an
intent to help Indians towards a more prosperous future, the
development also created a profession of people who believed they
were peculiarly qualified to say what was best for the Indian.
This movement won a victory in 1846, when in response to a
petition by the new Indian scholars, Congress first ordered compila-
tion of an annual census of the Indians of the United States.269 The
census was not a mere enumeration, but was intended to encompass
the "history, current conditions, and prospects of the Indians."2 v°
This development was explicitly connected to an expanded role for
the federal government in overseeing the lives of the Indians. The
next year, in an appeal to Congress for appropriations to conduct
this study, the scholars argued that the results would be valuable
"not only to history and ethnology, but important, and indeed
necessary, to enable government to perform its high and sacred
duties of protection and guardianship over the weak and still savage
267. 5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 425 (2d ed. 1989) (citing uses of the term in 1842 and
1847).
268. ROBERT E. BERKHOFER, JR., THE WHITE MAN'S INDIAN: IMAGES OF THE AMERICAN
INDIAN FROM COLUMBUS TO THE PRESENT 89 (1979).
269. The Constitution, while requiring a census of all persons in the United States,
specifically excludes "Indians not taxed" from this enumeration. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
270. Act of June 27, 1846, ch. 34, 9 Stat. 20; SENATE JOURNAL, 29th Cong., 1st Sess., at 491
(Aug. 7, 1846). The Act required the Secretary of War
to avail himself of such means as may be afforded by the organization of the
Indian department to collect all such information as may be practicable
respecting the condition, habits, and progress of the Indian tribes of the United
States, and to lay the same from time to time, as may be convenient, before the
Senate.
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race placed by Providence under its care."27' The Committee on
Indian Affairs "most cheerfully" approved the request, which was
subsequently enacted by Congress.272
3. Battle Between the Cherokee Nation and the Executive
Branch
The Rogers case also came about at the height of the battle
between the executive branch and the Cherokee government
surrounding the so-called Cherokee Civil War. Federal reports of
the Cherokee Nation between 1839 and 1846 were dominated by a
conflict between three groups of Cherokees: what the United States
called the "Ross Party," the Cherokee government of which John
Ross was Chief; the "Old Settlers" or "Western Cherokees," the
Cherokees that had emigrated to the Western Territory before 1835;
and the "Treaty Party," the Cherokees that had signed the 1835
treaty.273 The local military, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, the
271. H.R. REP. No. 29-53, at 2 (2d Sess. 1847). The Indians seem to have understood the
potentially sinister nature of the government's interest, refusing to cooperate with the
voluminous inquiries with which the agents were armed. In 1854, eight years into his project,
Henry Schoolcraft wrote, "It has, from the inception of the plan, been found difficult to
overcome the reluctance of the Indians to furnish their statistics. Even their gross population
has been wrung from them." S. EXEC. Doc. No. 33-13, at 2 (2d Sess. 1854).
272. H.R. REP. No. 29-53, at 1.
273. There were two main sources of this conflict. The Eastern Cherokees were removed
to lands that had already been guaranteed by treaty to 'the old settlers," the 6,000 or so
Cherokees that had agreed to move since 1819, and had set up an independent government
unwilling to relinquish its power. When the new emigrants, led by John Ross, proposed ajoint
government, the leaders of the Old Settlers refused, and instead offered to incorporate the
new emigrants under the rule of the current leaders. When this offer was not accepted, the
Old Settlers walked out of the joint council.
Immediately after the unsuccessful joint council, a large group of the recent emigrant
Cherokees killed Major Ridge, his son John Ridge, and Elias Boudinot-three of the principal
signers of the false 1835 Treaty. Although the killers were careful not to let Chief John Ross
know of their plans, their actions must be understood as political. Cherokee law provided that
the penalty for signing a treaty relinquishing Cherokee land without government authority
was death, and that private citizens carrying out this act were not guilty of murder under
Cherokee law. Major Ridge himself had participated in the enforcement of this law in 1806,
killing Cherokee Chief Doublehead for signing Cherokee land away to the United States. See
WARDELL, supra note 66, at 17-18. While an act of sovereignty, however, the assassinations
were absolutely contrary to federal interests, challenging the basis of the federal removal, and
jeopardizing a long-standing method of obtaining a treaty from a tribe that did not want to
negotiate.
Although within a few months most influential people among the Old Settlers, including
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Secretary of War, and the President repeatedly argued that the
federal government needed to intervene to protect the Old Settlers
and the Treaty Party from oppression and violence at the hands of
the dominant party.274 During this period, Cherokee country was
briefly placed under military rule, Fort Gibson provided protection
and rations to Cherokees leaving Cherokee land for the Arkansas
border, and the President threatened to partition Cherokee land in
response to the conflict. 5
Like the claims that federal jurisdiction was needed to protect
Cherokees from unscrupulous white men, the claim that federal
interference was necessary to protect the Cherokees from them-
selves seems unfounded. The Cherokees on both sides of the dispute
were savvy political actors, and reports from either side must be
taken with a grain of salt. But independent reports of the situation
in Cherokee country simply do not confirm the views of the federal
government. As discussed above, the detailed report of the 1840
trial of Archilla Smith, a member of the Treaty Party, was marked
by conspicuous concern for fairness.2 7 ' That same year, the Senate
Committee on Indian Affairs drafted a report declaring that not only
did the executive branch have no authority to interfere as it had, but
also that its interference had only prolonged the conflict by encour-
aging the Old Settler chiefs to continue their opposition to the joint
government. 7 The Committee agreed to six resolutions, starting
with the resolution that "the interference of the Executive in the
affairs of the Cherokee Indians ... [was] an assumption of discretion-
ary power contrary to the principles of the Constitution."278 After
reaching these resolutions, however, five of the nine members of the
Committee retracted their decision to publish the report, and the
one of their three chiefs, agreed to form a cooperative government with the new emigrants,
the above factors irrevocably turned the local military commander, General Arbuckle, as well
as the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and the Secretary of War against the Ross Party. In
the early stage of the conflict, it was General Arbuckle, rather than the Old Settlers, who
provided written condemnations of the Ross government. Throughout the period from 1839
to 1846, moreover, the executive branch provided support and assistance to the Old Settlers
and members of the Treaty Party and repeatedly argued for federal authority to intervene.
274. Id. at 63.
275. Id. at 64-70.
276. See supra text accompanying notes 185-87.
277. Mr. Bell's Suppressed Report, supra note 108, at 22.
278. Id.; see also CHEROKEE ADVOC., Feb. 12, 1846-Mar. 26, 1846.
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House forbade the resolutions from being reported.2"9 Angered at
what he perceived to be political quashing of the report, Committee
member John A. Bell of Tennessee released it to the National
Intelligencer, where it was published as Mr. Bell's Suppressed
Report.28 °
The report of an independent commission appointed by the
Secretary of War is even more persuasive.281 The Board of Inquiry
spent two months in Cherokee territory, during which it received
reports from 908 members of the opposition parties, 546 Old Settlers
and 362 Treaty Party members.282 Most of the reports did not
complain of wrongs or oppression by the dominant party, but rather
of the desire for money from the United States to compensate for
occupation of their land by the eastern emigrants and for the per
capita payments promised under their treaties but withheld by the
United States.28 Apparently the leaders of the Old Settlers told
them that if more than 400 Cherokees enrolled with the Commis-
sion, the Cherokee territory would be partitioned and that they
would get money from the United States for the part assigned to the
Eastern Cherokees. 4 There was thus little evidence of repression
by the Cherokee government, and many indications that economic
concerns rather than political ones motivated the complainants. 2m
In addition, many of those testifying were not in favor of partition
at all, but rather were anxious to see harmony restored to the
Nation.2' The Commissioners also found little evidence of the
reputed divisions between the parties. They found that the
political distinctions between new emigrants and Old Settlers had
disappeared by 1841, and that, by the time of the Commission,
Western Cherokees held a majority of legislative, judicial, and other
offices. 7 The claims of unjustified arrests were also not supported
279. Mr. Bell's Suppressed Report, supra note 108, at 1 (July 27, 1840 letter from John Bell
to editors of the National Intelligencer).
280. Id.
281. WnIAm WILKINS, THE REPORT AND CORRESPONDENCE OF THE BOARD OF INQUIRY, TO
PROsECUTE AN EXAMINATION INTO THE CAUSES AND EXTENT OF THE DISCONTENTS AND
DIFFICULTIS AMONG THE CHEROKEE INDIANS, S. DOC. No. 28-140, at 1 (2d Sess. 1845).
282. Id. at 5.
283. Id. at 6.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 8.
286. Id.
287. Id. Another complaint of the opposition was that the 1840 Act of Union between the
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by the evidence; rather, the arrests appeared to have been made for
sufficient and just cause.'
The Commission found a significant threat to the safety of the
Cherokees, but it was not the one that the federal government
expected. The Commission stated that:
It cannot be denied that human life in the Cherokee country is
in danger-great danger. But the danger lies in the frequent and
stealthy incursions of a desperate gang of banditti ... whose
fraternity is not of the dominant party; nor are the dangers from
these outlaws most dreaded by the parties who send up their
complaints of the insecurity of life.2"9
In fact, the Cherokees had complained of these outlaws for years,
but the military at Fort Gibson and the Arkansas residents on the
Cherokee border, citing oppression by the Cherokee government,
had helped them to elude capture.2"
The only valid causes for complaint were ones that the Board
of Inquiry had not been appointed to investigate, as they had
been overshadowed by the unfounded complaints of a few."9
These complaints did not concern the Cherokee government, but
the failure of the U.S. government to keep its promises did. The
Commission believed that the Western Cherokees should be
compensated for the imposition of the Eastern Cherokees on the
land reserved to the Western Cherokees by treaty, and that the
Eastern Cherokees might have a claim for compensation for any
monies paid to the Western Cherokees from the proceeds of the sale
of the Eastern Cherokee lands in the Southeast.29 In addition, the
old and new settlers was a fraudulent document fabricated by the new settlers with an
unrepresentative minority of Old Settlers. Id. at 7. Despite this, seven of the twelve Western
Cherokees that signed the Act of Union had been selected to represent their complaints before
the Commission. Id. at 7-8. The Board concluded that had the signers indeed acted against
the authority or wishes of the Old Settlers in 1840, they would not again be deputed to
represent their people. Id.
288. Id. at 9.
289. Id. at 9-10. These banditti were members of the Starr gang, who, while children of one
of the signers of the 1835 Treaty and motivated by the perceived unfairness of the Ross
government, attacked white travelers not connected to either party as well as Cherokees.
WARDELL, supra note 66, at 54.
290. WARDELL, supra note 66, at 66-67.
291. S. Doc. No. 28-140, at 11.
292. Id. at 12.
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Commission agreed that the Cherokees had been unjustly denied
the per capita payments to which they were entitled to under the
1835 treaty.293 The Cherokee government had pressed this com-
plaint with the United States for years, but it had always been
pushed aside with federal complaints regarding the Cherokee
leadership. The Commission strongly recommended a new treaty to
settle these claims.294
With respect to the claims of oppression by the Cherokee
government, however, the commissioners had found that,
even while present on the spot, where they are able in most
cases to elicit the truth, complaints have come up, either
frivolous in the extreme, or not true. And it is believed that the
"old settlers" and "treaty party" enjoy, under the "act of union"
and the constitution of the Cherokee nation, liberty, property,
and life, in as much insecurity as the rest of the Cherokees."
The Commission also found that the bitterness against the domi-
nant party was "confined only to a few.... [Tihe masses on either
side, are as well disposed to each other as in most communities
divided into political parties."2" Whether they would be able to live
in harmony depended mainly on the actions of the United States.
Nothing is more calculated to keep alive the flame of discord in
the Cherokee nation, than the belief that the restless or discon-
tented, though comparatively few in number, will always find a
ready audience at Washington, and the hope that complaints of
oppressions, and the like, may enlist the sympathies of the
Government and the community.
9 7
This report, although published, was wholly ignored.298 Only a year
later, the President of the United States used oppression by the
Cherokee government as the central argument for extending federal
293. Id. at 12-14.
294. Id. at 14.
295. Id. at 10.
296. Id. at 11.
297. Id.
298. See MCLOUGHLUN, supra note 65, at 47-48 (describing surprise and inaction in
response to the Commission's report).
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criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.299 Despite the failure to obtain
such jurisdiction, the Cherokee Civil War mysteriously came to an
end a few months later after the federal government agreed to a
new treaty that satisfied many of the claims for compensation and
ended hopes for a profitable partition of Cherokee lands.3" The
reliance on useful fiction instead of fact during the Cherokee Civil
War bears a striking resemblance to similar fabrications in the
Rogers case.3" 1
4. Executive Use of the Rogers Decision
In Rogers," the executive branch got exactly what it wanted. The
opinion immediately helped to transform Indian policy, justifying
the Reservation Policy that was coalescing in the Indian Depart-
ment. In April 1846, the month after the decision was announced,
President Polk asked Congress to pass legislation extending federal
jurisdiction over crimes between Indians on reservations. 3 Three
months later, Commissioner Medill relied on Rogers to justify this
request:
Of the original power and right of the United States to subject
the Indian tribes within the limits of their sovereignty to any
system of laws having for their object the prevention or punish-
ment of crime, or the melioration of the condition and improve-
ment of the red race, there cannot be a doubt. The correct
doctrine on this point is laid down in the decision of the Supreme
court [sic], at its recent term, in the case of the United States vs.
William S. Rogers.... These views of the highest judicial tribunal
of the land must be deemed to be conclusive. 0'
299. JAMES K. POLK, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES RELATIVE TO
THE CHEROKEE DIFFICULTIES, H.R. Doc. No. 29-185, at 2 (1st Sess. 1846).
300. WILLIAM MEDILL, REPORT OF THE COMMSSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, S. Doc. No. 29-
11, at 218 (2d Sees. 1846) ("Since the provisions of the treaty were generally made known in
the country, not a murder or outrage, unfortunately of frequent occurrence previously, has
been reported.").
301. See United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 571-73 (1864); S. Doc. No. 29-11,
at 218.
302. Rogers, 45 U.S. at 567.
303. H.R. Doc. No. 29-185, at 2.
304. S. Doc. No. 29-461, at 2 (lst Sees. 1846) (setting forth a July 21, 1846 letter from
William Medill to Senator Ashley).
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The bill was never enacted. Congress apparently was not ready for
this abrupt expansion of federal power into Indian country. °" But
the decision continued to inform the views of the executive branch.
Between the years 1846 and 1850, Commissioner Medill and the
Indian Department formulated the Reservation Policy that domi-
nated Indian policy from 1853 through the 1870s.3' This policy
concentrated tribes on small reservations and appointed Indian
agents to "civilize" them through such methods as dividing their
land in severalty and forcing them to become farmers, denying them
rations if their children failed to attend school, and punishing them
for practicing their traditional religions.3 v
The Indian Department saw the Rogers opinion as establishing
its legal authority to take these intrusive steps. In 1851, for
example, the Governor of the Minnesota Territory advocated the
division of Indian lands among individual Indians, and the creation
and enforcement of laws to secure the rights of individual property
owners.31' Although Governor Ramsay recognized that this would
amount to an unprecedented intrusion on tribal sovereignty, he
asserted that the Rogers decision
disposes at once of the fanciful pretensions and artificial rules of
construction to which the assumed sovereignty of Indian tribes
305. Providing additional evidence that the proposal was not in line with current
congressional Indian policy, the bill was sponsored by the Senate Judiciary Committee, rather
than the Committee on Indian Affairs, which sponsored most other amendments to the Indian
laws. Id. at 1.
306. The Commissioner of Indian Affairs proposed a plan
to colonize our Indian tribes beyond the reach, for some years, of our white
population; confining each within a small district of country, so that, as the
game decreases and becomes scarce, the adults will gradually be compelled to
resort to agriculture and other kinds of labor to obtain a subsistence.
WILLIAM MEDILL, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, H.R. ExEc. Doc. No, 30-
1, at 386 (2d Sess. 1848); see also CHARLES E. MIX, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN
AFFAIRS, S. EXEC. Doc. No. 35-1, at 354-59 (2d Sess. 1858) (stating that policy was first
implemented in 1853); TRENNERT, supra note 262, at 29-31 (dating beginning of reservation
idea to 1845).
307. See infra note 310, see also S. ExEc. Doc. No. 35-1, at 357-58 (stating that Indians
must "be subjected to the pangs of hunger, if not actual starvation" to force them to become
farmers); 2 FRANcIs P. PRUcHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND
AMERICAN INDIANS 317 (1984). As discussed below, as these were matters of executive policy
rather than statute, much of the policy must be deduced from the treaties enacted at the time.
308. LUKE LEA, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, S. EXEC. Doc. No. 31-1,
at 416-17 (1st Sess. 1851) (setting forth the report of Governor Alexander Ramsay,
Superintendent of the Minnesota Superintendency).
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has so often given rise, and provides ... for the prescription of
laws, which shall not alone punish criminal offenses, but which
may also protect the more delicate and complicated rights which
arise when the relations between man and man are carried to a
high degree of perfection.
Congress did not codify these policies; instead they were simply
a matter of executive policy and the practice of individual agents
and treaty commissioners.310 In the 1880s, however, Congress began
to enact laws mandating the policies the Indian Department had
long practiced.311 As discussed in Part V below, when these laws
were challenged before the Supreme Court, the Court used the
Rogers decision as the core precedent to justify them.312
IV. REVISITING THE ROLE OF RACE IN UNITED STATES V. ROGERS
Scholars frequently cite the Rogers decision313 as evidence that
federal Indian law is all about race l.31  Despite these assertions, the
decision has had little influence on the definition of the Indian as an
individual. Later cases seeking to define who is an Indian are all
over the map: some, while following Rogers' requirement of Indian
309. Id. at 417.
310. For treaties providing that tribal lands would be divided among individual Indians,
see Treaty with the Kansas Tribe of Indians, Oct. 5, 1859, U.S.-Kansas Indians, art. 1, 12
Stat. 1111, 1111; Treaty with the Sisseeton, & C., Sioux, June 19, 1858, U.S.-Sisseeton
Indians-Sioux Indians, art. 1, 12 Stat. 1037, 1037; Treaty with the Wyandotts, Jan. 31, 1855,
U.S.-Wyandott Indians, art. 3,10 Stat. 1159,1160. For treaties denying parents compensation
and rations if they did not send their children to school, see Treaty with the Poncas, Mar. 12,
1858, U.S.-Ponca Indians, art. 2, 12 Stat. 997, 998; Treaty with the Pawnees, Sept. 24, 1857,
U.S.-Pawnee Indians, art. 3, 11 Stat. 729, 730.
311. See Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, § 6,24 Stat. 388, 390 (1887) (making every Indian who
accepted an allotment a citizen of the United States, and subject to U.S. laws); Act of Mar. 3,
1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885) (applying local criminal laws to Indians on
reservations, and giving local courts jurisdiction in criminal cases involving Indians or
occurring on Indian land).
312. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375,380-81 (1886) (relying on Rogers to uphold act
asserting jurisdiction); Exparte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556,559-60 (1883) (relying on Rogers for
the proposition that Congress could assert federal jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country);
see also The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 619 (1870) (relying on Rogers to uphold
extension of federal tax laws to Indians on reservation); Newton, supra note 16, at 210-11
(tracing origins of plenary power doctrine to Rogers).
313. United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1864).
314. See, e.g., Ford, supra note 10, at 1263-67; Snowden et al., supra note 9, at 200-16;
Owen, supra note 10, at 178-79.
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blood, hold that the individual must also be a member of a federally
recognized Indian community;315 others hold that Indian status
must be inherited from one's mother;316 some hold that it must be
inherited from one's father;317 and still others hold that it can be
asserted without any Indian blood at all. 318 In Elk v. Wilkins,319 a
case often condemned as affirming racism toward individual
Indians, both the majority and the dissent cited Rogers as support-
ing their conclusions.32 °
Was it then a coincidence that the quest for power described in
this Article coincided with the first time the Supreme Court defined
"Indian" as an explicitly racial category? Or can Rogers be taken as
evidence that Indian law is based on assumptions regarding the
biological differences between Indians and whites? Neither explana-
tion is correct. This Part argues that race played a significant role
in the Rogers case, one integrally tied to the diminished understand-
315. United States v. Prentiss, 273 F.3d 1277, 1282-83 (10th Cir. 2001).
316. See, e.g., Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499, 501 (1896) (holding that a child of a
black slave mother and Choctaw father took status of mother and was not Indian for purposes
of federal law).
317. United States v. Hadley, 99 F. 437,438 (D. Wash. 1900) (stating that a child of a white
father and Indian mother is not Indian for purposes of federal criminal law).
318. Turner v. Fish, 28 Miss. 306, 310-11 (1854) (holding that a white man that married
a Choctaw woman was entitled to an allotment as the "Choctaw head of a family" under the
Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek); In re Dependency & Neglect of A.L., 442 N.W.2d 233, 235
(S.D. 1989) (finding that a caucasian child adopted by an Indian family was an "Indian child"
for purposes of the Indian Child Welfare Act). Indeed, the year after the Supreme Court's
decision, Judge Johnson again held that the federal court in Little Rock had no jurisdiction
over a white man who had intermarried with the Cherokee tribe, because of a provision in the
1846 treaty pardoning all Cherokee citizens. United States v. Ragsdale, 27 F. Cas. 684, 685-86
(D. Ark. 1847). Although Judge Johnson was careful not to say that Ragsdale had become
Indian through his adoption, Judge Johnson asked: "In this plenary pardon to all native born
Cherokees, why should it not also extend to adopted members of the tribe? After adoption they
became members of the community, subject to all the burdens, and entitled to all the
immunities of native born citizens." Id. at 686. The Supreme Court even went back on its prior
holding. In 1897, inNofire v. United States, the Supreme Court ordered the release of two full-
blooded Cherokees who were charged with the murder of an intermarried white Cherokee
citizen, holding that the Cherokee courts, and not the federal court, had jurisdiction over the
crime. 164 U.S. 657, 660-62 (1897). Although this puzzling conclusion likely was based on an
1890 law providing that the Cherokee courts had exclusive jurisdiction over cases in which
both parties were Cherokee, whether adopted or native born, Act of May 2, 1890, ch. 182, §
31, 26 Stat. 81 (1890), the case did not cite the law. See Nofire, 164 U.S. at 657-62.
319. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 109 (1884) (holding that an Indian who had chosen to
leave the reservation and had fully assimilated with non-Indian society was not a citizen of
the United States and was not entitled to vote in state elections).
320. Id. at 100; id. at 122 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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ing of the power of Indian tribes. This role, however, did not depend
on defining individual Indians according to their race, but defining
tribes as inherently bounded by race, and therefore inherently
inferior to sovereign nations.
A. Cherokee Understandings of Race
This Article's analysis of the role of race in the Rogers case
concentrates on the federal discourse of Indian race, a discourse that
took place largely in the absence of accurate perceptions of Indian
attitudes towards race. Before continuing with this discussion, it is
important to try to understand what race meant to the Cherokees
themselves.
The Cherokees were not unique in naturalizing racial outsiders
as members of the tribe. As others have noted, for many tribes, race
was initially a marker for national distinctions among outsiders
rather than a category in itself.321 Many tribes had practices of
incorporating outsiders, whether through marriage or adoption.322
These incorporations served a variety of political and social pur-
poses. Taking in outsiders might help to cement political alliances,
facilitate trade, or ensure that newcomers would be fully incorpo-
rated into the life of the community.323
321. See ALEXANDRA HARMON, INDIANS IN THE MAKING: ETHNIC RELATIONS AND INDIAN
IDENTITIES AROUND PUGET SOUND 10 (2000) (noting that Northwestern Indians referred to
settlers not as "whites" but as "Bostons" or "King's Men" depending on whether they were
American or English); Carol Chomsky, The United States-Dakota War Trials: A Study in
Military Injustice, 43 STAN. L. REV. 13, 16 n.7 (1990) (arguing that Dakotas perceived conflict
of 1862 as war between Dakota and United States nations, rather than as conflict between
whites and Indians).
322. See MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 65, at 121 (describing Cherokee adoption of captives);
JUNE NAMIAS, WHITE CAPTIVES: GENDER AND ETHNICITY ON THE AMERICAN FRONTIER 3-5
(1993) (describing practice of adopting captives); Berger, supra note 121, at 24-26 (discussing
reasons for intermarriage).
323. See, e.g., JAMES AXTELL, THE INVASION WITHIN: THE CONQUEST OF CULTURES IN
COLONIAL NORTH AMERICA 302-28 (1986) (describing adoption of outsiders as a means of
replacing lost family members); JACQUELINE LOUISE PETERSON, THE PEOPLE IN BETWEEN:
INDIAN-WHITE MARRIAGE AND THE GENESIS OF A METIS SOCIETY AND CULTURE IN THE GREAT
LAKES REGION, 1680-1830, at 87-88 (1981) (describing intermarriage as a "means of
entangling strangers in a series of kinship obligations. Relatives by marriage were expected
not only to deal fairly, but to provide protection, hospitality, and sustenance in time of
famine").
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In the Cherokee Nation, significant numbers of white men began
to intermarry with the Cherokees after the Revolutionary War.
British loyalists settled with the Cherokees, who had supported
England, as a politically sympathetic community and a possible
staging ground for rebellion . 2 4 The names of these men-Adair,
Rogers, Coodey-were later borne by many politically influential
Cherokees. As time went on, some Cherokees who left their lands to
be educated or participate in politics also married outsiders. 2 One
of the earliest written laws of the Cherokee Nation concerned the
status of these intermarried citizens, providing while naturalized
citizens could not hold elected positions, they could vote for office
and their children would have full political rights.
3 26
It might be tempting, given these facts, to portray racial distinc-
tions among Cherokees as wholly external and imposed. That would
be wrong. Just before the turn of the century, around the same time
that Americans were becoming citizens of the Cherokee Nation,
black Americans were becoming Cherokee slaves.3 27 During the
1840s, the same period in which Rogers was decided, the Cherokee
324. WILLAM G. McLoUGHLN, CHEROKEE RENASCENCE IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 20 (1983).
325. The marriages ofElias Boudinot and John Ridge provide a particularly revealing story
about American perceptions of Indian race. Boudinot and Ridge left the reservation in the
1820s to study at the American Board of Missions School in Cornwall, Connecticut, an
academy whose missionaries were preaching racial equality to the Cherokees and to American
policymakers. Id. at 367. While there they became engaged to two young white women. Id.
The residents of the Connecticut town were outraged, holding mass meetings against the
marriage and burning one of the couples in effigy. Id. at 367-68. The trustees of the academy
closed the school to prevent future interracial marriages. Id. at 368. While the Indian wives
of prominent white men were celebrated by some, id. at 70, the idea of white women marrying
dark-skinned men was too much for the New Englanders to stomach. Id. at 368.
326. LAws OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, supra note 182, at 10.
327. MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 324, at 32. During the seventeenth and much of the
eighteenth centuries, Africans living among the Cherokees, like members ofother tribes, were
eligible for adoption and equal citizenship after a period of years. Id. at 338. English-speaking
blacks, with their knowledge of European language, crafts, and customs, could become valued
members of the Cherokee community. Id. Racial consciousness, however, quickly arose with
the influence of the dominant white society and the adoption by elite Cherokees of plantation
agriculture. In 1793, for example, Chief Little Turkey explained that he would never ally with
the Spanish because they seemed more like blacks than "real white people ... and what few
I have seen of them looked like mulattoes, and I would never have anything to say to them."
Id. at 339. Traditional Cherokees adopted a creation myth in which the Great Spirit had
created three kinds of man, allotting the plow and the hoe to the black man. Id. at 342. By
1825, the younger generation of Cherokees took it as a point of pride that among the Cherokee
people "there is hardly any intermixture of Cherokee and African blood." Id. at 339 (citation
omitted).
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tribe adopted laws similar to many southern slave laws, prohibit-
ing marriages between Indians or whites and blacks, outlawing
teaching blacks to read or write, and forbidding blacks from owning
real property, livestock, or firearms.3 2' Although these racial dis-
tinctions may have been inspired by the distinctions Cherokees
observed in white society and the pressure to conform to white
expectations of "civilization,"3 29 neither slavery nor the repressive
laws were the result of direct coercion by outsiders.
At the same time that race was increasingly defining the rights
of blacks in the Cherokee Nation, significant political and class
divisions were arising between mixed bloods and whites and the full
bloods that still composed seven-eighths of the tribe's population.330
Children raised in homes speaking English and practicing non-
Cherokee customs faced far less of a challenge in learning to read
and write in the mission schools.33 1 Christian education thus became
an arena in which full-blooded children felt themselves inferior to
their mixed-blood peers.332 Eventually most full bloods withdrew
their children from the mission schools and spurned the education
they provided.33 With the invention of the Cherokee alphabet by
George Guess, the full bloods quickly became literate, but in their
own language.3 34 The different attitudes towards missionary ed-
ucation corresponded with different attitudes toward the religion
and customs the missionaries preached. Being a mixed blood came
to epitomize a preference for acculturation, Christianity, the English
language, and individualistic materialism, while being full-blooded
328. LAws OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, supra note 182, at 19 (discussing a September 19,
1839 law prohibiting intermarriage between free citizens and slaves or persons of color not
entitled to citizenship); id. at 44 (discussing November 7, 1840 law prohibiting "any free negro
or mulatto, not of Cherokee blood," from owning improvements and prohibiting slaves from
owning livestock or firearms); id. at 53 (noting an October 19, 1841 law allowing organization
of neighborhood patrols to gather and punish blacks leaving owners' premises without pass);
id. at 55 (discussing an October 22, 1841 law prohibiting teaching slaves or blacks not of
Cherokee blood to read or write).
329. MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 324, at 337-38; RENNARD STRICKLAND, FIRE AND THE SPIRTS:
CHEROKEE LAW FROM CLAN TO COURT 80-81 (1975).
330. MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 324, at 360-61.
331. Id. at 361.
332. Id. at 360.
333. Id. at 378.
334. Id. at 350-53; see also MoRRIs L. WARDELL, A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE CHEROKEE
NATION, 1838-1907, at 4 (1938) (noting that Cherokees learned to read and write Cherokee
in three days).
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symbolized a preference for traditional ways and the Cherokee
language. These tensions erupted at least twice in Cherokee politics,
first in "White Path's Rebellion" in 1827... and next in the
Keetoowah Movement of 1858.36
Incorporation of racial outsiders was problematic for reasons
inherent to Cherokee culture as well. Much of traditional Cherokee
law was based on a clanship system in which social obligations were
determined by family connections.3 Incorporation of outsiders
without clan affiliations troubled this system. In particular, one's
primary economic responsibilities were to the members of one's
maternal clan. It was a woman's brothers, sisters, or mother, not
her husband, who were responsible for her economic support.338
Property descended to one's maternal relatives, not to one's spouse.
White men and their relatives, however, felt entitled to inherit and
dispose of the property of their wives.33 9 By 1819, these conflicting
property regimes posed enough of a concern that the Cherokee
Council enacted laws providing that "in order to avoid imposition on
the part of any white man," citizenship by marriage would only be
afforded to white men who were married by ministers of the gospel
or upon obtaining a license from the national council."4 In addition,
a white man could not, by marriage, gain the right to dispose of a
Cherokee woman's property without her consent.34'
White women, about a third of intermarried white citizens, posed
an even greater problem; because clan affiliation descended through
the maternal line, their children had no clan at all.342 It was not
until 1825 that the Nation addressed this problem by providing that
children of Cherokee men and white women were entitled to the
same privileges as children of Cherokee women and white men. 43
Despite these apparently race-based distinctions, political
alliances and attitudes do not appear to have turned on racial
grounds in the same way they did for white Americans. Although
335. MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 324, at 366-67.
336. McLouGm.IN, supra note 65, at 155-58.
337. STRICKLAND, supra note 329, at 22.
338. MCLoUGHLIN, supra note 324, at 13.
339. Id. at 31, 330.
340. See LAWS OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, supra note 182, at 10.
341. Id.
342. McLOUGHLIN, supra note 324, at 333.
343. LAws OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, supra note 182, at 57.
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many Cherokee leaders held significant numbers of slaves, chattel
slavery was confined to mixed and white Cherokees, and only a
third of those (about four percent of the total Cherokee population)
held slaves.344 Poor whites in the South identified with white
slaveholders and supported slavery, but the full-blood component
of the Cherokee Nation opposed it, not because of feelings of
fellowship with black slaves, but because it was part of a materialist
economic and cultural framework contrary to the Cherokee way.
34 5
The repressive slave laws were apparently not enforced because
of widespread resistance to their principles, and some black chil-
dren attended school alongside Cherokee children.3 Abolitionist
missionaries like Evan Jones and Samuel Worcester were influen-
tial with the Cherokee people347 and the Cherokee government long
resisted efforts to have the missionaries expelled for their senti-
ments.348
Even the terms "full blood" and "mixed blood" seem to be
American misnomers for cultural rather than racial divisions. Elias
Boudinot, editor of the Cherokee Phoenix and advocate of preserving
sovereignty through using the white man's tools, was considered a
full-blood Cherokee.349 His brother, Stand Watie, was the leader for
many years of the white and mixed-blood treaty party, while John
Ross, with only one-eighth Cherokee blood, remained Principal
Chief of the Cherokee Nation for forty years largely because of the
support of the full-blood majority.' ° The United Keetowah Society,
the political action group of the "full bloods," was led by Lewis
Downing, who was one-half Cherokee. The criteria for membership,
translated as "[olnly full blood, uneducated [that is, non-English
344. McLOUGHLIN, supra note 65, at 125.
345. Id. at 123.
346. STRICKLAND, supra note 329, at 81-82.
347. MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 65, at 84, 132-34, 154-55. Worcester was also the plaintiff
that successfully challenged Georgia's efforts to prevent his entry onto Cherokee land.
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 562 (1832).
348. LAWS OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, supra note 182, at 33-34 (noting an October 2, 1839
resolution objecting to an order that an agent prohibit Jones from residing among Cherokees);
MCLoUGHLIN, supra note 65, at 142-43 (detailing the efforts of Agent Butler to have Jones and
Worcester expelled).
349. In reality, Boudinot was three-quarters Cherokee, as his mother's father was white.
The family, however, was raised speaking only Cherokee, although Boudinot's father obtained
a western education for his children.
350. MCLoUGHLIN, supra note 65, at 3.
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speaking]""' thus appears to refer to cultural affiliation more than
blood quantum. Similar differences seem to have divided the so-
called mixed- and full-blood factions generally. Although blood
quantum often went along with the attitudes towards assimilation
that divided the factions, it did not define the division.
In other words, race was important for the Cherokees. It was also,
however, less defining of status, education, or politics than outsiders
often imagined it to be. This complex reality accorded poorly with
what American policymakers needed to believe about Indian people.
B. White Americans' Ideas of Indian Race
1. The Racially Equal Indian
The easiest way to understand the function of race in Rogers is as
part of a growing belief that Indian individuals were defined by and
could not overcome their biological racial inheritance. At first
glance, there is some evidence to support this interpretation. The
case coincided with the rise of scientific racism in America. In 1839,
Samuel Morton had published his renowned Crania Americana,
comparing skulls from representatives of Indian tribes to challenge
the biblically derived conception that all human beings descended
from a common origin."5 2 In the 1840s and 1850s, popular journals
published articles on the differences of hair, wool, cranial capacity
and aptitude for civilization of the Caucasian, African, and Ameri-
can races.353 Henry Schoolcraft, the man Congress appointed to
oversee the census and study of the Indians, was an amateur
phrenologist who had published his own observations on his
personal collection of over 410 Indian skulls.5 4 At the same time, in
351. Id. at 158.
352. SAMUEL GEORGE MORTON, CRANIA AMERICANA, OR, A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF THE
SKULLS OF VARIOUS ABORIGINAL NATIONS OF NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA (Philadelphia,
Dobson 1839).
353. See The Hair and Wool of the Different Species of Man, 27 U.S. MAG. & DEMOCRATIC
REV. 451 (1850); James Cowles Prichard, Do the Various Races of Man Constitute a Single
Species?, 11 U.S. MAG. & DEMOCRATIC REV. 113 (1842); see also Reginald Horsman, Scientific
Racism and the American Indian in the Mid-Nineteenth Century, 27 AM. Q. 152 (1975).
354. 2 HENRY R. SCHOOLCRAFT, INFORMATION RESPECTING THE HISTORY, CONDITION AND
PROSPECTS OF THE INDIAN TRIBES OF THE UNITED STATES 328 (Philadelphia, Lippincott,
Grambo & Co. 1853).
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response to abolitionists in the Northeast, pro-slavery states like
Arkansas enacted resolutions stating that blacks and mulattoes
were not citizens of the United States and therefore were not
entitled to the privileges and immunities afforded the citizens of the
several states. 3 ' Rogers might therefore be read as part of a larger
growth of an idea that race was innate and immutable and that the
political status of Indians was an outgrowth of this inevitable
biological inferiority.
There are two problems with this interpretation of Rogers. The
first is that the idea of attaching permanent, race-based disabilities
to Indians as individuals was not new at all and long predated the
new science of race. The colonial laws of Georgia, South Carolina,
and North Carolina declared Indians, along with blacks and
mulattoes, to be "absolute" slaves-property, not only for their lives
but also for the lives of their children.5 6 They could not testify in
court, except against each other, could not marry whites, and in
most other cases were subject to the same disabilities and discrimi-
nation as blacks.357 It was only as political groups, or "Indians in
amity with this government," that Indians occasionally overcame
these racial disabilities.358
Thomas Jefferson's statements regarding Indians in his 1784
Notes on Virginia are cited for the contrary view, that until the mid-
nineteenth century, Americans believed that Indians were their
racial equals.359 Closer examination shows instead that Jefferson's
statements were part of a response to attacks on Americans. Two
355. ARK. ST. GAZETTE, May 21, 1845, at 2.
356. 16 EARLY AMEmicAN INDiAN DOCUMENTS: TREATiES AND LAwS, 1607-1789, at 297
(Alden T. Vaughan ed., 1998) [hereinafter EARLYAMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS] (1740 South
Carolina law declaring Negroes, Mulattoes, and Indians "absolute slaves" and their children
also to be slaves); id. at 120 (1696 South Carolina law declaring Negroes, Mulattoes, and
Indians to be slaves); id. at 381 (1755 Georgia law declaring blacks, Indians, Mulattoes, and
Mestizos and "all their [i]ssue" to forever remain "absolute [silaves"); id. at 16 (1716 North
Carolina law regulating black, Mulatto and Indian slaves).
357. See id. at 13 (1716 North Carolina law declaring that no blacks, Mulattoes, Mustees,
or Indians could vote); id. at 17 (1716 North Carolina law prohibiting intermarriage between
whites and blacks or Indians); id. at 45 (1746 North Carolina law prohibiting blacks,
Mulattoes, and Indians from testifying except against each other); id. at 202 (1717 South
Carolina law providing that only Christian white men "and no other" were eligible to vote).
358. Id. at 297 (1740 South Carolina law exempting "free Indians in amity with this
government" from absolute slavery); id. at 381 (1755 Georgia law exempting "free Indians in
amity with this government" from absolute slavery).
359. MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 324, at xv.
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French scholars had recently published claims that the small size
and inferior quality of American-grown animals, plants, and human
beings were evidence that the American environment was detrimen-
tal to life, and that, as a result, the American people and their new
nation would never amount to much.36 ° Jefferson's statements
regarding Indians are part of his effort to refute this argument, just
as the skeletons of mastodons showed that the American continent
had produced the biggest animals, so America's Indians were the
equal to any human beings, right down to their ability to grow just
as much hair on their bodies as Europeans.36' Jefferson's comments
in this context, while certainly evidence that representations of
Indian race could be manipulated according to American needs, are
hardly conclusive evidence of a widespread belief in racial
equality. 62
Second, the belief in permanent Indian racial difference was not
the dominant view of the new scientists of the Indian. Rather,
Schoolcraft's census, the reports of most Indian commissioners and
agents, and the statements of other federal officials, all emphasized
Indian potential to achieve full equality with whites.363 Indeed,
360. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON VIRGINIA (1784), reprinted in THE LIFE AND SELECTED
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 205-06, 213 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds., 1944).
361. Id. at 212. In the modern age, in which much technology and time is devoted to the
ideal of female hairlessness, Jefferson's insistence that Indian women were hirsute and
therefore equal is particularly funny:
It has been said that Indians have less hair than the whites, except on the head.
But this is a fact of which fair proof can scarcely be had. With them it is
disgraceful to be hairy on the body. They say it likens them to hogs. They
therefore pluck the hair as fast as it appears. But the traders who marry their
women, and prevail on them to discontinue this practice, say, that nature is the
same with them as with the whites.
Id.
362. Indeed, immediately after praising America's Indians, Jefferson ensured that his
statements could not be taken as a testament to racial equality:
I do not mean to deny that there are varieties in the race of man, distinguished
by their powers both of body and mind. I believe there are, as I see to be the case
in the races of other animals. I only mean to suggest a doubt, whether the bulk
and faculties of animals depend on the side of the Atlantic on which their food
happens to grow....
Id. at 213.
363. See, e.g., ALBERT G. ELLIS, DOCUMENT ACCOMPANYING THE REPORT OF THE
COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, S. Doc. No. 29-1, at 497 (1845) (noting in a report by a
subagent for a Green Bay subagency that full-blood children had made good progress in the
schools and that the Menomonies "can be civilized"); WILLIAM WILKINS, REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY OF WAR, H.R. EXEC. Doc. No. 28-2, at 125 (1844):
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Schoolcraft, the most prominent contemporary scientist of Indian
race, was married to an Indian woman, whom he lauded for her
beauty and intelligence.3
The U.S. Supreme Court also did not espouse the view that
individual Indians were innately inferior. Two years before the
Rogers decision, the Court decided a case strongly affirming Indian
individual rights. In Rowland v. Ladiga,3" the Alabama Supreme
Court held that a Choctaw grandmother, who had not been officially
granted a federal right to her cabin or her fields, had no claim
In the course of the progress under our moral enterprise for their civilization,
they must eventually attain the sagacity to look out for individual and social
rights, and that degree of general intelligence to entitle them to the full
extension of all the privileges of American citizens. When that time shall arrive,
there will be no obstacle to political association by reason of any natural or
acquired repugnance to the blood of the original American.
Id.; T. HARTLEY CRAwFORD, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, H. EXEC. Doc.
No. 28-2, at 309 (1844):
The condition of the Indian race, as connected with the United States, is, in the
general, one of improvement, and slow but sure approaches to civilization, very
distinctly marked in my judgment. It is proved, I think, conclusively, that it is
in no respect inferior to our own race, except in being less fortunately
circumstanced. As great an aptitude for learning the letters, the pursuits, and
arts of civilized life, is evident; if their progress is slow, so has it been with us,
and with masses of men in all nations and ages.
Id.; 2 SCHOOLCRAFT, supra note 354, at 523 ("The Indians, when young, are gay, sprightly, and
acute, and are perfectly capable of being instructed, and consequently improved."); 3
SCHOOLCRAFT, supra note 354, at vii (stating that while the large territory of the Indians had
led them to barbarism, examination of Indian crania showed no impediment to progress in the
arts and sciences). In 1975, historian Reginald Horsman argued that this emphasis on Indian
potential in the 1840s was a last gasp before the discourse of scientific racism took hold in the
late 1840s and 1850s. Horsman, supra note 353, at 153, 168. The above quotations show that
the idea of Indian potential continued to animate policymakers into the 1850s. None of this
obscures the offensiveness of these sentiments, or the devastating policies they justified.
Throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century, this idea would serve to justify
increasingly repressive policies toward the Indians.
364. Schoolcraft, in his reports to Congress, cited this relationship as peculiarly qualifying
him for his task:
The peculiarly intimate relations the author has held to them (having married
a highly educated lady, whose grandfather was a distinguished aboriginal chief-
regnant, or king), has had the effect of breaking down towards himself,
individually, the eternal distrust and suspicion of the Indian mind, and to open
the most secret arcana of his hopes and fears, as imposed by his religious
dogmas, and as revealed by the deeply hidden causes of his extraordinary acts
and wonderful character.
1 SCHOOLCRAFr, supra note 354, at viii.
365. Rowland v. Ladiga, 9 Port. 488 (Ala. 1839), rev'd, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 581 (1844).
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against a white man who moved onto the lands. Without a grant
from the federal government, the state court declared, "the Indians
are remediless in courts of law." 6 The U.S. Supreme Court
disagreed, strongly affirming both the individual rights of the
claimant, and the power of the courts to protect these rights against
governmental intrusion. 67 In addition, as discussed above, ten years
after Rogers, Chief Justice Taney emphasized in Dred Scott v.
Sandford that for Indians, unlike blacks, race did not constitute an
immutable political status.3
There is even some evidence that this idea of Indian racial
equality was in part the product of the 1830s and 1840s, an
alternative discourse supplementing that of scientific racism. An
1838 South Carolina Supreme Court case, for example, held that all
free Indians, not only those who could prove their connection with
a particular tribe, could take advantage of the rights of "free Indians
in amity with the government" and testify in court.3 69 This holding
was not consistent with the 1740 law that the case construed. The
law provided that
all negroes and Indians, (free Indians in amity with this
government, and negroes, mulattoes and mustizoes, who are
now free, excepted) mulattoes or mustizoes who now are, or shall
hereafter be, in this Province, and all their issue and offspring,
born or to be born, shall be, and they are hereby declared to be,
and remain forever hereafter, absolute slaves, and shall follow
the condition of the mother.
7 0
The statute then drew a further distinction between "free Indians"
who had the burden of proving that they should not be enslaved,
and "Indians in amity with this government," for whom the burden
was reversed. In contrast with the court's holding, therefore,
under the statute not all free people who were racially Indian could
assert the privileges of "Indians in amity with this government."372
366. Id. at 492.
367. Ladiga v. Roland, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 581, 591-92 (1844).
368. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,403-04 (1856).
369. Miller v. Dawson, 23 S.C.L. (1 Dud.) 174, 175 (1838).
370. 16 EALY AMERICAN INDIAN DocuMENTs, supra note 356, at 297.
371. Id. at 298.
372. Id.
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It might seem surprising that the idea of Indian racial equality
should develop at the same time as scientific racism was being used
to defend America's peculiar institution. This apparent contrast,
however, was not benign. Removing racial disabilities from Indians
seems to have been in service of the southern argument that slavery
was reserved for the race that was particularly suited for it. In 1848,
the South Carolina Supreme Court reaffirmed its earlier decision
with explicit consideration of the slavery debate, asking:
[MIight not certain other States ask, is she so deep in the cause
of slavery, as to reverse her own decisions, in order to re-assume
that the Red race, like the African black, comes within the curse
of Noah upon Ham and his offspring? Would not such a reversal
of past adjudications be a libel upon our international spirit? For
such reasons I am for adhering to the decision in the case of
Charlotte Miller v. Dawson and Brown [sic], that spares the race
of Shem 73
While by the late 1830s officials would affirm the equality of
individual Indians, only a few years earlier they had been equally
likely to explain any signs of equality as the result of Caucasian
blood. In 1829, Secretary of War John Eaton urged policymakers to
look to the red men as they are, and not as oftentimes they are
represented to be; to their inaptitude to live under a well
regulated system of law, and to the danger and hazard of the
experiment. A few of them are well informed men, and capable
of enjoying refined society. These are the mixed Indian-the
half-breed, as they are usually termed.374
In 1834, Joel Roberts Poinsett, a South Carolina politician who later
served as Secretary of War, suggested that hunting tribes could be
civilized only through racial inbreeding.35
373. State v. Belmont, 35 S.C.L. (4 Strob.) 445, 452-53 (1848).
374. JOHN H. EATON, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR, H.R. ExEc. Doc. No. 21-2, at 34
(1831).
375. J. R. POINSETT, AN INQUIRY INTO THE RECEIVED OPINIONS OF PHILOSOPHERS AND
HISTORIANS, ON THE NATURAL PROGRESS OF THE HUMAN RACE FROM BARBARISM TO
CIVILIZATION 10 (Charleston, S.C., J.S. Burges 1834).
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The belief in Indian equal potential, of course, was at least as
powerful an argument for control of Indian people as a belief in
innate inferiority. The belief in potential combined with the idea
that although Indians, when presented with the opportunity, were
just as intelligent, moral, and capable as Caucasians, they also
inherited a fierce resistance to the advancement that was in their
best interest. After praising the inherent capacity of the Indian, for
example, Schoolcraft insisted that, "[a]s a race, there never was one
more impracticable; more bent on a nameless principle of tribality;
more averse to combinations for their general good; more deaf to the
voice of instruction; more determined to pursue all the elements of
their own destruction."376 It was not the Indian as an individual, but
the tribal group that was hopelessly mired in race. Loyalty to the
tribe became not patriotism to one's government, but adherence to
a "nameless principle of tribality,"377-the call of race, not the call of
civilization. The white idea of individual Indian equality, therefore,
became a powerful justification for stamping out the Indian tribe.
2. The Dangerous Half-Breed
United States v. Rogers3 78 is consistent with this idea of the
racially equal Indian. In the Rogers opinion, the inferior people are
not the Indians by blood, but the white men that settled among
them, whom Taney characterizes as "the most mischievous and
dangerous inhabitants of the Indian country."379 Only a small
minority of members of Indian tribes were either racially non-
Indian or of mixed blood. Although the Cherokee Nation, for
example, was assumed to be one of the most intermixed tribes, only
1.3% of Cherokee citizens were white and only about 10% were of
mixed blood.380 Despite their insignificant numbers, such racial line
crossers loomed large in the minds of policymakers. Their role
further illuminates the complex role of race in Indian policy.
376. 1 SCHOOLCRAFr, supra note 354, at 15.
377. Id.
378. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846).
379. Id. at 573.
380. Census Roll, 1835, of the Cherokee Indians East of the Mississippi, and Index, Nat'l
Archives, Washington, D.C., T496, at 66 (enumeratinga total of 16,542 Cherokees with 12,468
full bloods; 1454 half-breeds; 1492 quadroons; 201 intermarried whites; and 74 mixed
Negroes).
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"Half-breeds" and intermarried whites or blacks were often the
scapegoats for any failure of the Indians to conform to white
expectations, and particularly for dissension among the Indians. If
the Indians failed to civilize properly, resented a policy initiative of
the federal government, or resisted efforts to enter into treaties, the
blame was laid on some mixed-blood Indian, or dissolute whites or
blacks among the Indians. l8' For example, when the Creeks refused
to cede their land to the new federal government, it was because
they were "much under the influence and direction" of the mixed
blood Alexander McGillivray." 2 When the Seminoles fought in
Florida rather than voluntarily moving west, it was the fault of the
African Americans "whose influence was so great among the
Indians" and who composed the "most insidious, dangerous, and
ferocious part of the enemy."ss When the Winnebagoes refused to
sign a removal treaty, it was blamed on the influence of whites and
half-breeds amongst them."8 4
Popular assumptions and fears about Indian women played into
this perception. From the earliest contact with American Indians,
Europeans and American observers portrayed them as sexually
381. See, e.g., JONATHAN PHILLIPS, DocUMENT ACCOMPANYING THE REPORT OF THE
COMMISSIONEROF INDIAN AFFAIRS, H.R. ExEC. Doc. No. 28-2, at 445 (1844) (stating the report
of Subagent to Wyandots that "[tlhe half-breeds control the tribe. A majority of them are
stubborn and vindictive, subtle, lazy, and deceptive.... One of the Wyandot Tribe (a half-breed)
has ... been called upon by the chiefs to write a very daring and threatening article against
the government"); id. at 458 (stating the report of Acting Superintendent of Western Territory
that tribes should not be allowed to shut out all but Indian traders because Indian traders
were seven-eighths or three-fourths white, and would raise prices to the disadvantage of full
bloods); CONG. GLOBE, 25th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 374 (1838) (noting that the leader of the
Seminoles "Oseola was not a noble savage battling for rights, but a miserable half breed, a
traitor, and violator of every thing held sacred among all races of men, whether civilized or
savage. His heart was warmed in equal proportions by the blood of the white man and the
red").
382. HENRY KNOx, RELATING TO THE SOUTHERN INDIANS, S. Doc. No. 1-2, at 15 (1789).
383. CONG. GLOBE, 25th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 356 (1838).
384. HENRY DODGE, DOCUMENT ACCOMPANYING THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF
INDIAN AFFAIRS, S. Doc. No. 29-1, at 461 (1845). The Document sets forth the report of Henry
Dodge:
The Winnebagoes are ... a most degraded race of Indians; their intercourse with
the whites has made them reckless and profligate in their habits, and
apparently abandoned in their principles... the traders and the half-breeds have
heretofore and still exercise an undue influence over the Indians, in making
treaties with the United States.
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desirable but lascivious, and their marriages as without obligation
or propriety."8 5 White men who married women according to Indian
custom, therefore, were engaging in savagery and immorality
detrimental to federal policies of civilizing the American Indians.'
The Indian women that married them, like the wives of Rogers and
Nicholson, were invisible, except as generic representatives of their
race and sex, sources of trouble when they encouraged association
of whites and Indians without acceptance of American culture, but
vectors for assimilation when they did.
Such reactions against racial boundary crossers plainly colored
arguments regarding the Cherokees. In 1827, after the United
States sent John Cocke to the Cherokee territory to try to persuade
the Cherokees to move west, he reported back that "two-thirds of
[the Cherokees were] willing to cede their whole country and remove
to the west of the Mississippi," but the mixed-blood elite had
intimidated the "real Indians."3 s7 This report was in direct contrast
with reality; the full bloods and traditionalists were, if anything,
more determined to remain in their ancestral lands than many of
the more acculturated Cherokees.3" In the debates of the next
decade, however, American advocates of removal found a powerful
argument in their claim that they were "acting in the interests of
the full bloods against the monopoly of power held by the mixed
bloods.""8 9
Such arguments persisted after removal. The executive branch
used the fact that Ross was only one-eighth Cherokee by blood
while his opponents were full bloods to argue for intervention to
protect the real Cherokees against the Cherokee government. The
influence of white northern missionaries was decried as the reason
that the majority of Cherokees failed to embrace slavery. Lastly, the
influence of scheming, lawbreaking whites and mixed bloods was
385. See Berger, supra note 121, at 25, 34, 38-40.
386. Id. at 29-30.
387. McLouGHLIN, supra note 324, at 402 (quoting John Cocke's Report on Cherokee
Negotiations, Aug. 15-Oct. 11, 1827, M-234, reel 72, 0267-98); see also CONG. GLOBE, 25th
Cong., 2d Sess. 484 (1838) (alleging that opponents to Cherokee removal "claim to be Indians"
but "may be considered, from their complexion, white men, not Indians").
388. MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 324, at 402.
389. Id.
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the most powerful justification for the extension of federal law
enforcement over Indian lands.3"
3. Racing the Indian Tribe
Why did those who crossed racial boundaries like Rogers pose
such a powerful spectre to white policymakers? This was a time
when the belief in the equal potential of Indian individuals provided
a powerful engine to federal policy. Separation between the races
was not advocated: Indians were encouraged to assimilate into
white society. The primary objection rested not on beliefs about the
racial characteristics of Indian and white individuals, but about
what racial line crossers meant for shifting understandings of the
tribe, and beliefs about the basis of American identity.
Federal Indian law and policy were based on the assumption that
"Indian" was a discrete category, separate and distinct from the
white community, with fixed boundaries permitting easy definition
and control. To be an American, in contrast, meant to be part of a
community bounded by universal ideals and aspirations. If tribes
also had the ability to choose their members in ways not controlled
by the federal government, they became uncomfortably like
sovereign nations. In addition, if those the federal government
treated as Indian could not be limited by race, it would undermine
another fundamental assumption of federal Indian policy: the
federal government knew who Indians were and what they needed.
Political theorists sometimes have overlooked the significance of
the ability to determine the bounds of one's community. As Michael
Walzer has pointed out, however, "[tihe primary good that we
distribute to one another is membership in some human commu-
390. This is a persistent belief. As recently as 1957, a biographer of Isaac Parker wrote the
following
Their savagery flaunted itself. It seemed that every white man, Negro, and half-
breed who entered the country was a criminal in the state from which he had
come; that the last thing on his mind at night was thievery and murder, and it
was his first thought in the morning. No American frontier ever saw leagues of
robbers so desperate, any hands so red with blood. By 1875 this civilization was
in the balance. Decent men, red and white alike, cried to the government for
protection.
SHIRLEY, supra note 113, at ix.
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nity."391' This choice structures "all our other distributive choices: it
determines with whom we make those choices, from whom we
require obedience and collect taxes, to whom we allocate goods and
services."392 Political theories that assume a polis, or an established
group and a fixed population, thus "miss the first and most impor-
tant distributive question: How is that group constituted?"
393
Walzer addressed when communities may exclude others from
membership. 394 Exclusion raises significant questions of justice.
During the 1840s, these questions were coming to the fore with the
exclusion of African Americans from full membership in the
American community and efforts to stem the tide of immigrants
to America's shores. The power of inclusion, however, is equally
important for the idea of the modern nation. A nation is constituted
not by the individuals that happen to be present when national
boundaries are established, but by the imagined characteristics that
provide the bonds between its members.3 95 The ability to include
geographic outsiders perceived to share those characteristics thus
affirms that these bonds are indeed defining national ties.
Others argue that ideas of ethnic affinity form a distinctive bond
between members of a nation.39 It is certainly true that race
played a significant role in America's immigration and natural-
ization decisions.397 Even after the Fourteenth Amendment
mandated citizenship for all those born in the United States,
American law explicitly restricted naturalization to "free white
persons" and persons of "African descent" until 1952.9' Despite the
Fourteenth Amendment, birthright citizenship also was denied to
391. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 31
(1983).
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 35-41, 61-63.
395. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND
SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 6-7 (2d ed. 1991) (defining the nation-state as an imagined
community, defined by its members' understanding of the geographic, cultural, and political
bonds between themselves and multiple unknown others).
396. See, e.g., ANTHONY D. SMITH, NATIONALISM AND MODERNISM 45-46 (1998).
397. See, e.g., IAN F. HANEY LPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 49-
53 (1996) (examining cases in which American courts sought to define who was white for
purposes of federal naturalization). Race played an especially significant role in America's
immigration and naturalization decisions from 1880-1965. See, e.g., id. at 37-47.
398. Id. at 42-44.
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most American Indians39 until 1924 when Congress changed the
status quo. °°
It is equally true, however, that the modern nation-state was
built around an ideal of universality. 1 Its theoretical traditions
were those of theorists like Locke and Rousseau, based on the
precept that philosophy could uncover the universal rules around
which all human societies should be built. The French Revolution,
for example, was perceived as great not because it embodied
particularistic, ethnically defined goals, but because it embodied
ideals that should govern all men. 2 Today, particularly with the
collapse of the Soviet Union, we see the struggle for recognition of
numerous ethnically defined national movements. These emerging
governments, however, are perceived as a necessary evil for lesser
nations than the inclusive America that appears in contemporary
political rhetoric.03
The American concept of Manifest Destiny which emerged during
the Rogers period, although part of an explicitly racist rhetoric, was
no less tied to the ideal of universality. John O'Sullivan coined the
term Manifest Destiny in an 1839 article in the United States
Magazine and Democratic Review, the mouthpiece of the Democratic
Party.4'0 The Democratic Party was the strongest opponent of the
abolition of slavery and the extension of citizenship to free blacks.
399. See Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 109 (1884) (holding that an Indian who had chosen
to leave the reservation and had fully assimilated with non-Indian society was not a citizen
of the United States and was not entitled to vote in state elections).
400. Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 237, 43 Stat. 253 (1924) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2000))
(making all Indians born in the United States citizens). This denial was based not on
explicitly racial grounds, but on the argument that Indians on reservations were not "subject
to the jurisdiction" of the United States, and therefore not within the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Elk, 112 U.S. at 102. This argument finds some support in the history of the
Amendment, see David C. Williams, The Borders of the Equal Protection Clause: Indians as
Peoples, 38 UCLA L. REV. 759, 832-40 (1991), and may accord better with some Indian tribes'
perception of their sovereignty and independence. See Ex parte Green, 123 F.2d 862, 863-64
(2d Cir. 1941) (rejecting a challenge by a member of an Iroquois Tribe to the government's
extension of citizenship as inconsistent with tribal sovereignty).
401. See PETR FITZPATRICK, 'We know what it is when you do not ask us': Nationalism as
Racism, in NATIONALISM, RACISM AND THE RULE OF LAW, 3, 8-9 (Peter Fitzpatrick ed., 1995).
402. See id. at 8.
403. See, for example, the current government's representation of the United States as the
country of freedom and tolerance of all ethnicities and religions, and the resistance to the
creation of a separate Kurdish polity in the reconstruction of Iraq.
404. John O'Sullivan, The Great Nation of Futurity, 5 U.S. MAG. & DEMOCRATIC REV. 426,
427 (1839).
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The article used the idea of Manifest Destiny to justify a disregard
of the political rights of Mexicans and Indian tribes. Despite this,
O'Sullivan's article explicitly rejected a particularistic, ethnic basis
for the greatness of the United States. Rather, the American people
had "derived their origin from many other nations."0 5 For
O'Sullivan, "American patriotism is not of soil; we are not abori-
gines, nor of ancestry, for we are of all nations." °6 How then could
the Democrats argue that this "nation of many nations" was divinely
chosen to conquer the world?' Not because of its particularity, but
its inclusiveness and universality-"because the principle upon
which a nation is organized fixes its destiny, and that of equality is
perfect, is universal."' °
The application of the outsider for membership and the accep-
tance of such outsiders as members are necessary confirmations of
the universal appeal of the nation.' The liberal theory of govern-
mental power is built on an idea of consent to the social contract."0
This consent is not actual but mythic for the average American who
is born into the nation, thus undermining national claims of choice
and self-governance. The foreigner who chooses to join the American
democracy, however, makes this consent concrete,
address[ing] the need of a disaffected citizenry to experience its
regime as choiceworthy, to see it through the eyes of still-
enchanted newcomers whose choice to come here ... [reenacts
democracy's] fictive foundation in individual acts of uncoerced
consent. Simultaneously, the immigrant's decision to come here
is seen as living proof of the would-be universality of America's
liberal democratic principles.4 '
Using the foreigner to reinforce American myths of democracy
and universality was very much part of the national discourse of the
405. Id. at 426.
406. Id. at 429.
407. Id. at 427.
408. Id. at 426.
409. See BONNIE HONIG, DEMOCRAcY AND THE FOREIGNER 72-79 (2001).
410. The Declaration of Independence makes this idea explicit, stating that governments
are "instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPDENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
411. HONIG, supra note 409, at 75.
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1840s. When Rogers was decided, the country was engaged in a
national debate over the definition of the American. Immigrants
were coming to America in unprecedented numbers,412 prompting
the birth of the Native American party, which argued that immigra-
tion and naturalization must be controlled.413 The party argued
for the need to ensure that America's universalist principles of
democracy and equality would not be undermined by the influx of
foreigners steeped in the antidemocratic prejudices of a Europe
still dominated by monarchies and intolerant religious creeds.414
Party opponents, in turn, referred explicitly to the proof of the
superiority of American democracy that immigration provided,
claiming that the immigrants "had abandoned their homes, and all
that was dear to them, because of their superior love to freedom."415
These universal principles caused "the eyes of the downtrodden
nations of Europe ... [to be] fixed with [an] admiring gaze" on the
United States. 416 During the American Revolution, these politicians
claimed, French soldiers who fought for the British changed sides
and "threw themselves into the ranks of those who declared to
the world that man is capable of self-government." 4" The choice of
outsiders to come to America thus affirmed America's myths of
universality and democracy.
What could it mean, then, that American citizens chose to
expatriate themselves from this icon and affiliate with another
group? The only permissible answer was the one reached in Rogers:
such men were outlaws, dangerous and mischievous characters.41
412. ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTINGVISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY
202 (1997).
413. CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. 67, 74, 77 (1845).
414. Id. at 74, 77.
415. Id. at 80 (statement of Rep. Bowlin). It is important to remember that this fervent
advocacy of freedom and democracy lived side by side with equally fervent denial of freedom
to those deemed not deserving of it. The Native American party was founded in Pennsylvania
after they had learned that "a foreign demagogue" was urging Irish emigrants to vote for the
destruction of an institution "[covered by the compromises of the Constitution." That
institution was slavery. Id. at 81 (statement of Mr. Faran). An opponent of the party
passionately replied that the Irish emigrants "knew that the destruction of that institution
involved the destruction of the Union." Id. He claimed that in his district "he was yet to see
the first Irish abolitionist." Id. At this declaration, "several voices here exclaimed 'Good! Id.
416. Id. at 72 (statement of Rep. Giles).
417. Id. at 78 (statement of Rep. Chase).
418. See United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572-73 (1846).
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Native Indians could be forgiven for their ignorance in clinging to
their inferior governments, but not so those born into American
civilization. Their choices could not possibly be motivated by the
desire to affiliate with another government, but only by the inten-
tion to take advantage of weakness and escape from justice. They
were the worst of all men and must be controlled.
While the choice of non-Indians to join a tribe threatened the
American self-concept, so did the ability of tribes to accept such
outsiders. Where a nation claims that its "distinguishing characteris-
tic""19 is one of universality, it can only justify its distinctness from
and corresponding oppression of other governments by characteriz-
ing them as particular and bounded.420 In this manner the United
States defined itself through its opposition to the non-universality
of other political groups. Race becomes the "originating exclusion"
not only of individuals but also of other groups claiming
sovereignty.421 A group whose boundaries were defined by race and
limited by history could not claim political equality with a nation
that was universal, a "nation of futurity."422 The discourse of
universality was therefore part of, not opposed to, the discourse of
exclusion.2 23
Regardless of whether the new scientists of the Indian race
believed that Indians were innately inferior to Caucasians, the fact
that they could be isolated and defined as a distinct object of study
encouraged paternalistic control. Unlike a "nation of futurity,"
419. O'Sullivan, supra note 404, at 429.
420. "As universal, the nation can have no positive limits and would, without more, lack
identity .... [Ildentity and its limits are generated from within, as it were, by constituting the
nation as universal in opposition to what is exceptional to its universality." FrrZPATRICK,
supra note 401, at 10.
421. Id. at 17.
422. O'Sullivan, supra note 404, at 426 (emphasis omitted). Peter Fitzpatrick also argues
that to give identity to the apparently boundless universality of the modern nation,
the protean double comes to the fore, organizing and classifying the world along
a spectrum ranging from the most "advanced" liberal democracies to barely
coherent nations always about to slip into the abyss of ultimate alterity.... At
various points along this formative spectrum are nations still afflicted by
atavistic particularity, by fundamentalisms and ethnic hatreds, and by
unpredictable destructive urges.
FITZPATRICK, supra note 401, at 20.
423. Compare SMITH, supra note 412, at 6 (arguing that there are two distinct threads in
American discourse, one of inclusion and one of racism and exclusion), with HONIG, supra note
409, at 11-12 (challenging Smith's notion of distinct threads of discourse).
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unknowable because it could accept outsiders and engage in a
sovereign process of self-definition, ethnically defined tribes had
fixed boundaries in time. Policymakers could therefore rest assured
that they knew who Indians were and what they needed.
The debate over the Rogers case explicitly involved what the
ability to naturalize outsiders would mean for both American
and tribal identity. For the Arkansas press and the prosecuting
attorney, the most important questions raised by the case did
not concern Indian relations, but rather what it meant to be an
American. According to the Little Rock Gazette, the case posed
questions "involving the natural rights of man, as well as the
political condition of the different Indian tribes."424 The Arkansas
State Gazette described the questions before the Supreme Court as
whether an American citizen can at will ... become the subject of
a country of which he was a not a native. Unless Rogers is
disposed of on some other ground, the Supreme Court will have
to decide some of the most important questions, affecting the
natural rights of man, which have arisen since the achievement
of our revolution.425
In the district court, United States Attorney Samuel Hempstead
challenged the idea that
it had ever been judicially decided ... that a citizen of our
government could expatriate himself, and, conceding this right,
the Cherokee Nation was within the limits of the United States,
and not such a foreign, independent nation, as would admit of
the idea, that a citizen of the American Union, by living among
the tribe, could throw off his allegiance to the government.42
The first two questions posed to the Supreme Court concerned the
ability of American citizens to expatriate themselves from the
United States, while the third was whether tribes could be "held and
recognized ... as a separate and distinct government or nation,
424. Reprinted in CHEROKEE ADVOC., June 5, 1845, at 3.
425. ARK. ST. GAzErrr, Apr. 28, 1845, at 2 (emphasis added).
426. CHEROKEE ADvoc., May 8, 1845, at 3.
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possessing political rights and powers such as authorize them" to
naturalize such citizens.427
The answer to the third question was a resounding "no."428
Naturalization was not consistent with the increasingly inferior
position of tribes within the American political scheme. Rogers'
chosen political affiliation could not overcome his inherited
affiliation and, while tribes might have some indicia of nationhood,
that nationhood had ethnic limits. 41 Whatever privileges of self-
government might be granted to individuals living as a tribe, tribal
boundaries would be fixed by the United States, not the tribe
itself.4 0
This result affirmed that tribes were not national political
entities, but racial ones.43 ' Racial outsiders might choose to join
them and abide by their rules, but this choice was disparaged and
disrespected by federal law. 2 Tribal members were not alien
citizens, free from federal regulation, but individuals subject to the
jurisdiction of the federal government.3 3 Racializing the Indian
tribe, not the Indian individual, accomplished this result.
V. IMPACT OF ROGERS ON INDIAN LAW
Although legal scholars have paid little sustained attention to
United States v. Rogers, the case has had a tremendous impact on
Indian law. The Rogers decision was not the immediate catalyst of
a change in the law, but instead confirmed the coalescing legal
posture of the executive branch. Although Congress and the courts
largely ignored its legal implications for many years, eventually the
executive branch was able to translate its administrative policy
into statutory law. When these laws were challenged in the courts,
Rogers became the core precedent justifying congressional power
over reservations. The decision has raised its head again in the
427. United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 569-70 (1846).
428. See id. at 572-73.
429. See id. at 573.
430. See id.
431. See id.
432. See id.
433. See id.
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modern era by justifying judicial diminishment of tribal power
under the common law doctrine of implicit divestiture.
A. Rogers and the Origins of Federal Plenary Power
One of the most significant challenges to the idea of tribal
sovereignty is the doctrine that "Congress has plenary authority to
limit, modify or eliminate the powers of local self-government which
the tribes otherwise possess." 4 This power is largely unconstrained
either by treaties or the U.S. Constitution. Through most of the
history of Indian policy, moreover, the political question doctrine
has been invoked successfully to shield congressional power from
judicial review. Although the origin of the plenary power doctrine
has been traced to the Supreme Court decisions of the 1880s
through the 1920s, 43" analysis of these decisions shows that the
Rogers case and its reasoning were important to the development of
the doctrine.436
For almost one hundred years, the principle that the United
States could only diminish tribal rights with tribal consent in
the form of treaties provided powerful protection for tribal sover-
eignty.43 v In 1870, however, the Supreme Court relied on Rogers to
undermine this rule. In The Cherokee Tobacco, the Court considered
whether an 1868 law providing a federal tax on tobacco applied to
tobacco grown by Cherokees on their land.3 8 The 1866 treaty with
the Cherokees provided that Cherokees and others residing in the
territory could sell farm products grown in the territory without
paying such taxes.43 9 The federal law, enacted only two years after
the treaty, did not refer to Indian country but simply to articles
produced "anywhere within the exterior boundaries of the United
434. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978).
435. See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes,
34 ARIz. ST. L.J. 113, 171 (2002).
436. See Newton, supra note 16, at 209-11 (tracing the origins of formulation of plenary
power doctrine to Rogers).
437. Even in United States v. Rogers, the Court reluctantly agreed that the Cherokee treaty
might have some impact on the construction of the Intercourse Act, but through a somewhat
dubious interpretation of the treaty, held that there was no conflict between the two. Rogers,
45 U.S. at 573.
438. The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 617-18 (1870).
439. Id. at 618.
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States."4" The Court nevertheless relied on Rogers to hold that
tribes were subject to the authority of the United States, and
Congress could therefore extend its laws over the Indian territory
at will.44' According to the Court, these principles were "so well
settled in our jurisprudence that it would be a waste of time to
discuss them or refer to further authorities in their support."" 2 That
established, the Court had little trouble concluding that Indian
treaties provided no bar to congressional legislation.443 In the same
year, Congress resolved to deal with tribes in the future through
congressional legislation rather than treaties.
444
Still, Congress did not unilaterally break treaties with Indian
tribes, and continued to seek tribal consent to abandon these treat-
ies for many years. In 1903, however, the Court relied on The
Cherokee Tobacco and its progeny to affirm the exercise of congres-
sional power over Indians without regard to treaty obligations in
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock."5 The decision was immediately excoriated
440. Id. It appears, therefore, that the decision to subject Cherokee products to the law had
its origins in the executive branch's tax collectors rather than Congress.
441. Id. at 619. Although the Court used Cherokee cases, Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat) 543 (1823), and Mackey v. Coxe, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100 (1855), as support for the
proposition that Indian territory was part of the United States, only Rogers supported the
Court's interpretation of the range of congressional power there.
442. The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. at 619.
443. Id. at 621. Following Rogers' self-imposed limits on the range of judicial power, the
Court also asserted that the judiciary had no power to check the hand of Congress in violating
its treaties with the Indians: "Treaties with Indian nations within the jurisdiction of the
United States, whatever considerations of humanity and good faith may be involved ... are
beyond the sphere of judicial cognizance.... [T]he act of Congress must prevail as if the treaty
were not an element to be considered." Id. Subsequent law has mitigated this principle by
providing that the Courts will not interpret a statute as abrogating an Indian treaty unless
the statute or its legislative history provides clear evidence of congressional intent to do so.
See, e.g., United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739 (1986).
444. Act of March 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 566 (1871) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2000)).
Although the law was enacted as a rider to an appropriations act before The Cherokee Tobacco
was argued or decided, the temporal correspondence between the two suggests that each
provided support for the other. See WiLKINS, supra note 29, at 54-55.
445. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565-68 (1903).
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as the Dred Scott of Indian law.' Unlike Dred Scott, no Civil War
or constitutional amendment has yet abrogated Lone Wolf." 7
The decision had an even stronger impact in defining the range
of federal power over Indians. For over thirty years, the executive
branch had been advocating unsuccessfully for a provision subject-
ing crimes between Indians to federal jurisdiction.' In 1883 the
executive branch brought a test case prosecuting a member of the
Bril6 Sioux Tribe named Kan-gi-shun-ca, or Crow Dog, for the
alleged murder of Spotted Tail, another Brfil6 Sioux, before the
Supreme Court."9 There is a striking similarity between the
methods of the executive branch in this case and those in Rogers. As
Sidney Harring documented, beginning the day after Spotted Tail's
killing, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) "engaged in a systematic
distortion of the facts of the case" by suggesting that the prosecution
446. A month after the decision, Senator Matthew Quey of Pennsylvania, in a debate as to
how many copies of the decision should be printed for Congress, declared that
It is a very remarkable decision. It is the Dred Scott decision No. 2, except that
in this case the victim is red instead of black. It practically inculcates the
doctrine that the red man has no rights which the white man is bound to
respect, and, that no treaty or contract made with him is binding. Is that not
about it?
WILKINS, supra note 29, at 116.
447. Subsequent decisions, however, have somewhat ameliorated its impact. First, the
Court has established that while Congress may abrogate Indian treaty rights, "it must clearly
express its intent to do so" and the Court will not find such an intent absent "'clear evidence
that Congress actually considered the conflict between its intended action on the one hand
and Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by abrogating the
treaty."' Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 202-03 (1999)
(quoting United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 740 (1986)). Second, the Court has established
that federal acts with respect to Indians are not as immune from judicial review as Rogers,
Cherokee Tobacco, and Lone Wolf suggest. Decisions that are not rationally related to the
federal obligations to the Indians may be reviewed and condemned by the Court. See, e.g.,
United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 424 (1980) (requiring compensation
with interest for federal taking of land that was not consistent with federal obligations toward
the Indians); Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977) ("The power of
Congress over Indian affairs may be of a plenary nature; but it is not absolute.") (quoting
United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, 54 (1946) (plurality opinion)); Morton
v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974) (suggesting Congress may not constitutionally single out
Indians for special treatment which is not rationally tied to the fulfillment of Congress' unique
obligation toward the Indians); see also Newton, supra note 16, at 228-37 (discussing the
decline of absolute plenary power).
448. See S. Doc. No. 29, at 461 (1846) (setting forth an early proposal to extend criminal
jurisdiction); see also HARRING, supra note 215, at 134-36 (discussing efforts since 1874 to
obtain such jurisdiction).
449. Exparte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 557-58 (1883).
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was motivated by a popular outcry for the killer to be brought to
justice.450 The BIA, in fact, was well aware that the dispute had
already been resolved through Brfil6 Sioux laws.' The BIA also
knew that these laws differed sharply from "blood revenge," the
popular misconception of Indian law.4 2 Instead, the families of Crow
Dog and Spotted Tail met as ordered by the tribal council, and
Spotted Tail's family had accepted horses, blankets, and sweet grass
as a symbol of their reconciliation.453 In both Rogers and Crow Dog,
therefore, the executive branch was aware that the matter already
had been resolved, obviating the need for resolution by the federal
courts. In both cases, the executive branch fabricated a tribal
demand for federal interference in the matter. In both, moreover, its
arguments relied on eliding the existence of tribal legal systems
capable of handling such disputes.
While the Supreme Court held in Crow Dog that current federal
law did not authorize the prosecution, it relied on Rogers to suggest
that Congress had the power to create jurisdiction over such
crimes.' In 1885, in response to popular outrage at the apparent
refusal to protect Indians from Indian crimes, Congress enacted the
Major Crimes Act. When the act was challenged in the Supreme
Court, the Court extensively quoted Rogers' assertion that Congress
had the power to prosecute anyone on an Indian reservation, and
that the limits on the exercise of this power were a political question
not subject to judicial review. 5 With these principles established,
the Court arrived at a further, even more startling conclusion:
Congress could regulate internal relations on Indian reservations,
even though such power was not authorized by the Constitution,
simply because "the theatre of its exercise is within the geographical
450. HARRING, supra note 215, at 102-05, 115.
451. Id. at 103.
452. Id. at 105. The focus of BrOld Sioux law was reestablishing harmony in the community
in which the crime had occurred. In the most serious cases, the tribal council ordered the
parties to meet and the accused to offer gifts to the family of the victim. Id. at 104-05. These
gifts were not considered either as an admission of guilt or as compensation for the life of the
victim-indeed, the victim's family would often refuse to take the gifts as a testament to their
pride and wealth. Id. at 105. Rather, it was "an offer of reconciliation and a symbolic
commitment to continuation of tribal social relations." Id.
453. Id. at 104-05.
454. Exparte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 559-60.
455. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 380-81 (1886).
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limits of the United States, because it has never been denied, and
because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes."' Thus, while
the Rogers decision was initially a product of the executive branch
whose influence was confined to executive actions, it soon became
independent support for wide reaching judicial and congressional
action.
B. Rogers and the Doctrine of Implicit Divestiture
The Rogers decision has resurfaced in the modem era to contrib-
ute to one of the most disturbing recent trends in Indian law. Since
the 1970s, Congress has acted with restraint in exercising its
plenary power, passing legislation that is designed in consultation
with tribes and intended to enhance tribal self-determination.5 7
In 1978, however, in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,"' the
Supreme Court assumed judicial power to erode tribal sovereignty
by creating the doctrine of implicit divestiture. According to this
doctrine, tribes lost much power over non-Indians on their land
simply through their incorporation within the United States, despite
the absence of any treaty or statute removing this power.4 59 As with
the development of the plenary power doctrine, Rogers' expansive
vision of federal power over Indians was fundamental to this
holding.
Until recently, the understanding that tribes retained all
attributes of sovereignty not expressly removed by congressional
action or tribal consent tempered the plenary power doctrine. As
articulated by Felix Cohen, who almost fifty years after his death
remains the most influential scholar of Indian law:
LT]hose powers which are lawfully vested in an Indian tribe are
not, in general, delegated powers granted by express acts of
Congress, but rather inherent powers of a limited sovereignty
which has never been extinguished.... The statutes of Congress,
then, must be examined to determine the limitations of tribal
sovereignty rather than to determine its sources or its positive
456. Id. at 384-85.
457. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAw 83 (1987).
458. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
459. Id. at 209.
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content. What is not expressly limited remains within the
domain of tribal sovereignty.46
The only powers removed without express congressional action
were those inconsistent with the sovereign integrity of the United
States: the power to sell land without federal permission and the
power to make treaties with foreign nations. In Oliphant, the
Supreme Court broadened the doctrine to include implicit divesti-
ture of tribal powers whenever they were deemed "inconsistent"
with the interests of the United States. 461 For the Supreme Court,
this meant jurisdiction over non-Indians.
The case concerned the tribal prosecution of two non-Indians for
crimes committed on Suquamish land. Relying on the concept of
retained inherent sovereignty, the Ninth Circuit held that
the power to preserve order on the reservation, when necessary
by punishing those who violate tribal law, is a sine qua non of
the sovereignty that the Suquamish originally possessed.... "(Ilt
must remain an attribute of its government until by the
agreement of the nation itself or by the superior power of the
republic it is taken from it.""62
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, rejected
this formulation of the problem. Despite the decision's extensive
discussion of nonjudicial assumptions about tribal jurisdiction
over non-Indians,"' its precedential underpinnings were extremely
thin.46' The Rogers holding that Indian tribes "hold and occupy [the
reservations] with the assent of the United States, and under their
authority"' therefore was central to the conclusion that "[ulpon
incorporation into the territory of the United States, the Indian
tribes thereby come under the territorial sovereignty of the United
460. FELIx S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (1942).
461. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208 (quoting Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir.
1976)).
462. Oliphant, 544 F.2d at 1009-10 (quoting Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 950 (8th Cir.
1905)).
463. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 196-208 (identifying tribal, congressional, and executive
historical attitudes regarding jurisdiction of Indian legal systems over non-Indians).
464. See id. at 208-12.
465. United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572 (1846).
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States and their exercise of separate power is constrained so as not
to conflict with the interests of this overriding sovereignty." 466 The
Court held that this constraint implicitly divested tribes of the
power to prosecute non-Indians criminally.
4 67
Over the past twenty-five years, the Court has expanded on
Oliphant to whittle away tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers
of the tribe.4' These decisions represent judicial attacks on tribal
sovereignty in the absence of congressional authorization, which one
scholar called the common law of colonialism." 9 While Rogers has
not figured prominently in these subsequent decisions,470 its
holdings that federal power trumped tribal power, and that the
federal government did not intend to extend tribal sovereignty to
those whose tribal affiliation was not a matter of biological inheri-
tance, could well have been the model for these later decisions. In
effect, the decisions make law of Justice Johnson's dismissive
concurrence in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,7 1 which stated that
tribes were not true sovereigns, but, like the Israelites wandering
in the desert, "nothing more than wandering hordes, held together
only by ties of blood and habit," with an extremely circumscribed
right of "personal self-government" and nothing else.47 2
The Rogers decision did not compel any of these legal develop-
ments. All of them, however, rested on the precedent it provided.
This is a long shadow to be cast by a decision that relied on legal
466. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208-09.
467. See id. (interpreting precedent and statutes to allow broad preemption of Indian law).
468. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) (denying tribal jurisdiction over action
by tribal member against state officials for action arising on land held by tribe); Strate v. A-1
Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997) (denying tribal civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over case
between nonmembers arising on state right of way through reservation); Montana v. United
States, 450 U.S. 544, 561 (1981) (denying tribal civil legislative jurisdiction over nonmembers
on land owned in fee by nonmembers outside limited exceptions).
469. See generally Philip Frickey, A Common Law For Our Age Of Colonialism: The
Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE. L.J. 1 (1999)
(discussing the divestiture of tribal sovereignty through reduction of territory and reduction
ofjurisdiction over nonmember matters arising on tribal lands).
470. But see Brief for Petitioners at 17, Hicks, (No. 99-1994) (citing United States v. Rogers
to support the ultimately successful proposition that tribes should not have jurisdiction over
state officials).
471. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 21 (1831) (denying that "a people so low in the grade of organized
society as our Indian tribes most generally are" were states at all).
472. Id. at 27.
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and factual misrepresentations to adjudicate the rights of a dead
man.
CONCLUSION
The Rogers opinion provided the bridge between Justice
Marshall's jurisprudence, with its relatively robust idea of tribal
sovereignty and accordingly limited idea of federal power, and the
current doctrine that tribal sovereignty is subject to "complete
defeasance" by the federal government. 73 The decision has returned
to significance in the Supreme Court's doctrine of implicit divesti-
ture, under which tribes are deemed to have lost jurisdiction over
nonmembers simply by virtue of their incorporation within the
territory of the United States. 74 The two developments are flip sides
of the same coin. In the first, tribal power was diminished by
permitting outside control of its members. In the second, tribal
power was again diminished by removing internal control over all
but members of the tribe.
The weakness of the legal foundation for these developments
should raise questions as to the stability of the edifice built upon it.
The Supreme Court at least once withdrew an opinion after
discovering that, without its knowledge, the controversy in the case
had ended before it reached the Court.47 Although the Court is, to
say the least, unlikely to withdraw an opinion 167 years after
473. Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico, 458 U.S. 832, 857
(1982); see United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 380-81 (1886) (relying on Rogers to uphold
act asserting jurisdiction); Exparte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 559-60 (1883) (relying on Rogers
for proposition that Congress could assert federal jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country);
Newton, supra note 16, at 210-11 (tracing origins of plenary power doctrine to Rogers).
474. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 209 (1978) (relying on the Rogers
vision of federal control in holding that "[ulpon incorporation into the territory of the United
States, the Indian tribes thereby come under the territorial sovereignty of the United States
and their exercise of separate power is constrained so as not to conflict with the interests of
this overriding sovereignty").
475. Gardner v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 131 U.S. App. at ciii-civ (1873). On May
6, 1872, the Supreme Court had affirmed a decree in favor of the company. Id. Subsequent to
this affirmance, however, the Court learned that the costs and fees of both parties had been
paid by the company. Id. Ten months after its original decision (although apparently before
the decision had been read), on March 3, 1873, the Court withdrew its affirmance and
dismissed the appeal. Id.
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issuing it, future courts should think twice before relying on this
shaky legal ground or on the legal principles it has spawned.
The Rogers case also provides a cautionary tale directly relevant
to contemporary Indian law. As in Rogers, judges today continue to
establish radical principles based upon their retelling of a history of
Indian relations that never existed.4 7 They continue to rule based
on their interpretations of congressional policy, when the views of
contemporary Congresses are in stark contrast with the legal
principles they pronounce.477 They continue to write opinions based
not so much on precedent as on their assumptions about Indian
tribes and the inadequacy of their legal systems.4v8 The 1846
476. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 363 (2001) (taking nineteenth century cases
out of context to find the assumption that state courts could serve process on Indians on
reservations for commission of off-reservation crimes); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688-89
(1990) (using history to deny tribal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians although history
relied on in Oliphant lumped all Indians together); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands
of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 462-63 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(criticizing Justice Stevens' reliance on the hypothetical intent of nineteenth century
Congress); Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 196-208 (using a doctored historical record to deny tribal
jurisdiction over non-Indians); Russell L. Barsh & James Y. Henderson, The Betrayal:
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe and the Hunting of the Shark, 63 MINN. L. REV. 609,617-
31 (1979) (criticizing the use of history in Oliphant).
477. Since the 1970s, Congress has pursued a policy of tribal self-determination, and has
generally acted to help tribes govern themselves and their territories. See David H. Getches,
Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of States'Rights, Color-Blind Justice and
Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267,276-77 (2001). During the same period, however,
the Court through its decisions has persistently undermined tribal sovereignty. See id. at 277-
79 (attributing the court's decisions to subjective judgment rather than reasoned
interpretation of the laws). At least once the Court has invalidated a portion of federal
legislation on Indian affairs, Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), and at
least one of the Court's efforts has been reversed by congressional legislation, United States
v. Enas, 255 F.3d 662, 669 (2001) (discussing the history of legislation to reverse Duro v.
Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990)).
478. See, e.g., Hicks, 533 U.S. at 383-84 (Souter, J., concurring) (expressing concern about
subjecting nonmembers to tribal courts); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997)
(denying that "requiring [defendants] to defend this commonplace state highway accident
claim in an unfamiliar court" was necessary for tribal sovereignty); Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S.
399, 421 (1993) (holding that reservation was diminished in part because holding that land
was still part of reservation would'seriously disrupt the justifiable expectations of the people
living in the area"); Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210-11 (holding that tribal jurisdiction over non-
Indians would contravene the federal "great solicitude to protect against intrusions on
personal liberty."). The Court decided against tribal jurisdiction in Strate v. A-1 Contractors,
in the face of a pending case concerning tribal jurisdiction that was the subject of horror
stories about the tribal justice process. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 62, at 554-55. In Nevada
v. Hicks the Court held, without citation to legal precedent except dicta in two nineteenth
century cases, that the state interest in serving process for off-reservation crimes was so
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Supreme Court might be forgiven for these lapses in Rogers, as the
only source of a contrary view was a discharged soldier who had
died a year earlier. Today, when tribes are eager and able to
participate in legal debates concerning their rights, when accurate
information regarding what occurs in tribal courts is only a mouse
click away,479 these lapses are less forgivable.
Taking an even broader perspective, how does the Rogers story
enhance our understanding of the ways race works in politics and
law? Outside the Indian context, America is a country with few
colonies. American race scholars, therefore, began their work with
the experience of African Americans, a group whose members were
forcibly separated from their national identities, and whose
individual equality was persistently denied. The resulting discourse,
however, can only with difficulty be expanded to relationships with
groups acknowledged as politically distinct.480
Because of these origins, proclaiming the equality of the individ-
ual members of such groups often masks the ways that racism or
ethnocentrism colors how we analyze the political rights of the
group. In Rogers and the policies of which it was part, however,
considerable as to prevent any tribal jurisdiction over state officials doing so, even though the
facts in the case suggested that tribal cooperation with the state police in the matter had in
fact led to additional evidence regarding the alleged crimes. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 356, 363-64.
In a case recently before the Supreme Court, Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of
Bishop County, 538 U.S. 701 (2003), the petitioner explicitly sought to revive the image used
so successfully in Rogers that reservations were enclaves for lawbreakers of all stripes. Brief
for Petitioner at 21, 23-24, Inyo County (No. 02-0281).
479. See, e.g., httpJ/www.versuslaw.com (last visited Apr. 7, 2004) (providing searchable
versions of hundreds of tribal court cases); httpJ/thorpe.ou.edu/codes.html (last visited Apr.
7, 2004) (providing links to many tribal codes).
480. This difficulty is particularly poignant in Indian law. Much of federal Indian law
depends on different treatment for groups that are, in large part, defined by the ancestry of
their members. To apply strict scrutiny to such treatment could result in taking away most
of the protection for tribal sovereignty that the federal government has provided. To deny
heightened scrutiny to such treatment, however, leaves tribal groups subject to the
destructive "whim of the sovereign." Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 289
n.21 (1955). For various perspectives on this difficulty, see generally Goldberg, supra note 11
(discussing error in treating descent-based laws regarding Indian people as race-based laws);
Newton, supra note 16, at 286-88 (arguing for heightened scrutiny as protection against
federal plenary power); Williams, supra note 400 (arguing that strict scrutiny should be
applied to classification of Indians as individuals but not to those applying to them as tribal
entities); Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Not "Strictly" Racial:A Response to *Indians as Peoples,"
39 UCLA L. REv. 169, 170 (1991) (arguing that Williams' response would "invite the complete
demolition of federal Indian law as we know it today").
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the government proclaimed the racial equality of Indians while
emphasizing the racial limits on tribal power. The result was not
equal treatment of either Indians or tribes, but instead coerced
assimilation of Indian people and enshrined inferiority of tribal
governments.
This process continues in modern Indian law, as the Court
emphasizes the racially closed nature of Indian tribes in order to
deny tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers and affirm state jurisdic-
tion over non-Indians on tribal land."' These efforts replicate
nineteenth century attempts to deny tribes political rights by
defining them as groups tied together by "blood and habit" rather
than as governmental entities." 2 Paradoxically, although these
limitations on tribal power are sometimes justified as efforts to undo
the "racism" of Indian law,' they only reinscribe it, by denying
tribes the right to make choices as governmental rather than ethnic
entities, and denying the federal government the power to protect
those choices. The story of Rogers should teach us that it is not
federal recognition of tribal power that enshrines race in law, but
instead federal efforts to place racially defined limits around it.
Perhaps a better understanding of the complex ways race works in
this situation and others will help us to ensure that our legal
responses conform to the ideals of equality that we espouse.
481. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688, 693 (1990); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of
the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 161 (1981); Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210-11.
482. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 27 (1831).
483. See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 514 (2000) (invalidating qualifications based on
Native Hawaiian ancestry for voting on trustees for land held in trust for Native Hawaiians);
Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 666 (9th Cir. 1997) (striking down protections for Alaska
Natives in Reindeer Act of 1937 as race-based); Gould, supra note 11, at 771-72; Snowden et
al., supra note 9, at 173-76, 231-38 (criticizing the continuing adherence to foundations of
Indian law based on racism and colonialism); see also Goldberg, supra note 11, at 1375
(discussing and criticizing this trend).
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